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Introduction
The global financial crisis of 2007-08 and its adverse effects on economic activity have
put financial stability back on the agenda of both researchers and policymakers. In im-
mediate response to the crisis, central banks across the world provided liquidity to the
financial sector on an unprecedented scale. In addition, governments of many countries
supported their financial institutions through capital injections and debt guarantee pro-
grams. These emergency measures certainly helped prevent financial stress from doing
further harm to the real economy. However, it is evident that they did not address the
underlying causes of the crisis and might have led to distortions and other unintended
consequences.
Against this backdrop, the regulatory debate has since then revolved around the
question which reforms are needed to effectively reduce the likelihood and costs of fu-
ture systemic financial crises. By now, the debate has led to an update of regulatory
frameworks on the national, European, and global level. Key reforms in this respect
include the use of macroprudential policy instruments, the implementation of new cap-
ital and liquidity requirements for banks under the Basel III accord, and the creation
of a supranational bank supervisory system and of new rules for bank resolution in
Europe.
Designing an appropriate and comprehensive framework of financial regulation is
challenging. Such a framework is supposed to foster prudent bank behavior, to re-
duce bailout expectations, and to minimize systemic risks which might threaten the
stability of the financial system and might have negative repercussions on the over-
all economy. However, it should be designed in a way such that the financial system
can still provide its intermediary functions and efficiently allocate funds to productive
investments in the real economy. In the face of this challenge, key insights from the cri-
sis can provide helpful guidance for the process of regulatory reform (Beck et al., 2016).
The global financial crisis should be seen in the light of the substantial change the
financial system has undergone over the past decades and in particular since the 2000s
(Claessens et al., 2010). One fundamental change in the wake of financial globaliza-
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tion was that banks increasingly made use of short-term maturity funding, for instance
through global interbank markets, and heavily relied on financial innovations such as
securitization of their assets (Brunnermeier, 2009; Keys et al., 2010). Another distinct
feature relates to a high level of interconnectedness among market participants such
as banks, non-bank financial institutions, and sovereigns – both within and across na-
tional borders (Acharya et al., 2014; Allen and Gale, 2000; Bolton and Jeanne, 2011).
Taken together, these factors arguably enhanced diversification and improved risk-
sharing possibilities. However, they also gave rise to the emergence of systemic risks,
for instance, through the external cost that the failure of one individual entity or stress
in one market segment might exert on the entire system. Such risks are particularly
prevalent if the loss-absorbing capacity of financial institutions is low due to insufficient
capital buffers (Acharya et al., 2016; Acharya and Thakor, 2016). In conclusion, ex-
ternalities due to systemic risks, which are likely to arise in interdependent economies
and financial markets, provide a rationale for financial regulation.
Financial globalization appears also to be connected to the build-up of global and
macroeconomic imbalances (Mendoza et al., 2009; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2009). Re-
garding European crisis countries, there is evidence that increasing financial integra-
tion contributed to large and persistent current account deficits (Kang and Shambaugh,
2013; Schmitz and Von Hagen, 2011) and high levels of private or public debt (Lane and
McQuade, 2014). Research points towards imbalances in global lending and borrowing
being a key factor behind the financial crisis (Gourinchas, 2012; Obstfeld, 2012). In
addition, if macroeconomic imbalances reflect weak economic fundamentals, they are
likely to increase the vulnerability to sudden shifts in investors’ risk perception, which
in turn can trigger financial turmoil (Bacchetta et al., 2012; De Grauwe and Ji, 2013).
In sum, this indicates that macroeconomic imbalances should be considered in any
comprehensive assessment of risks to financial stability.
This thesis contributes to the research on the risks to financial stability and to the
debate on the regulation of international financial markets. It builds on some of the
key insights from the recent global financial crisis and the respective policy responses.
In particular, it analyzes the reasons behind the strong co-movements of credit risk in
sovereign bond markets during the financial crisis and the subsequent euro area debt
crisis (Chapter 1). Furthermore, it investigates how uncertainty in banking affects
banks’ loan supply, and it analyzes if the lending behavior is heterogeneous across dif-
ferent types of banks, also differentiating between domestic and foreign-owned banks
(Chapter 2). Turning to the analysis of actual policies, it studies the effect of liquidity
provided by the Eurosystem on macroeconomic adjustment in European crisis countries
(Chapter 3). Finally, it assesses the effectiveness of a macroprudential policy instru-
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ment, caps on banks’ leverage, in stabilizing credit growth during financial downturns
(Chapter 4). The remainder of the introduction will give a more detailed outline of the
contents of the thesis.
In Chapter 1, we study credit risk co-movements in sovereign bond markets during
the global financial crisis and the subsequent euro area sovereign debt crisis.1 The
study starts from the observation that sovereign credit risk exhibits a pattern of high
co-movement across euro area countries. This holds true irrespective of the fact that
there was a considerable divergence in the levels of credit spreads across countries: In
the course of the debt crisis, credit spreads surged in countries such as Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, Spain, and Italy, but they remained at low levels in countries such as France
and Germany. Based on these observations, we empirically explore the factors behind
credit risk co-movements and ask to what extent they might be the outcome of con-
tagion. In addition, we disentangle different channels through which contagion might
occur.
Our empirical analysis is based on a sample of 17 euro area and non-euro area coun-
tries and comprises three steps. First, we apply the dynamic conditional correlation
(DCC) model by Engle (2002) to daily sovereign CDS spreads and compute volatility-
adjusted correlations of sovereign credit risk spreads on a bilateral basis. This allows
us to analyze the pattern of co-movements over time and across country pairs. Second,
we follow Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and label periods as contagious if we observe
a significant increase in the co-movements measure at a given point in time. Third,
we can build on the previous steps to separate interdependence, that is, the factors
that drive co-movements during tranquil times, from the channels of contagion, that
is, from the factors that affect co-movement differently given that the period is conta-
gious. Specifically, we investigate the impact of global factors (implied volatility index
and a measure for liquidity risk), common economic fundamentals (based, for example,
on GDP, public debt, foreign reserves, or banking system size), cross-border linkages in
trade and banking, and a proxy for common market sentiment (weighted stock market
volatility). This allows us to differentiate between wake-up call, fundamentals based,
and non-fundamentals based contagion.
Our empirical results show that sovereign credit risk co-moves considerably, in par-
ticular among euro area countries and during the sovereign debt crisis. Furthermore,
we find evidence of contagion in sovereign debt markets at different points in time
and for different country pairs. Contagion is mainly channeled through similarity in
1 Chapter 1 is based on the published article Buchholz, M. and Tonzer, L. (2016). Sovereign credit
risk co-movements in the eurozone: Simple interdependence or contagion? International Finance,
19(3):246-268 (Buchholz and Tonzer, 2016). The copyright of the original article is with the Inter-
national Finance, John Wiley & Sons.
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fundamentals, cross-country linkages in banking, and common market sentiment. This
implies that all three types of contagion – wake-up call, fundamentals based, and
non-fundamentals based contagion – played a role in transmitting shocks during the
sovereign debt crisis.
In sum, the findings of Chapter 1 suggest that policies targeting weak economic
fundamentals such as a high level of public debt relative to GDP might be effective
in mitigating the adverse effects of fundamentals based contagion. In addition, the
evidence for non-fundamentals based contagion, which might root in sudden shifts in
market sentiment or risk panics, potentially provides a rationale for policy measures
during a crisis that affect investors’ expectations or reduce uncertainty.
In Chapter 2, we analyze how uncertainty affects bank lending to the real econ-
omy. We also investigate how this effect depends on bank-level heterogeneity relating
to capital and liquidity holdings of banks, and their ownership status (domestic versus
foreign-owned).2 The analysis is motivated by the observation that since the outbreak
of the financial crisis, many countries have experienced stagnating or even declining
levels of bank lending. Banks have also withdrawn from international markets on a
large scale. We analyze the role played by increased uncertainty in the banking sector
regarding the decline in bank lending. In the presence of uncertainty, that is, in a
situation when future outcomes become less predictable (Jurado et al., 2015), it might
be beneficial to a bank to postpone the loan decision.
We apply the dispersion measure proposed by Bloom et al. (2012) to banking.
From the perspective of an economic agent such as a bank, weaker predictability due
to higher uncertainty is reflected by a wider distribution of shocks to key bank-level
variables. Therefore, we measure uncertainty in banking as the cross-sectional disper-
sion of shocks to total asset growth, short-term funding, productivity, and profitability.
We then empirically analyze the impact of uncertainty on bank lending. Methodologi-
cally, we closely follow Cornett et al. (2011), who measure the impact of funding shocks
on bank lending and allow for heterogeneous effects along various banking characteris-
tics such as banks’ capital and liquidity holdings.
Our main finding is that higher uncertainty in banking, that is, a higher cross-
sectional dispersion of bank-level shocks, has negative effects on bank lending. The
effect is heterogeneous across banks: lending by banks which are better capitalized and
which have higher liquidity buffers is affected less. Also, the degree of international-
2 Chapter 2 is based on the published article Buch, C. M., Buchholz, M., and Tonzer, L. (2015).
Uncertainty, Bank Lending, and Bank-Level Heterogeneity. IMF Economic Review, 63(4):919-954
(Buch et al., 2015). The copyright of the original article is with the IMF Economic Review, Palgrave
Macmillan.
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ization matters, as loan supply by banks in financially open countries is affected less
by uncertainty. In contrast, the impact of the ownership status of the individual bank
is less important.
In sum, the results of Chapter 2 suggest that uncertainty was an important explana-
tion behind the decline in bank lending during the crisis and that capital and liquidity
buffers tend to stabilize bank lending in the presence of uncertainty. In particular the
latter result might provide useful guidance for regulation.
Chapter 3 turns to the analysis of actual policies. In particular, we investigate how
liquidity provided by the Eurosystem has affected internal adjustment in European
periphery countries after the crisis.3 European periphery countries faced a massive
capital flight during the recent crisis. Because of euro area membership or the commit-
ment to defend the peg to the euro, the necessary adjustment to the crisis had to take
place internally, for instance, through prices or labor costs. However, only members of
the euro area could access liquidity provided by the Eurosystem. This might lead to
different adjustment processes in euro area GIIPS countries than in Eastern European
BELL countries.4
We draw on cross-sector, cross-country panel data to identify the impact of Eu-
rosystem liquidity provision on the internal adjustment following the liquidity shock
that was induced by the sudden stop in private capital flows. Our main hypothesis
is that adjustment pressure due to this liquidity shock is higher in more financially
vulnerable sectors. As a consequence, liquidity provided by the Eurosystem – mitigat-
ing the liquidity shock – could affect the path of internal adjustment differently across
this sectoral dimension. More specifically, we focus on identifying the interaction of
liquidity support by the Eurosystem with a measure of financial vulnerability in panel
regressions explaining internal adjustment. Using sectoral data and focusing on this in-
teraction effect enables us to disentangle the effect of liquidity provision on adjustment
to the liquidity shock from other common omitted variables by including time-varying
country-specific and time-varying sector-specific fixed effects. Hence, concerns about
potential omitted variables constituting conflicting alternative explanations are mini-
mized.
We measure internal adjustment based on the time pattern of sectoral nominal and
real unit labor costs since the sudden stop. In addition, we analyze adjustment in real
and nominal wages, labor productivity, prices, and employment. Liquidity provision
3 Chapter 3 is based on joint work with Claudia M. Buch, Alexander Lipponer, and Esteban Prieto.
4 The countries in our sample comprise the euro area GIIPS countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
Spain) and the Eastern European BELL countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania were not yet members of the euro area at the time when the sudden stop in
capital inflows occurred but had pegged their currency to the euro.
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by the Eurosystem is measured as TARGET2 net liabilities (relative to 2007 GDP).
TARGET2 net liabilities provide a measure of when and to what extent euro area crisis
countries substituted central bank funding for dried-up private capital inflows (Cour-
Thimann, 2013). Our measure of financial vulnerability is based on sectoral pre-crisis
credit growth rates. It varies across sectors but not across countries and is therefore
related to the seminal measure of financial dependence by Rajan and Zingales (1998).
Four key results emerge from our analysis. First, Eurosystem liquidity provision
lowered the adjustment in real unit labor costs and real wages in sectors that are more
financially vulnerable. Second, conditional on financial vulnerability, higher liquidity
provision leads to lower price increases. Third, there is no evidence for differential
adjustment due to liquidity provision in nominal unit labor costs, nominal wages or la-
bor productivity. Finally, more financially vulnerable sectors reduce employment more
strongly, the higher the liquidity provision by the Eurosystem.
Our finding that liquidity provision by the Eurosystem affects adjustment by reduc-
ing price increases in financially vulnerable sectors relates to recent theoretical work
analyzing the effects of liquidity shocks in models featuring financial frictions. Chris-
tiano et al. (2015) show that firms pass on jumps in financing costs to consumers and
increase their prices. We conjecture that the more financially vulnerable the sector, the
stronger this channel should be. Similarly, Gilchrist et al. (2015) develop a menu-cost
model with heterogeneous firms, in which firms with limited access to external liquidity
have an incentive to increase prices in response to adverse financial shocks compared
to firms with better access to liquidity. The result that higher liquidity provision leads
to stronger reduction in employment in financially vulnerable sectors is in line with
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016). According to their study, the lower reduction in real
wages over the adjustment period should lead to a higher reduction in employment
(that is, higher unemployment), which is exactly what we find.
The findings of Chapter 3 suggest that central bank liquidity has an effect on
macroeconomic adjustment after a liquidity shock induced by a sudden stop in capital
flows. More generally, the results point towards a trade-off between mitigating the im-
pact of negative (liquidity) shocks and delaying adjustment. Therefore, they contribute
to our understanding of the macroeconomic consequences of non-standard monetary
policy measures in response to crises.
In Chapter 4, I assess if a macroprudential policy instrument, caps on banks’ lever-
age, stabilizes bank lending during financial downturns.5 The study is motivated by
recent empirical studies suggesting that macroprudential policy is effective in damp-
5 Chapter 4 is based on Buchholz (2015).
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ening the credit cycle and reducing the build-up of systemic risk (Cerutti et al., 2016;
Claessens et al., 2013). This is important because excessive credit booms might lead
to systemic financial crises and thus to large economic costs in terms of output losses
(Jordà et al., 2013; Schularick and Taylor, 2012). However, there is a second dimension
to countercyclical macroprudential policy, which is that it should not only reduce the
probability of a crisis occurring but also stabilize the provision of credit during financial
downturns. Less is known about how macroprudential policy contributes to stabilizing
financial markets and the real economy during such periods. The aim of the study is
to fill this gap.
The chapter focuses on one particular macroprudential policy instrument: caps on
banks’ leverage. This instrument, which is often referred to simply as the leverage ra-
tio, is an example of a measure which might potentially stabilize the lending of banks
during financial downturns. Technically, a cap on the leverage of a bank means that it
has to hold a minimum amount of equity capital relative to its total assets. Through
this, the instrument can increase loss-absorbing capacity and thus make banks more
resilient in the face of adverse shocks.
The empirical analysis is based on a sample of 69 advanced and emerging countries
during 2002-14, of which eight had introduced the leverage cap before the crisis. The
study analyzes the effect of the leverage cap on bank credit to the domestic private
sector. Methodologically, I apply a difference-in-differences approach. This means that
the difference in real credit growth rates in the post-crisis period of 2009-14 and the
pre-crisis period of 2002-08 is compared for those countries that implemented a leverage
cap prior to the crisis and those that did not. Under the assumption that real credit
growth rates would have continued to develop similarly in both groups of countries if
the crisis had not occurred, this differential effect can then be attributed to the imple-
mentation of the leverage cap prior to the crisis.
The main finding of the study is that caps on banks’ leverage indeed have a sta-
bilizing effect on real credit growth during financial downturns. Additional evidence
suggests that the channel through which this stabilizing effect works is that banks build
up higher capital buffers before the crisis and can then draw on them afterwards to
stabilize lending to the private sector.
The implication of the results of Chapter 4 is that any comprehensive cost-benefit
analysis of macroprudential policy should incorporate the potentially stabilizing effect
of the chosen policy instruments during crisis times. This is particularly important be-
cause even if macroprudential policy might not be able to prevent financial crises from
happening at all, it might still be effective in stabilizing the economy in their aftermath.
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In sum, this thesis provides a number of insights on the risks to financial stabil-
ity that can inform the debate on regulatory reform. One general conclusion is that
systemic risks in financial markets provide a rationale for a sustainable regulatory
framework which aims at reducing the likelihood and costs of future financial crises.
Regulation of bank capital and liquidity as well as the use of macroprudential policy
instruments might make a valuable contribution to achieve this goal. At the same time,
the findings of this thesis point towards a major role for short-term policy measures
which help mitigate the immediate and severe impact of a financial crisis.
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Chapter1
Sovereign Credit Risk Co-movements in the
Eurozone: Simple Interdependence or
Contagion?
1.1 Motivation
Diverging sovereign credit risk in Europe has received increasing attention in recent
times. While sovereign spreads surged in countries such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal,
Spain and Italy during 2010-11, they have remained at low levels in countries such
as France and Germany. Despite this divergence, the Eurozone as a whole entered
the recent global financial crisis as a highly interdependent region characterized by a
considerable degree of financial and trade integration fostered by a common currency.
While such interdependencies play an important role in international risk sharing in
normal times, they also facilitate the transmission of distress in sovereign debt markets
across national borders in times of crisis. In this respect, Figure 1.1 presents a primary
indication that sovereign credit risk (as measured by CDS spreads) has shown a com-
mon pattern across core and periphery Eurozone countries for the period of 2008-12.1
Thus, in this study, our interest is not in the reasons for which sovereign credit risk
has diverged but in co-movements of credit risk in integrated markets like the one of
the Eurozone. We ask two research questions: First, do co-movements in sovereign
markets arise due to simple interdependence or contagion? Second, if we find evidence
for contagion, which are the channels through which contagion occurs? Thereby, we
1 This chapter is based on the published article Buchholz, M. and Tonzer, L. (2016). Sovereign credit
risk co-movements in the eurozone: Simple interdependence or contagion? International Finance,
19(3):246-268. The copyright of the original article is with the International Finance, John Wiley
& Sons.
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distinguish between “wake-up call contagion” going back to similarities in economic
fundamentals, fundamentals based contagion arising due to direct links between coun-
tries, and non-fundamentals based contagion, which can be associated with the idea of
sudden changes in market sentiments.
The contribution of our empirical study is threefold. First, we begin by taking
a closer look at the pattern of sovereign credit risk co-movements in a sample of 17
Eurozone and non-Eurozone countries for the period 2008-12. We apply the dynamic
conditional correlation (DCC) model developed by Engle (2002) to daily sovereign CDS
spreads and compute volatility-adjusted correlations of sovereign credit risk spreads on
a bilateral basis. Using these time-varying measures of co-movement, we can analyze
the pattern of sovereign credit risk co-movements over time and across country pairs.
Second, we investigate whether and at what time contagion prevailed in sovereign
debt markets: For each country pair, we check whether at any point in time sovereign
credit risk co-movements increase significantly. To do so, we run sequential time-series
regression of the co-movements on dummies that take a value of one for each period
and check their impact. We follow Forbes and Rigobon (2002) in that we interpret a
significant increase in volatility-adjusted co-movements as contagion. Our specification
is flexible enough such that we do not need to make assumptions about breakpoints
between tranquil and turbulent periods.2
Third, we apply panel regressions to separate interdependence from channels of
contagion. We investigate the impact of global factors, common fundamentals, cross-
border linkages in trade and banking, and a proxy for common market sentiment on
sovereign credit risk co-movements. By including cross-border linkages in banking,
we take the sovereign-bank risk nexus and the related two-way feedback into account
(Acharya et al., 2014; Alter and Beyer, 2014; Alter and Schüler, 2012; König et al.,
2014). We interact selected variables with the contagion indicator to assess whether
they affect co-movements differently conditional on the occurrence of contagion. If this
is the case, these variables constitute channels of contagion. This approach allows the
empirical differentiation between “wake-up call” contagion, fundamentals based, and
non-fundamentals based contagion. The differentiation between fundamentals based
and non-fundamentals based contagion is motivated by, for example, the finding of
Dewachter et al. (2015) that during the height of the sovereign debt crisis both eco-
nomic fundamentals and non-fundamental risks like policy uncertainty influenced Eu-
rozone sovereign bond yield spreads. In contrast to our paper, they analyze sovereign
2 We distinguish “tranquil” from “turbulent” periods rather than “pre-crisis” from “crisis” periods
to account for the fact that our full sample spans a period of crisis. We are thus comparing “bad
times” to “really bad times” (see also Caporin et al., 2013).
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credit risk spreads whereas our focus is on co-movements in sovereign debt markets.
Our empirical findings suggest that despite the divergence in its levels, sovereign
credit risk co-moves considerably. This holds particularly among Eurozone countries
and during the sovereign debt crisis. Furthermore, we find evidence of contagion in
sovereign debt markets at different points in time and for different country pairs. In a
related paper, Claeys and Vas˘íc˘ek (2014) apply multivariate structural break tests in
a FAVAR model to detect spillovers in EU sovereign bond markets. In line with our
results, they find that spillovers increase during the sovereign debt crisis. Finally, con-
tagion is channeled mainly through similarity in fundamentals, cross-country linkages
in banking, and common market sentiment.
Our study relates to three main strands of literature. The first strand is the exten-
sive body of literature on the determinants of sovereign credit risk during the Eurozone
sovereign debt crisis. One of the main findings is that with the onset of the financial cri-
sis, common risk factors, deteriorating debt positions, and high expected fiscal deficits
have become the main drivers of sovereign credit risk spreads (Attinasi et al., 2010;
Aizenman et al., 2013; Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013). We build on the insights of this
literature when analyzing the determinants of sovereign credit-risk co-movements.
The second strand deals with the strengthened interdependence between bank
fragility and sovereign credit risk, which gives rise to a reinforcing negative feedback
loop between banks and sovereigns (Acharya et al., 2014; Alter and Schüler, 2012;
Ejsing and Lemke, 2011). These studies find, for example, that sovereign credit risk
is sensitive to the state of the financial sector (Dieckmann and Plank, 2012). For a
sample of European banks, Mink and De Haan (2013) show that banks’ stock prices
are negatively affected by news about a Greek bailout. This indicates that investors
price in potential future bailout costs and banks’ losses due to sovereign debt holdings.
De Bruyckere et al. (2013) study spillovers among sovereigns and banks and find sig-
nificant evidence for contagion which is defined as excess correlations. Based on these
findings, our analysis incorporates variables related to the banking sector and takes the
sovereign-bank risk nexus into account. However, we do not assess the bank-sovereign
nexus within one country but analyze cross-country correlations in sovereign credit risk
and the underlying determinants.
Third, a number of studies analyze the feedback between bank and sovereign credit
risk across national borders and contagion in sovereign debt markets during the Eu-
rozone sovereign debt crisis. In a theoretical contribution, Bolton and Jeanne (2011)
show that international contagion in sovereign debt markets is facilitated by the expo-
sure of banks to foreign sovereign debt. Forbes (2012) shows empirically that countries
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with leveraged banking systems, greater trade exposure, weak economic fundamentals,
and higher external debt positions are more vulnerable to contagion. Gorea and Radev
(2014) analyze the joint probability of default of sovereigns in the Eurozone and find
that financial linkages are only a transmission channel of contagion among Eurozone
periphery countries. Beirne and Fratzscher (2013) report evidence for “herding con-
tagion” during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. Caporin et al. (2013) use quantile
regressions to analyze contagion in the Eurozone and find only limited evidence for spill-
overs. In contrast to these papers, our focus is on sovereign credit risk co-movements.
Based on these co-movements, we can detect episodes in which sovereign debt markets
were subject to contagion. At the same time, they provide valuable information on
how shocks were transmitted internationally.
The detection of contagion and understanding through which channels it spreads is
by no means only an academic exercise. The reason is that the effectiveness of policy
responses might depend on the underlying contagion channel. If contagion was found to
be associated with non-fundamentals such as shifts in market sentiment or risk panics,
policy measures that affect investors’ expectations or reduce uncertainty might prove
more useful than those that aim at influencing financial cross-border exposures (Forbes,
2012). Interestingly, events in markets during the crisis were understood as evidence
for contagion by policymakers and market participants.3 Rescue measures in Greece,
Ireland, and Portugal were justified by the fear that a default might be contagious and
spill over to other highly indebted Eurozone countries with fragile banking systems,
causing adverse effects for the Eurozone as a whole.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 describes the
sample and the properties of the CDS data used for the analysis. Section 1.3 outlines
the empirical methodology. Section 1.4 presents the empirical results and robustness
analyses. Section 1.5 concludes the chapter.
1.2 Data Description
1.2.1 CDS Data Description
The analysis is based on daily data on five-year sovereign credit default swap (CDS)
spreads as a measure of credit risk in sovereign debt markets. The sample covers 17
countries, of which 11 are Eurozone member countries, and the period spans January
3 E.g., Mario Monti – then prime minister of Italy – stated on July 10, 2012: “It’s difficult to say to
what extent the contagion comes or came from Greece or from Portugal or from Ireland or from the
situation of the Spanish banks. (...) The contagion is that unease hitting through the markets in
terms of bigger uncertainty, lower confidence towards the euro’s integrity, higher interest rates.”
16
Chapter 1: Sovereign Credit Risk Co-movements in the Eurozone
2008 to September 2012.4 We include non-Eurozone countries mainly to obtain a clear
picture of how co-movement patterns in the Eurozone differ from those of non-Eurozone
countries. We conduct the estimations for the period starting in 2008. This is because
before 2007, the volume of CDS markets was relatively small and trading occurred in-
frequently. However, the volume has steadily increased over recent years, reaching an
amount outstanding of almost 3,000 billion USD (approximately four percent of 2012
world nominal GDP) in 2012.5 This ensures that CDS markets are sufficiently active
such that CDS spreads represent a timely measure of (perceived) credit risk.
Data on CDS spreads are obtained from Datastream, which relies on two sources:
CMA and Thomson Reuters. To obtain long time series, we append data from the two
sources.6 If available, we used data for which the underlying sovereign CDS contract
is denominated in US dollars. If not, the contract is specified in euro. Because CDS
spreads are measured in basis points and are therefore free of units, currency differences
are of minor concern (Ang and Longstaff, 2013; Longstaff et al., 2011).
Compared to yield spreads on sovereign bonds, CDS data have the advantage that
they already represent a risk premium and therefore, we do not need to omit, e.g.,
Germany from the sample by computing yield spreads relative to German bund yields.
This would require the strong assumption that German bund yields represent a risk-less
benchmark. Additionally, as opposed to bond yields, CDS spreads lead price discovery
(Palladini and Portes, 2011), and no premia compensating for inflation or devaluation
risk are included in the data because a CDS contract primarily insures against credit
risk.
Figure 1.1 shows that most of the series have an upward-moving behavior in the
second half of 2008 and at the beginning of 2010 when the sovereign debt crisis started.
Because we are interested in co-movements, it must be noted that the time series of
various countries show common patterns. This holds for core Eurozone countries, e.g.,
Germany and France, and periphery Eurozone countries, such as Italy and Spain. In
contrast, the range of CDS spreads varies across the different country groups. While
non-Eurozone countries’ spreads tend to remain below 150 basis points, Eurozone CDS
spreads can lie above 200 basis points for core-Eurozone countries and considerably
higher for periphery states.
4 Finland is the only country for which we did not obtain data before mid-2008. Data entries for
Greek CDS spreads increase suddenly and dramatically after February 2012 and remain constant.
These observation points are excluded from the analysis.
5 See BIS Derivatives Statistics, http://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm.
6 See the Datastream Extranet website for information on how to merge the two series:
http://extranet.datastream.com/data/CDS/Index.htm.
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1.2.2 CDS Time Series Properties
Visual inspection (Figure 1.1) and augmented Dickey Fuller tests show that the data
are clearly not stationary. We thus take the first difference of the natural log of the
series. This data transformation is comparable to studies applying DCC models to
financial asset returns and was also used in related work in which dynamic correlations
for CDS spreads have been of interest (Chiang et al., 2007; Coudert and Gex, 2010).
Summary statistics of the log-differenced series are provided in Table 1.1.
One noteworthy feature is that the data are found to have a negative skewness and
high values for the kurtosis. This suggests that the series do not follow a normal distri-
bution but show extreme events, which is supported by the Jarque-Bera test statistic.
An analysis of the squared series reveals a significant first-order autocorrelation based
on the Portmanteau (or Q) test statistic with up to 10 lags for most countries. For the
residuals of the mean equation, non-reported ARCH-LM tests broadly reject the null
of no autocorrelation. This, together with signs of persistence in the log-differenced
time series depicted in Figure 1.2, gives evidence of volatility clustering. In sum, the
daily log-differenced CDS data show signs of non-normality, autocorrelation and volatil-
ity clustering. This supports the computation of conditional correlations based on a
GARCH model, which accounts for these data properties.
Simple pairwise correlations are given in Table 1.2. To obtain a better picture of
the ongoing dynamics in co-movements in sovereign credit risk, we investigate the cor-
relation coefficients during the financial crisis as well as after the start of the sovereign
debt crisis. For the latter, we choose as a starting date the Greek announcement of the
fiscal deficit being twice as large as expected in November 2009. Comparing correla-
tion coefficients across sovereign CDS markets for the different time periods shows that
correlations increase for Eurozone countries and particularly for the periphery during
the sovereign debt crisis. This does not hold for Greece, potentially revealing the spe-
cial role it played during the start of the sovereign debt crisis. However, it should be
noted that this still does not provide any evidence of contagion because an increase in
these unconditional correlation coefficients might simply be driven by an increase in
volatility during turbulent times (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002).
Nevertheless, the correlation matrices reveal interesting patterns for different coun-
try pairs. Within the group of Eurozone countries, there is strong evidence of common
patterns as correlation coefficients tend to be higher than 0.5 from 2007 on. Inter-
estingly, this also holds for periphery-core country pairs, e.g., Germany and Portugal.
Not surprisingly, co-movements are more pronounced if both countries belong to the
periphery crisis countries, e.g., Ireland or Greece. For the sovereign debt crisis period,
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the correlations reveal strong interdependencies for Italy, Portugal and Spain. The
non-Eurozone countries show small correlations with the remaining countries. This
provides primary evidence that developments in Eurozone sovereign debt markets are
affected by membership in the currency union. Whether this result continues to hold
for volatility-adjusted conditional correlations is part of the following analysis.
1.3 Empirical Methodology
The empirical estimation strategy consists of three steps. First, we apply dynamic
conditional correlations from a bivariate GARCH model to sovereign CDS spreads of
17 countries over the period of 2008 to 2012. Second, we separate periods of simple
interdependence from contagion. Third, we analyze the determinants behind interde-
pendent credit risk co-movements and the role of contagion using a regression analysis.
1.3.1 Correlation Analysis
We estimate dynamic conditional correlations (DCC) to obtain an indicator for the
time-varying pattern of co-movements in sovereign credit risk spreads. The DCC se-
ries are obtained from a bivariate GARCH model as proposed by Engle (2002) and
have been applied by e.g., Chiang et al. (2007) to study contagion in stock markets
during the Asian crisis.7 See the Appendix for a more detailed description of the model.
Similar to Engle (2002) or Chiang et al. (2007), the estimation of the DCC model
evolves in two steps. First, univariate GARCH models are estimated for each de-
meaned time series of returns (or in our case, risk spreads). Thereby, time-varying
standard deviations
√
hi,t are obtained. Second, these standard deviations are used to
adjust the residuals ξi,t corresponding to the time series under consideration, i.e., vi,t =
ξi,t√
hi,t
. From the standardized residuals, one can derive the conditional correlations.
The DCC model is estimated by maximum likelihood in a two-stage procedure (see
Engle, 2002). In contrast to Chiang et al. (2007), we do not specify a source country
but estimate bivariate DCC GARCH models to obtain conditional correlations for each
possible country pair separately. This accounts for the heterogeneity in the parameters
that characterize the underlying correlation process.
7 Coudert and Gex (2010) apply GARCH DCCs to study contagion among firms in the CDS market
during the GM and Ford crisis. Wang and Moore (2012) use a DCC model to study co-movements
in the sovereign CDS market during the subprime crisis. Missio and Watzka (2011) find evidence
of contagion during the sovereign debt crisis based on conditional correlations but focus on yield
spreads for the period 2008-2010 and rating announcements as the main determinants of contagious
effects.
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The dynamic conditional correlation framework provides us with estimates of volatility-
adjusted co-movements of credit risk spreads between countries. This methodology
has various advantages compared to alternative correlation measures. First, as in the
study by Forbes and Rigobon (2002), the measure controls for heteroscedasticity. This
is important because given that in turbulent times volatility increases, the correlation
increases by statistical definition. This occurs even if fundamental cross-country link-
ages do not change. Only a significant change in volatility-adjusted correlations can
thus be labeled as contagion.
Second, and in contrast to Forbes and Rigobon (2002), who rely on static cor-
relations for the identification of contagion, our approach provides us with dynamic
correlations. By obtaining time-varying correlation coefficients, we can, e.g., trace out
the effects of changes in investors’ behavior in response to market developments on
cross-country co-movements.
Based on Forbes and Rigobon (2002), we interpret a significant increase in the
estimated correlations between two countries’ credit risk spreads as an indicator of
contagion. This definition of contagion implies that a necessary condition to find
evidence of contagion is the rejection of constant conditional correlations. If this is
the case, the next step requires the measurement of significant increases in the DCCs.
Once contagious episodes have been found, the results can be used to analyze the
determinants of credit risk co-movements in sovereign debt markets and their role in
channeling contagion. The empirical implementation to achieve this is presented in the
following two sections.
1.3.2 Measurement of Contagion
Contagion is a term commonly used at least since the Russian and Asian crises. How-
ever, a common agreement on what constitutes contagion and how to measure it is
lacking.8 In this paper, we define an episode as contagious only if we find a signif-
icant increase in volatility-adjusted correlations (Boyer et al., 2006; Caporin et al.,
2013; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). The literature uses different methods to measure a
contagious episode: if a threshold is exceeded, i.e., if the correlation falls outside of
a certain confidence interval, if mean difference tests between tranquil and turbulent
periods deliver significant results, or if time dummies capturing the turbulent periods
have a significant impact on co-movements (Chiang et al., 2007; Caporale et al., 2005).
Based on the third method, we take the weekly average of the dynamic conditional
8 For further discussions see, e.g., Dornbusch et al. (2000), Kaminsky et al. (2003), Pericoli and Sbracia
(2003) or Forbes (2012). Corsetti et al. (2005), Dungey et al. (2005), and Pesaran and Pick (2007)
discuss empirical methods to measure contagion.
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correlation ρijt and test for contagion as follows:
ρijw = d0 +
K∑
k=1
dkρijw−k + qwdummyw + ijw, (1.1)
where ρijw is the weekly average of the dynamic conditional correlation of country pair
ij and dummyw is an indicator variable taking a value of one for a given week w and
zero otherwise. If qw shows a positive sign and is significantly different from zero at
the 10 percent significance level, we interpret the episode corresponding to the dummy
variable dummyw as contagious. The regressions are conducted for each country pair
separately and in a sequential way, i.e. in the first set of regressions the dummy is one
in week one and zero otherwise, in the second set of regressions the dummy is one in
week two and zero otherwise, and so on.
It is important to note that we deviate from previous studies in various ways. First,
we do not specify periods related to tranquil and turbulent times ex-ante as in Forbes
and Rigobon (2002) or Chiang et al. (2007) in order to test whether correlations behave
differently across periods. Instead, we take an agnostic and data driven approach in
that we aggregate the data to weekly frequency, construct dummies for each week of
the estimation period and test their significance sequentially. Aggregating to a lower
frequency serves to eliminate possible short-run (over-)reactions in investors’ percep-
tions. Constructing weekly dummies has the advantage that we do not impose strong
assumptions about cut-off points. Focusing on the whole sample avoids a selection bias
arising from an arbitrary division into subsamples with a usually large “non-crisis” sam-
ple and small “crisis” sample.9
Second, we do not specify a source crisis country but conduct the regression to mea-
sure contagion for each country pair in our sample separately. This allows us to obtain
contagion indicators that vary across two dimensions: (i) over time and (ii) across
country pairs. The contagion indicator can be exploited in the subsequent regression
analysis and delivers a refined measure of contagion. Because the regression analysis
is based on monthly data, the country pair specific contagion indicator is aggregated
to monthly frequency and takes a value of one if at least one of the weekly dummies
showed evidence of contagion and zero otherwise.
Third, in contrast to e.g., Caporin et al. (2013), we do not limit the analysis to the
detection of contagion but seek to find out through which channels it affects credit risk
co-movements. Because we obtain correlations for the whole period, this does not limit
9 In a similar vein, and in order to circumvent this shortcoming, Caporale et al. (2005) select break-
points endogenously to analyze contagion during the Asian crisis. Claeys and Vas˘íc˘ek (2014) use
multivariate structural break tests in a FAVAR model to identify contagion.
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our analysis to extreme events as in the studies by Bae et al. (2003) or Forbes (2012),
and discrepancies in the transmission channels during tranquil and turbulent times can
be separated. We can compare the determinants of significant increases in correlations
with those causing cross-country correlations in tranquil times. In addition, by not im-
posing restrictions on the transmission channels of contagion ex ante, we can consider
both the possibility of fundamentals based and non-fundamentals based contagion. A
more detailed discussion of possible contagion channels can be found in Section 1.3.3.
In sum, our approach allows us to make use of the time series of volatility-adjusted
correlations to analyze when significant increases in cross-country correlations, i.e.,
contagion, took place without being forced to make assumptions about break points,
facing restrictions by observation windows of different length, or focusing only on one
source country or contagion channel.
1.3.3 Separating Interdependence from Channels of Conta-
gion
Empirical Specification
We now analyze which economic variables explain the observed pattern of sovereign
credit risk co-movements. Thereby, our approach allows us to separate interdependence
from channels of contagion. The dynamic conditional correlation framework outlined
in Section 1.3.1 provides us with estimates of daily credit risk co-movements (ρijt),
which we aggregate to monthly averages denoted by ρijm. Monthly data still capture
short-run variation in co-movements but smooth out high-frequency noise. This ap-
proach is also in line with data availability regarding the explanatory variables (Table
1.3).
To investigate the determinants of credit risk co-movements, we use the DCCs as
dependent variable in the following regression model (specification (I)):10
ρijm = x′ijm βI + uijm, (1.2)
where xijm denotes a vector containing the elements for all K explanatory variables
(“determinants”) for a certain country pair (ij) and time period (m), βI is a vector
containing the parameters, and uijm is the error term.
While this specification allows us to empirically assess the impact of global variables
on sovereign credit risk co-movements, it controls neither for the full set of arbitrary
10Flavin et al. (2002) and Beine and Candelon (2011) use similar regression models applied to stock
market correlations.
22
Chapter 1: Sovereign Credit Risk Co-movements in the Eurozone
global shocks nor for unobserved heterogeneity across country pairs. To overcome this
shortcoming, country pair and time fixed effects are included in specification (II):
ρijm = z′ijm βII + λij + γm + vijm, (1.3)
where zijm is a subset of xijm that contains the explanatory variables that vary across
time and country pairs, λij denotes country pair specific effects, and γm denotes time
fixed effects.
The contagion indicator described in section 1.3.2 carries information about whether
a country pair experienced a contagious episode at a certain point in time. Based on
our definition, contagion means that shocks are transmitted more intensely than they
are in tranquil times, leading to a significant increase in co-movements. Consequently,
we call the channels through which this shock transmission occurs channels of conta-
gion. These channels of contagion might be linkages that exist in tranquil times but
abruptly change their strength or their role (or both) in turbulent times. Furthermore,
they might be new channels that emerge in turbulent times and can be related to shifts
in market sentiment. We refer to the first phenomenon as fundamentals based conta-
gion and to the latter as non-fundamentals based contagion. We separate channels of
contagion by adding interaction terms of the explanatory variables and the contagion
indicator (specification (III)):
ρijm = x′ijm βIII + x˜′ijm δIII × CIijm + φIV CIijm + uijm (1.4)
where x˜ijm is a subset of the explanatory variables xijm. A variable constitutes a chan-
nel of contagion only if it affects the pattern of co-movements differently conditional
on the occurrence of contagion, i.e., if the contagion indicator (CIijm) takes a value
of one. In this case, the interaction term will have a significant effect. The equivalent
specification including fixed effects is straightforward (specification (IV)):
ρijm = z′ijm βIV + z˜′ijm δIV × CIijm + φIV CIijm + λij + γm + vijm (1.5)
Including the contagion indicator as explanatory variable in specifications (III) and
(IV) leads to a bias in its coefficient (φ). The reason is that according to Section
1.3.2, the contagion indicator is derived endogenously from sovereign credit risk co-
movements, which is the dependent variable in both specifications. However, following
the identification strategy in Nunn and Qian (2013), interaction terms including one
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endogenous and one exogenous variable can be considered as exogenous.11 Therefore
estimation of the empirical specifications can yield insightful results on the channels of
contagion. Clearly, the assumption of exogeneity of the explanatory variables entering
the interaction term is key for the argument to hold. While exogeneity can be plau-
sibly assumed for rather low-frequency macroeconomic and aggregate balance sheet
variables, this might not be the case for high-frequency financial variables.
Choice of Explanatory Variables
We divide the explanatory variables into three groups based on their economic inter-
pretation and theoretical considerations: (i) global controls, (ii) similarity in economic
fundamentals, and (iii) direct and indirect linkages between countries. Table 1.3 shows
the list of explanatory variables and their classifications.
(i) Global controls: Common macroeconomic shocks that affect all countries at the
same time, such as changes in risk aversion or liquidity risk, are likely to affect the
structure of credit risk co-movements in sovereign debt markets. We control for these
global factors by including the VDAX implied volatility index and the Euribor-Eonia
spread in specifications (I) and (III).12 We expect increases in risk aversion and de-
creases in liquidity risk to lead to stronger credit risk co-movements. Macro shocks of
any kind are implicitly controlled for by the time fixed effects in specifications (II) and
(IV).
(ii) Similarity in economic fundamentals: Because the creditworthiness of a sovereign
is connected to economic fundamentals, two countries with similar economic fundamen-
tals should exhibit a higher degree of credit risk co-movement. This justifies the inclu-
sion of similarity measures based on GDP growth, public debt, and foreign reserves held
by the (national) central bank. We also include similarities in the size of the banking
system and common portfolio exposure, where the first is proxied by banks’ total assets
and the latter by the correlation of bank equity prices. The rationale behind the inclu-
sion of these banking sector-related variables is to capture the interdependence between
sovereign and bank credit risk as an important feature of the Eurozone debt crisis. Such
interdependence might arise through risk transfers from banks to sovereigns and the
impact of sovereign credit risk on banks’ holdings of sovereign debt (Acharya et al.,
2014). We expect sovereign credit risk to co-move more strongly for two countries that
11In their 2012 working paper version (Nunn and Qian, 2012), the authors write: “Our instrument,
which is constructed by interacting an arguably exogenous term (. . .) with one that is potentially
endogenous (. . .), can be interpreted as exogenous since we directly control for the main effect of
the endogenous variable (. . .).”
12We use the VDAX implied volatility index rather than the VIX because we consider it to be the
more relevant measure in our analysis which focuses on the Eurozone.
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are more similar to each other in specifications (I) and (II). By interacting the similar-
ity measures with the contagion indicator in specifications (II) and (III), we can test
for the presence of “wake-up call” contagion. This might arise if weak fundamentals in
one country make investors aware of (similar) structural problems in other countries.
In such a case, similarities in economic fundamentals constitute a channel of contagion.
(iii) Direct and indirect linkages: Variables related to direct linkages between coun-
tries account for simple interdependence in specifications (I) and (II). They comprise
linkages associated with the real and financial sector. The real linkage is captured by bi-
lateral trade flows. As banks hold sovereign debt on their balance sheets, they are likely
to play a critical role in the transmission of shocks related to sovereign debt markets.
We thus compute the financial linkage using bilateral data on banks’ foreign claims
from the Bank for International Settlements. In tranquil times, the financial linkage
is assumed to improve international risk sharing and thus to reduce co-movements in
sovereign credit risk (Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2013). However, direct real and financial
linkages might constitute channels of contagion in two respects. First, the strength of
the linkages can fluctuate if trade flows collapse, banks rebalance their portfolios via
asset sales, international interbank markets freeze, and bailouts take place. Second,
the role of the linkages can change. While the linkages can enhance risk sharing and
financial stability in tranquil times, it can foster the transmission of shocks and thus
channel contagion in turbulent times. In both cases, we would expect an increase in
credit risk co-movements. Bolton and Jeanne (2011) provide a theoretical framework
for this state-dependent role of financial (or banking sector) integration in the trans-
mission of shocks in sovereign debt markets.13 By interacting both linkages with the
contagion indicator in specifications (III) and (IV), we can test for this channel of con-
tagion, which we call fundamentals based contagion.
In addition to direct linkages, sovereign debt markets might also be connected via
more indirect or non-fundamental linkages. These linkages are often not prevalent in
tranquil times but emerge in turbulent times. From a theoretical point of view, they
can be related to concepts such as herding behavior, changes in market sentiment and
the occurrence of “bad equilibria” or “risk panics” (Bacchetta et al., 2012; Masson,
1999). Even though non-fundamentals are generally not observable, proxies do exist.
We choose the GDP weighted stock market volatility as a measure of common market
sentiment for a given country pair. We do not expect the non-fundamental linkage
to have a strong impact on credit risk co-movement in tranquil times. A significant
13The relation between the degree of market integration in general and the vulnerability to transmis-
sion of shocks and/or contagion is addressed in many papers and usually found to be non-monotonic.
While a comprehensive literature review is out of scope of this paper, we refer to Allen and Gale
(2000) as the seminal paper in this strand of literature.
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impact of this variable when interacted with the contagion indicator in specifications
(III) and (IV), however, would be a strong indication that sovereign debt markets have
been subject to non-fundamentals based contagion.
1.4 Empirical Results
1.4.1 Dynamic Conditional Correlations
For all country pairs, we conduct bivariate DCC estimations with standard errors ro-
bust to non-normality. The DCC estimations deliver parameter estimates for the mean,
conditional variance and correlation equation for 17 × 16/2 country pairs. These are
reported in Table 1.4. In general, the AR(1) term in the mean equation is positive and
significant. This can be explained by, for example, delayed adjustments in CDS prices
(Duffie, 2011). The conditional variance equation shows mostly significant coefficients
both for the lagged variance and the squared error term. This justifies the use of a
time-varying volatility model. Because the coefficients a and b of the conditional vari-
ance equation almost sum up to one, this points towards a high persistence in volatility.
The coefficients α and β, which characterize the time-varying correlation process, are
highly significant for most country pairs.
Based on the coefficients of the correlation equation, we test if our assumption of
a dynamic instead of a static model is reasonable. Except for three country pairs, we
reject the null of static correlations at a significance level of 5 percent. This is a neces-
sary pre-condition to not rule out the possibility of contagion, i.e., significant increases
in volatility-adjusted correlations. To see whether our model fits the data in an accept-
able way, we test the estimated standardized residuals for remaining ARCH effects.
Following ARCH-LM tests, we cannot reject the null of no second order autocorrela-
tion for the majority of cases. This reduces the concerns of model misspecification and
is in line with the common finding that it is often hard to improve on a GARCH(1,1)
model.14
Pairwise dynamic conditional correlations averaged across country pairs are shown
in Figure 1.3. Countries are classified into four groups: Eurozone core countries, Euro-
zone periphery (GIIPS) countries, countries belonging to the EU but not the Eurozone,
and countries outside of the EU (Table 1.5). From Figure 1.3, it becomes obvious that
co-movements in sovereign CDS spreads increase after September 2008. The increase is
highest for country pairs with both countries belonging to the Eurozone periphery and
points towards the importance of weak economic fundamentals and common structural
14For brevity, post-estimation tests are not reported but can be obtained from the authors on request.
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problems. Not surprisingly, the averaged dynamic conditional correlation series for this
country group remains at high levels in the time following.
Nevertheless, crucial events leave their mark. For example, after the announcement
that the expected Greek deficit was twice as large as expected in November 2009, the
correlations for the periphery countries increase to 0.8. The following decline can be
associated with the announcement of rescue packages in April 2010. However, the effect
of these policy measures seems to be rather short-run. Another peak takes place dur-
ing October 2011, which refers to a month with a great deal of uncertainty stemming
from the failure of Dexia and negotiations about private sector involvement regarding
Greek sovereign bonds. Co-movements again reach a lower level of approximately 0.6
in November 2011, most likely in response to ECB interventions in sovereign debt mar-
kets. In sharp contrast, correlation series referring to countries belonging to the EU
and non EU countries tend to persist at low levels.
For the remaining three groups of country pairs, sovereign CDS spreads show similar
co-movement patterns during the financial crisis. For example, correlations among core
Eurozone country pairs behave very similarly to Eurozone and EU/non-Eurozone coun-
try pairs. However, while the latter decline with the start of the sovereign debt crisis,
this decline does not take place for Eurozone country pairs. The importance of being
a member in the Eurozone is also reflected in the fact that risk spreads of Eurozone
country pairs show stronger co-movements on average than correlation series for com-
binations of Eurozone countries and EU countries outside the Eurozone.15 In this re-
gard, the sovereign debt crisis seems to keep common dynamics at a higher level within
Eurozone countries, whereas rescue packages predominantly lower co-movements be-
tween GIIPS countries as well as among EU countries inside and outside the Eurozone.
Summary statistics of the DCC series averaged per country group and for different
sub-periods confirm the findings above (Table 1.6).
1.4.2 Measurement of Contagion
As outlined in Section 1.3.2, the regression model to measure contagion as a significant
increase in DCC series is given by:
ρijw = d0 + d1ρijw−1 + d2ρijw−2 + qwdummyw + ijw, (1.6)
15Similarly, using a multifactor model, Ang and Longstaff (2013) find high levels of systemic risk
among Eurozone sovereigns compared to US states whereby the latter share not only a common
currency but also a political union.
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where ρijw is the dynamic correlation of country pair ij and dummyw is an indicator
variable taking a value of one for a given week w and zero otherwise. We choose an
AR(2) model following the general tendency suggested by conventional model selection
criteria. The number of measured contagious episodes, i.e., the number of qw that are
positive and significant, summed up across country pairs for each week of the estima-
tion period is shown in Figure 1.4.
Both the total number as well as the number of contagious episodes per country
group can be observed, and the result confirms our strategy to test for contagion
by country pair and across time. Without doubt, there are common patterns across
country groups, such as a high number of significant increases in correlations after the
failure of Lehman Brothers. However, there are also discrepancies: Looking at the
period between the announcement of the unexpectedly high Greek deficit in November
2009 and the Greek bailout combined with ECB interventions in securities markets
in May 2010, it becomes obvious that contagion occurs more frequently in periphery
Eurozone than in core Eurozone countries. This indicates that uncertainty about the
sustainability of Greek government finances particularly affected countries assumed to
have economic fundamentals and structural problems similar to Greece. Trying to
measure contagion by imposing a single dummy variable for e.g., a crisis period that is
in continuation held constant across all country pairs would miss this variation. Our
results are also in line with Alter and Beyer (2014) who study spillovers among banks
and sovereigns in the Eurozone. The authors derive a contagion index from generalized
impulse response functions in a standard VAR analysis. They find that the contagion
index fluctuates, whereas high values can be associated with policy events. However,
their index relates to bank-sovereign contagion not sovereign-sovereign contagion.
1.4.3 Separating Interdependence from Channels of Conta-
gion
The estimation results of the regression analysis are shown in Table 1.7. The estima-
tion period runs from January 2008 to March 2012.16 The column numbers correspond
to the numbers of the empirical specifications presented in section 1.3.3. Accordingly,
estimation results given in columns (I) and (II) – the latter based on the specification
with fixed effects – shed light on the factors that explain the general pattern of sovereign
credit risk co-movements. The VDAX volatility index and the Euribor-Eonia spread
were chosen as global controls that measure the degree of risk aversion and overall
liquidity risk, respectively. The results suggest that increasing risk aversion and higher
16March 2012 being the last period is due to availability of data from the BIS Consolidated Banking
Statistics.
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liquidity risk in financial markets are associated with higher credit risk co-movements.
These results are in line with the literature on the determinants of sovereign credit risk
spreads (Manganelli and Wolswijk, 2009; Aizenman et al., 2013).
Furthermore, sovereign credit risk co-moves more strongly for two countries that
are more similar with respect to GDP growth, the size of their banking systems, and
common portfolio exposures of banks proxied by the correlation in bank equity prices.
The significant impact of the two banking sector-related variables reflects the intercon-
nection between the financial and the public sectors (Acharya et al., 2014). In contrast,
neither similarities in foreign reserves (only weakly significant in (II)) nor similarities
in public debt seem to play a role in sovereign credit risk co-movements. The results
for the variables capturing cross-country linkages suggest that stronger financial link-
ages, as measured by banks’ foreign claims, tend to reduce co-movements (in (I) only),
while the real linkage, as measured by bilateral trade flows, does not seem to have
an effect. Adverse shifts in common market sentiment, as measured by an increase in
GDP-weighted stock market volatilities, are associated with higher co-movements.
Columns (III) and (IV) show the estimation results of the two corresponding spec-
ifications, which include the interaction terms of selected explanatory variables and
the contagion indicator to separate the different channels of contagion. As outlined in
Section 1.3.3, the idea behind this approach is that an explanatory variable constitutes
a channel of contagion if it affects the pattern of co-movements differently conditional
on the occurrence of contagion. The results in the upper portions of the table show
that for all three groups of variables, the direct impact (without interaction) does not
change much compared to the previous two columns. This confirms the roles of these
variables as determinants of sovereign credit risk co-movements in tranquil times that
constitute the underlying interdependence structure. The picture changes, however, as
soon as not only simple interdependence but also contagious episodes are accounted
for. Not surprisingly, the contagion indicator itself (CI) is highly significant and pos-
itively correlated with sovereign credit risk co-movements. While this is a result of
the contagion indicator being derived endogenously from the co-movements, its inter-
actions with other variables is still informative as pointed out in Section 1.3.3. The
interaction terms are shown in the lower part of the table. Their effects on the pattern
of sovereign credit risk co-movements can be attributed to either “wake-up call”, fun-
damentals based or non-fundamentals based contagion.
First, we find evidence of “wake-up call” contagion: Conditional on the occurrence
of contagion, the effect of similarity in public debt on sovereign credit risk co-movements
is positive and statistically significant (in (IV) only). This finding indicates that conta-
gion is related to the re-assessment of public sector debt as an important determinant
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of credit risk. In contrast, we do not find such a significant re-assessment regarding
banks’ common portfolio exposures proxied by the correlation in bank equity prices.
Second, the empirical findings point to fundamentals based contagion: In tranquil
times, sovereign credit risk in two countries that are more financially integrated in
terms of their banks’ foreign claims seems to be unaffected (column (IV)) or tends
to co-move less (column (III)). This supports the notion that this type of financial
linkage enhances risk diversification (Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2013). Conditional on the
occurrence of contagion, however, a stronger linkage is associated with stronger co-
movement in sovereign credit risk (column (IV) only). The role of the financial linkage
changes from being a tool for risk diversification to a channel of contagion. The result
provides evidence of the state-dependent role of banking sector integration as outlined
by Bolton and Jeanne (2011) and thus what we call fundamentals based contagion.
As regards the impact of trade (“real linkage”), it seems to increase co-movements in
tranquil times but decrease them during contagious episodes. An interpretation might
be that risk diversification via bilateral trade was still possible.
Finally, non-fundamentals based contagion is also present in sovereign debt mar-
kets: We find a positive and significant relationship between adverse shifts in common
market sentiment, i.e., higher GDP-weighted stock market volatility and credit risk
co-movements. Consequently, part of the pattern of credit risk co-movements can be
attributed to non-fundamentals based contagion. This result is in line with recent
findings by Beirne and Fratzscher (2013). The authors report evidence for “herding
contagion”, which corresponds closely to our definition of non-fundamentals based con-
tagion. It is also in line with the results of Aizenman et al. (2013) and De Grauwe and
Ji (2012), who see “bad” or “pessimistic equilibria” as a possible explanation for their
empirical findings of the higher pricing of sovereign risk.
1.4.4 Robustness Analyses
Table 1.8 shows that the results are robust to a number of alternative specifications.
In column (A-I), we apply the Fisher z-transformation to the dependent variable. The
Fisher z-transformation mitigates a potentially skewed distribution in correlation coef-
ficients, which could lead to incorrect inference. While the point estimates differ in size
due to the transformation, there are no major changes in their statistical significance.
In column (A-II) all explanatory variables are lagged by one period. This mitigates po-
tential concerns related to simultaneity. We still find evidence for fundamentals based
contagion channeled through the financial linkage. The interaction term of banks’ for-
eign claims and the contagion indicator remains significant at the 5 percent level. The
same holds true for “wake-up call” contagion, albeit at a higher significance level of
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10 percent. In contrast, the specification does not point to non-fundamentals based
contagion. An explanation is that common market sentiment channels contagion right
at the instant it occurs, which is better captured by the contemporaneous rather than
the lagged stock market volatility. Column (A-III) shows that the main results remain
unaltered if the contagion indicator is based on a lower significance level of 5 percent.
This does not hold true for “wake-up call” contagion, however, as the interaction term
with public debt now becomes insignificant. Column (A-IV) shows that the results
with respect to “wake-up call” contagion are robust for the time span starting from
the onset of the sovereign debt crisis (November 2009). However, nothing can be said
about fundamentals based and non-fundamentals based contagion during this time pe-
riod.
The results in Table 1.9 are based on a subsample of Eurozone countries. Columns
(B-I) and (B-II) are equivalent to specifications (III) and (IV) and confirm the results
regarding fundamentals based contagion (for the financial linkage only in (B-II)). Col-
umn (B-II) shows that while the financial linkage is associated with lower co-movements
in tranquil times, it is related to higher co-movements in turbulent times. As pointed
out in Section 1.4.3, this finding is in line with Bolton and Jeanne (2011) and Kalemli-
Ozcan et al. (2013). However, the finding of “wake-up call” and non-fundamentals
based contagion is not robust to the smaller sample of Eurozone countries. Specifica-
tion (B-III) additionally includes the euro exchange rate (EUR/USD) as global control,
which turns out to have a large and significant effect on credit risk co-movements. In-
cluding the euro exchange rate renders the impact of global risk aversion insignificant.
While risk aversion was found to be a key driver of sovereign credit risk spreads, it
seems to be dominated by a common regional factor among Eurozone countries. This
suggests that Eurozone countries are tied together, and by no means do only national
factors play a role in shaping credit risk movements.
1.5 Conclusions
This study investigates credit risk co-movements and contagion in sovereign debt mar-
kets for the period 2008-12. We first apply a DCC GARCH model to the sovereign
CDS spreads of 17 industrialized countries. In this way, we obtain time-varying corre-
lations for each country pair. Because our sample includes both countries within and
outside the Eurozone, this sheds light on the role of the common currency in sovereign
credit risk co-movements. Second, we detect contagious episodes, i.e., periods in which
co-movements increase significantly, separately for each country pair. We collect the
information in a contagion indicator, which varies across time and countries. Third, we
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assess which variables determine the overall pattern of co-movement and account for
interdependence. The contagion indicator is used to analyze whether certain variables
affect the pattern of sovereign credit risk co-movement differently conditional on the
occurrence of contagion. This approach allows the identification of the channels of
contagion.
Our main results are as follows. First, the correlation analysis shows that sovereign
markets in the Eurozone are strongly interconnected and co-move on a higher level
than non-Eurozone countries. This holds for both periphery and core Eurozone coun-
tries and is in contrast to the vastly documented divergence in individual countries’
credit risks. We document that contagion cannot be attributed to one moment in time
but shows a large variation both across time and countries. The contagious episodes
we detect match well with key events in the crisis. Finally, our results suggest that
similarities in economic fundamentals, cross-country linkages in banking, and common
market sentiment constitute the channels through which contagion occurs.
Several policy implications can be drawn from our findings. Given that contagion
occurs at different points in time, there is a need for timely intervention measures. The
evidence of “wake-up call” contagion suggests that fundamental reforms targeted at re-
ducing unsustainable debt levels, for instance, will reduce vulnerabilities to contagious
episodes. The role of financial and trade linkages in transmitting or absorbing shocks
is double-edged. Even during crises, these linkages might serve risk-sharing purposes
but can instantly become a channel of contagion. In line with Forbes (2012), policies
that aim to reduce international linkages would need to consider this trade-off. Regard-
ing non-fundamentals based contagion, policy measures that influence expectations of
market participants might prove most effective in reducing uncertainty. Our finding
of a strong “Eurozone effect” points towards the need for Eurozone-wide policy mea-
sures. The creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and unconventional
monetary policy measures conducted by the ECB might be considered in this light.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
1.A GARCH DCC model
The estimation of a GARCH DCC model requires time series with mean zero (Engle
and Sheppard, 2001). Thus, to start with, we have to apply a demeaning process to the
credit risk spreads in order to obtain appropriate residual series. The mean equation
for each 2× 1 vector of daily CDS spreads yt = (y1,t, y2,t)′ is specified as
yt = γ0 + γ1yt−1 + ξt (1.7)
where yi,t is the log first difference of the CDS spreads, i.e. log(CDSi,t)−log(CDSi,t−1),
and ξt = (ξ1,t, ξ2,t)′ is a 2 × 1 vector of residual terms. Conditional on time t − 1
information Ωt−1, the residuals are assumed to be multivariate normally distributed
with mean zero and variance-covariance matrix Ht such that ξt|Ωt−1 ∼ N(0, Ht). The
method exploits the fact that the variance-covariance matrix can be written as
Ht = DtRtDt (1.8)
where Rt is a 2 × 2 matrix of time-varying conditional correlations and Dt is a 2 × 2
diagonal matrix of time-varying standard deviations with
√
hi,t on the i−th diagonal.
The elements of Dt are assumed to follow a univariate GARCH (1,1) process given by:
hi,t = ωi + aiξ2i,t−1 + bihi,t−1 (1.9)
with a constant ωi and the parameters ai and bi accounting for the effect of past
innovations, respectively capturing the persistence in volatility. In the first stage,
univariate GARCH models for hi,t are estimated and the estimates for the standard
deviations are used to standardize the residuals, i.e. vi,t = ξi,t√
hi,t
.
The second stage makes use of the standardized residuals in order to estimate the
time-varying correlation of the DCC (1,1) process which can be expressed as follows:
Qt = (1− α− β)Q¯+ αvt−1v′t−1 + βQt−1 (1.10)
where Q¯ is the 2 × 2 unconditional time-invariant covariance matrix while Qt with
elements qij,t is the 2× 2 time-varying variance-covariance matrix of the standardized
residuals vt. The parameters α and β are non-negative and restricted to α + β < 1.
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The final correlation matrix Rt is then given by
Rt = (diag(Qt))−1/2Qt(diag(Qt))−1/2. (1.11)
The scaling of Qt ensures to obtain a correlation matrix with ones on the diagonal and
elements ∈ [−1, 1] otherwise. Individual off-diagonal elements of Rt provide informa-
tion on the correlation between CDS spreads in country i and j and can be written as
ρij,t = qij,t/
√
qii,tqjj,t for i 6= j.
Following Engle (2002), the GARCH DCC model is estimated by maximum likeli-
hood in two steps. The log likelihood function is given below:
` = −1/2
T∑
t=1
(2log(2pi) + log|Ht|+ ξ′tH−1t ξt) (1.12)
and can be decomposed in a volatility part being the sum of the individual GARCH
likelihoods and a correlation component such that we can write `(θ, φ) = `v(θ) +
`c(θ, φ) where `v(θ) = −1/2∑Tt=1(2log(2pi) + 2log|Dt| + ξ′tD−1t D−1t ξt) and `c(θ, φ) =
−1/2∑Tt=1(log|Rt| + v′tRtvt − v′tvt). Thereby, θ = (ωi, ai, bi) denotes the parameters
belonging to Dt and φ = (α, β) contains the remaining parameters in Rt. In a first
step, the log likelihood `v(θ) is maximized yielding estimates for θ. The following
estimation step conditions on these estimates θˆ and maximizes `c(θˆ, φ) with respect
to the correlation coefficients in φ. Under a set of regularity conditions the parameter
estimates are consistent and asymptotically normal (Engle and Sheppard, 2001).
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1.B Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1: Credit risk in sovereign debt markets (CDS, basis points)
The graph plots sovereign CDS premia in basis points for the period January 2008 to
September 2012. The series for six selected Eurozone countries (France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal and Spain) are depicted in the upper left. The series for the group of periph-
ery Eurozone countries (Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Greece) are shown in the upper
right. The lower left refers to core Eurozone countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Germany and the Netherlands) and the lower right to non-Eurozone countries (Denmark,
Japan, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States). Data source: Datastream.
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Figure 1.2: Credit risk in sovereign debt markets (CDS, log difference)
The graph plots the log differenced series of sovereign CDS premia for the 17 countries in the sample over the period from January 2008 to September 2012.
Data source: Datastream, own calculations.
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Figure 1.3: Dynamic conditional correlations by country group
The graph shows dynamic conditional correlations by country groups for the estimation period from January 2008 to September 2012. The individual
series are averaged across countries belonging to one country group. All series are depicted in the upper left panel followed by the averaged series across
core Eurozone country pairs (EZ: Core-core), periphery Eurozone country pairs (EZ: Periphery-periphery), core and periphery Eurozone country pairs (EZ:
Core-periphery), Eurozone and non Eurozone country pairs belonging to the EU (EU: EZ-non EZ), EU and non EU country pairs (Other: EU-non EU).
Key events are marked by a vertical line, e.g. 1 corresponds to the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.
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Figure 1.4: Contagious episodes
The graph shows the number of measured contagious episodes, i.e. the number of qw being positive and significant, summed up across country pairs for each
week of the estimation period from January 2008 to September 2012. The total sum across all country pairs is depicted in the upper left panel followed by the
partial sums over core Eurozone country pairs (EZ: Core-core), periphery Eurozone country pairs (EZ: Periphery-periphery), core and periphery Eurozone
country pairs (EZ: Core-periphery), Eurozone and non Eurozone country pairs belonging to the EU (EU: EZ-non EZ), EU and non EU country pairs (Other:
EU-non EU). Key events are marked by a vertical line, e.g. 1 corresponds to the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics: daily 5-year CDS premia (log difference)
The table shows summary statistics for the daily series of 5-year sovereign CDS premia in
log differences. The period starts in January 2008 and ends in September 2012. The table
gives the minimum, maximum, mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, the augmented
Dickey Fuller tests with lag order 10 to test for a unit root, the Jarque Bera test statistic to
test for normality, and the Q-statistic with lag order 10 to test for serial correlation in the
squared series.
Country Min Max Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis ADF Jarque- Q-statistic
lag(10) Bera lag (10)
Austria -0.627 0.539 0.002 0.058 0.69 26.43 -9.71 28000 191
Belgium -0.239 0.306 0.002 0.050 0.45 7.28 -10.93 986 100
Denmark -0.624 0.606 0.002 0.069 -0.54 24.86 -10.26 25000 302
Finland -0.337 0.255 0.002 0.048 -0.03 11.75 -10.14 3638 190
France -0.626 0.343 0.002 0.065 -0.50 14.56 -10.96 6942 268
Germany -0.622 0.398 0.002 0.060 -0.59 18.73 -11.06 13000 115
Greece -0.497 0.307 0.007 0.052 -0.53 18.15 -8.32 10000 54
Ireland -0.626 0.601 0.002 0.057 0.61 35.56 -11.33 55000 120
Italy -0.416 0.331 0.002 0.049 -0.28 12.82 -11.69 4993 164
Japan -0.437 0.363 0.002 0.053 -0.10 16.35 -10.00 9191 97
Netherlands -0.628 0.640 0.002 0.065 -0.10 26.42 -11.22 28000 320
Norway -1.259 0.699 0.000 0.071 -5.77 125.30 -13.07 780000 1
Portugal -0.560 0.280 0.003 0.048 -0.88 21.91 -10.90 19000 122
Spain -0.624 0.559 0.003 0.053 -0.34 31.07 -11.92 41000 220
Sweden -0.621 0.621 0.001 0.072 0.26 19.77 -11.13 15000 265
United Kingdom -0.628 0.511 0.001 0.051 -0.84 37.07 -10.69 60000 195
United States -0.620 0.699 0.001 0.054 1.88 53.87 -9.89 130000 158
Table 1.2: Correlation matrix: daily 5-year CDS premia (log difference)
The table shows the correlation matrix for the daily series of 5-year sovereign CDS premia in
log differences. The upper part is based on the period January 2008 to October 2009. The
lower part is based on the period November 2009 to September 2012.
AU BE DK FI FR DE GR IE IT JP NL NO PT ES SE UK USA
January 2008 - October 2009
Austria 1.00
Belgium 0.66 1.00
Denmark 0.63 0.62 1.00
Finland 0.51 0.52 0.59 1.00
France 0.64 0.64 0.60 0.52 1.00
Germany 0.51 0.53 0.50 0.50 0.63 1.00
Greece 0.69 0.61 0.65 0.51 0.62 0.53 1.00
Ireland 0.65 0.63 0.54 0.41 0.61 0.55 0.67 1.00
Italy 0.65 0.57 0.53 0.44 0.56 0.53 0.69 0.57 1.00
Japan 0.35 0.28 0.26 0.20 0.25 0.17 0.19 0.25 0.28 1.00
Netherlands 0.68 0.62 0.61 0.58 0.62 0.63 0.58 0.56 0.54 0.22 1.00
Norway 0.55 0.53 0.46 0.40 0.51 0.45 0.50 0.50 0.47 0.15 0.49 1.00
Portugal 0.72 0.62 0.55 0.47 0.61 0.51 0.66 0.68 0.69 0.31 0.59 0.50 1.00
Spain 0.70 0.64 0.59 0.53 0.66 0.53 0.69 0.63 0.65 0.28 0.58 0.49 0.73 1.00
Sweden 0.60 0.52 0.60 0.51 0.58 0.50 0.63 0.53 0.53 0.26 0.57 0.47 0.57 0.57 1.00
United Kingdom 0.55 0.59 0.55 0.48 0.62 0.44 0.56 0.46 0.50 0.18 0.52 0.43 0.53 0.60 0.50 1.00
United States 0.29 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.47 0.36 0.34 0.26 0.36 0.13 0.36 0.24 0.32 0.36 0.24 0.46 1.00
November 2009 - September 2012
Austria 1.00
Belgium 0.70 1.00
Denmark 0.50 0.48 1.00
Finland 0.54 0.47 0.43 1.00
France 0.64 0.66 0.43 0.46 1.00
Germany 0.64 0.64 0.53 0.45 0.66 1.00
Greece 0.41 0.50 0.31 0.32 0.44 0.41 1.00
Ireland 0.53 0.63 0.41 0.39 0.54 0.52 0.52 1.00
Italy 0.64 0.78 0.48 0.47 0.65 0.62 0.54 0.69 1.00
Japan 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.18 0.20 0.23 1.00
Netherlands 0.68 0.65 0.52 0.52 0.59 0.66 0.36 0.46 0.59 0.22 1.00
Norway 0.60 0.50 0.44 0.51 0.48 0.56 0.34 0.42 0.46 0.18 0.56 1.00
Portugal 0.55 0.66 0.39 0.39 0.55 0.60 0.57 0.74 0.76 0.18 0.46 0.43 1.00
Spain 0.62 0.76 0.50 0.44 0.65 0.63 0.56 0.72 0.88 0.17 0.54 0.46 0.80 1.00
Sweden 0.44 0.39 0.39 0.42 0.36 0.41 0.30 0.30 0.37 0.12 0.46 0.42 0.30 0.37 1.00
United Kingdom 0.65 0.68 0.43 0.45 0.62 0.65 0.44 0.59 0.71 0.21 0.58 0.48 0.62 0.68 0.38 1.00
United States 0.44 0.48 0.32 0.38 0.40 0.44 0.30 0.36 0.48 0.20 0.40 0.38 0.43 0.44 0.25 0.51 1.00
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Table 1.3: Explanatory variables descriptions and sources: regression analysis
Classification Variable Description Frequency Source
Global controls
(m)
%∆VDAX volatility pct. change of DAX im-
plied volatility
monthly Datastream
%∆Euribor - Eonia pct. change in spread monthly Datastream
%∆EUR/USD pct. change in exchange
rate (Euro/USD)
monthly Datastream
Similarity in
economic
fundamentals (ij)
∆GDP Q/Q change in sum of
log GDP (times 100)
quarterly Datastream
Public debt −|Xi − Xj | × 100
with Xi = Public debtiGDPi
(percent)
quarterly BIS
Foreign reserves −|Xi − Xj | × 100
with Xi = Foreign reservesiGDPi
(percent)
monthly Datastream
Banking system size −|Xi − Xj | × 100
with Xi = Bank assetsiGDPi
(percent)
monthly ECB
Bank equity corr. Monthly correlation of
bank stock price index
(percent)
monthly Datastream
Linkages (ij) Banks’ foreign claims sum of bilateral claims
over sum of GDP
(percent)a
quarterly BIS Consolidated
Banking Statistics
Trade sum of exports
over sum of GDP
(percent)
monthly IMF DOTS
Stock market
volatility
GDP weighted average of
countries’ stock market
volatilities
monthly Datastream
a Bilateral claims are banks’ total foreign claims reported on ultimate risk basis (URB). If data on
URB was not available, data reported on intermediate borrower basis (IBB) were used instead.
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Table 1.5: Sample countries: classification into country groups
The table shows the 17 sample countries classified into country groups: Core Eurozone;
periphery Eurozone; EU but non Eurozone; non EU countries.
Core Eurozone Periphery Eurozone EU, non-Eurozone Non EU
AU: Austria GR: Greece DK: Denmark JP: Japan
BE: Belgium IE: Ireland SE: Sweden NO: Norway
FI: Finland IT: Italy UK: United Kingdom USA: United States
FR: France PT: Portugal
DE: Germany ES: Spain
NL: Netherlands
Table 1.6: Summary statistics: DCC time series
The table shows summary statistics (minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviation)
for the estimated dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) series. The statistics are reported
for different time periods (January 2008-September 2012; January 2008-mid September 2008;
mid September 2008-October 2009; November 2009-September 2012) and for different groups
of country pairs (core Eurozone country pairs (EZ: Core-core), periphery Eurozone coun-
try pairs (EZ: Periphery-periphery), core and periphery Eurozone country pairs (EZ: Core-
periphery), Eurozone and non Eurozone country pairs belonging to the EU (EU: EZ-non
EZ), the EU and non EU country pairs (Other: EU-non EU).
Country group Min Max Mean Std.Dev.
(2008-2012)
EZ: Core-core -0.38 0.91 0.50 0.12
EZ: Periphery-periphery -0.48 0.98 0.57 0.14
EZ: Core-periphery -0.24 0.92 0.47 0.14
EU: EZ-non EZ -0.51 0.95 0.44 0.16
Other: EU-non EU -0.67 0.93 0.29 0.13
Total -0.67 0.98 0.42 0.17
(January 2008-mid September 2008)
EZ: Core-core -0.38 0.91 0.36 0.17
EZ: Periphery-periphery -0.37 0.97 0.51 0.16
EZ: Core-periphery -0.24 0.92 0.34 0.17
EU: EZ-non EZ -0.38 0.95 0.31 0.17
Other: EU-non EU -0.67 0.93 0.19 0.14
Total -0.67 0.97 0.30 0.19
(mid September 2008-October 2009)
EZ: Core-core -0.02 0.91 0.53 0.10
EZ: Periphery-periphery -0.20 0.98 0.59 0.13
EZ: Core-periphery -0.12 0.88 0.49 0.12
EU: EZ-non EZ -0.24 0.93 0.51 0.12
Other: EU-non EU -0.32 0.87 0.30 0.12
Total -0.32 0.98 0.46 0.15
(November 2009-September 2012)
EZ: Core-core -0.01 0.89 0.52 0.09
EZ: Periphery-periphery -0.48 0.97 0.58 0.14
EZ: Core-periphery -0.15 0.91 0.48 0.12
EU: EZ-non EZ -0.51 0.86 0.45 0.14
Other: EU-non EU -0.30 0.91 0.30 0.12
Total -0.51 0.97 0.43 0.15
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Table 1.7: Regression analysis: estimation results
The dependent variable is the measure for sovereign credit risk co-movements adjusted for
volatility (ρijm) in percent. The estimation period runs from January 2008 to March 2012 on
a monthly basis. Quarterly data is (linearly) interpolated to monthly frequency. Specifica-
tions (II) and (IV) report the estimated coefficients of the panel data model including country
pair as well as time fixed effects. Specifications (III) and (IV) include interaction terms of the
(0/1)-contagion indicator (CI) with public debt, bank equity, the financial linkage (banks’
foreign claims), the real linkage (trade), and the proxy for common market sentiment (GDP
weighted stock market volatilities). Continuous variables entering the interaction terms are
centered around their mean to facilitate interpretation. Standard errors are clustered by
country pair. The reported R2 is the R2 within. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
No FE ij + m FE No FE ij + m FE
Global controls %∆VDAX volatility 0.0165*** 0.0210***
(0.0048) (0.0047)
%∆Euribor-Eonia 0.0044*** 0.0033***
(0.0008) (0.0008)
Similarity in economic
fundamentals
∆GDP 0.1152*** 0.1748*** 0.1166*** 0.1587***
(0.0139) (0.0413) (0.0130) (0.0390)
Foreign reserves -0.0220 -0.0312* -0.0253 -0.0330*
(0.0164) (0.0186) (0.0169) (0.0187)
Banking system size 0.0002*** 0.0001* 0.0002*** 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Public debt -0.0058 -0.0128 -0.0079 -0.0153*
(0.0068) (0.0081) (0.0070) (0.0083)
Bank equity corr. 0.0051** 0.0113*** 0.0092*** 0.0134***
(0.0026) (0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0034)
Linkages financial Banks’ foreign claims -0.0918** -0.0526 -0.0920* -0.0684
(0.0463) (0.0496) (0.0522) (0.0511)
real Trade -0.0132 0.0284 -0.0019 0.0446*
(0.0126) (0.0253) (0.0133) (0.0265)
non-
fundamental
Stock market volatility 0.0459*** 0.0204** 0.0106 -0.0010
(0.0087) (0.0099) (0.0088) (0.0095)
CI 4.6056*** 3.0639***
(0.3480) (0.3542)
Interaction (× CI) Public debt 0.0134 0.0182**
(0.0088) (0.0088)
Bank equity corr. -0.0174 -0.0140
(0.0111) (0.0088)
Banks’ foreign claims -0.0490 0.1563**
(0.0685) (0.0736)
Trade -0.1112*** -0.0563**
(0.0272) (0.0246)
Stock market volatility 0.0669*** 0.0794***
(0.0150) (0.0192)
Observations 5,677 5,677 5,677 5,677
Country pairs 107 107 107 107
R2 0.05 0.27 0.09 0.29
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Table 1.8: Regression analysis: robustness A
The table presents various robustness checks based on the preferred specification (IV) of Table
1.7. Specification (A-I) applies the Fisher z-transformation to the measure for sovereign credit
risk co-movements in percent (ρ˜ijm = log(1 + ρijm)/(1− ρijm)). The transformed variable
is used as dependent variable to mitigate the potentially skewed distribution of correlation
coefficients. In specification (A-II) all explanatory variables are lagged by one period. In
(A-III), computation of the contagion indicator (CI) is based on lower significance levels
of 5%. Specification (A-IV) is based on a sample split considering only observations from
November 2009 capturing the onset of the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone. Standard
errors are clustered by country pair. The reported R2 is the R2 within. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
(A-I) (A-II) (A-III) (A-IV)
Fisher Z Lagged RHS CI (5%) Debt Crisis
Similarity in economic
fundamentals
∆GDP 0.4205*** 0.1023*** 0.1616*** 0.1189***
(0.1070) (0.0363) (0.0389) (0.0411)
Foreign reserves -0.0785 -0.0103 -0.0333* -0.0144
(0.0481) (0.0189) (0.0186) (0.0241)
Banking system size 0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001**
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Public debt -0.0360* -0.0201** -0.0145* -0.0274***
(0.0210) (0.0088) (0.0084) (0.0091)
Bank equity corr. 0.0321*** 0.0069** 0.0129*** 0.0147***
(0.0082) (0.0035) (0.0032) (0.0037)
Linkages financial Banks’ foreign claims -0.1994* -0.0538 -0.0677 0.1530**
(0.1212) (0.0434) (0.0505) (0.0763)
real Trade 0.1186* 0.0141 0.0425 0.0728***
(0.0672) (0.0202) (0.0278) (0.0273)
non-
fundamental
Stock market volatility -0.0073 0.0311** 0.0093 -0.0039
(0.0257) (0.0125) (0.0129) (0.0123)
CI 7.8891*** 3.3189*** 3.2102*** 2.9011***
(0.9123) (0.3449) (0.4396) (0.4265)
Interaction (× CI) Public debt 0.0433* 0.0192* 0.0142 0.0275**
(0.0231) (0.0104) (0.0098) (0.0111)
Bank equity corr. -0.0341 0.0094 -0.0174* -0.0180*
(0.0229) (0.0090) (0.0103) (0.0095)
Banks’ foreign claims 0.4062** 0.1534** 0.2715*** 0.0715
(0.2015) (0.0646) (0.1017) (0.0899)
Trade -0.1866*** 0.0020 -0.0737** -0.0388
(0.0682) (0.0290) (0.0358) (0.0501)
Stock market volatility 0.2059*** 0.0091 0.0605*** 0.0034
(0.0512) (0.0208) (0.0218) (0.0453)
Observations 5,677 5,582 5,677 3,551
Country pairs 107 107 107 107
R2 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.19
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Table 1.9: Regression analysis: robustness B (Eurozone only)
The table presents robustness checks excluding non-Eurozone countries. Based on the smaller
sample of Eurozone countries, specifications (B-I) and (B-II) are equivalent to specifications
(III) and (IV) of Table 1.7. Specification (B-III) additionally includes the exchange rate
(EUR/USD). Standard errors are clustered by country pair. The reported R2 is the R2
within. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
(B-I) (B-II) (B-III)
EZ EZ EZ
Global controls %∆VDAX volatility 0.0223*** 0.0050
(0.0079) (0.0067)
%∆Euribor-Eonia 0.0048*** 0.0059***
(0.0010) (0.0010)
%∆EUR/USD -24.7486***
(3.3735)
Similarity in economic
fundamentals
∆GDP 0.0948*** 0.2990* 0.0666***
(0.0135) (0.1674) (0.0113)
Foreign reserves -0.2828** -0.1225 -0.0536
(0.1270) (0.0829) (0.1269)
Banking system size 0.0047*** 0.0016 0.0030**
(0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0012)
Public debt -0.0128 -0.0388*** -0.0149
(0.0103) (0.0139) (0.0107)
Bank equity corr. -0.0006 0.0050 0.0042
(0.0054) (0.0050) (0.0049)
Linkages financial Banks’ foreign claims -0.2435*** -0.1137** -0.1985***
(0.0473) (0.0462) (0.0416)
real Trade 0.0270* 0.0577 0.0402*
(0.0163) (0.0374) (0.0231)
non-
fundamental
Stock market volatility 0.0871*** 0.0761** 0.0892***
(0.0329) (0.0387) (0.0323)
CI 4.2247*** 2.1607*** 4.3475***
(0.4502) (0.4288) (0.4318)
Interaction (× CI) Public debt 0.0187 0.0256 0.0235
(0.0150) (0.0158) (0.0154)
Bank equity corr. 0.0098 0.0057 0.0032
(0.0199) (0.0158) (0.0189)
Banks’ foreign claims 0.0481 0.1918** 0.0329
(0.0694) (0.0861) (0.0603)
Trade -0.1239*** -0.1137*** -0.1164***
(0.0296) (0.0372) (0.0276)
Stock market volatility -0.0264 0.0316 -0.0101
(0.0338) (0.0366) (0.0326)
Observations 2,311 2,311 2,311
Country pairs 44 44 44
R2 0.11 0.39 0.16
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Uncertainty, Bank Lending, and Bank-Level
Heterogeneity
2.1 Motivation
Since the outbreak of the financial crisis, many countries have experienced stagnating
or even declining levels of bank lending. Banks have also withdrawn from interna-
tional markets on a large scale. In this paper, we analyze the role played by increased
uncertainty in the banking sector regarding the decline in bank lending. We develop
a new measure for uncertainty that exploits bank-level information, and we explore
whether the impact of uncertainty in banking on the lending behavior is heterogeneous
across different types of banks, differentiating also between domestic and foreign-owned
banks.1
By analyzing the link between bank lending and uncertainty, this paper contributes
to a large body of research documenting the impact of uncertainty on investment. In a
recent survey, Bloom (2014) shows that uncertainty increases in recessions and that it
has a negative impact on short-run hiring and investment in the manufacturing sector.
Moreover, measures of uncertainty based on firm-level micro-data are strongly counter-
cyclical and negatively correlated with economic growth. A channel for the weakening
effect of increased uncertainty on investment and consequently economic growth is that
firms might exercise an “option value of waiting”: the higher the degree of uncertainty,
the more firms benefit from postponing investment projects, in particular if investments
are irreversible (Bloom et al., 2007).
Similar to an investment by a nonfinancial firm, bank lending is a longer-term con-
1 This chapter is based on the published article Buch, C. M., Buchholz, M., and Tonzer, L. (2015).
Uncertainty, Bank Lending, and Bank-Level Heterogeneity. IMF Economic Review, 63(4):919-954.
The copyright of the original article is with the IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan.
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tractual arrangement. Consequently, it might be beneficial to postpone the loan deci-
sion in the presence of uncertainty. Uncertainty can thus affect bank lending through
various channels. First, banks intermediate short-term funds into long-term loans. This
exposes them to liquidity risk and maturity mismatch. In uncertain times, refinanc-
ing in interbank markets might become more difficult, leading banks to restrain loan
supply. Second, intermediation through banks reduces information asymmetries and fa-
cilitates access to credit. In an environment characterized by higher uncertainty, credit
risk increases, and banks may restrict lending. Third, the probability that banks are
hit by large shocks increases in uncertain times such that investors demand a higher
funding premium. Hence, banks might face tightened external financing constraints
which restrict the ability to provide loans (Valencia, 2013).
Higher uncertainty in banking can thus be considered a key factor behind the decline
in loan supply during the crisis. However, there are few applications of the literature on
firm-level uncertainty for banks. In this paper, we construct a measure of uncertainty
based on bank-level data, and we analyze its impact on bank lending. Our data are
taken from Bankscope. We add information on the ownership status of banks provided
by Claessens and Van Horen (2014) and the degree of financial integration using data
from the Bank for International Settlements. The combined data are used to generate
measures of uncertainty in banking derived from bank-level data and to capture the
degree of internationalization of banks.
With these data at hand, we ask two questions. First, how can we measure un-
certainty in banking, and what have been patterns of uncertainty in banking during
the crisis? Uncertainty is often measured through the volatility of high-frequency time
series such as (bank) stock prices. The advantage of this method is that it allows
analyzing short-run changes in uncertainty. The disadvantage is that it is applicable
to listed banks only. In Europe though, smaller banks accounting for a significant
fraction of the market are not covered. Not only are market data unavailable for these
banks, relevant time series data are also available at a low (annual) frequency only.
We thus use the cross-sectional dispersion of bank-level shocks to growth rates in total
assets, short-term funding, productivity, and profitability as measures for uncertainty
in banking. Descriptive statistics show that the dispersion of bank-level shocks has
increased during the crisis, which we interpret as higher uncertainty. This pattern is in
line with alternative measures of uncertainty which are positively correlated with our
measure of uncertainty in banking.
Second, how does uncertainty affect bank lending, and is the effect heterogeneous
across different types of banks? We closely follow previous literature analyzing the
impact of funding shocks on banks’ investment patterns. Cornett et al. (2011) analyze
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the impact of funding shocks on the lending behavior of banks.2 They find that, during
liquidity crises, banks with a relatively large share of illiquid assets reduce lending by
more.Valencia (2013) analyzes the relationship between loan supply and uncertainty
for a sample of US commercial banks and the period 1984-2010. Uncertainty is mea-
sured as the dispersion of professional forecasts or stock market volatility. Valencia
shows that banks with relatively low levels of capitalization decrease lending more if
uncertainty increases. We find that higher uncertainty in banking, i.e. a higher cross-
sectional dispersion of bank-level shocks, has negative effects on bank lending. The
effect is heterogeneous across banks: lending by banks which are better capitalized and
which have higher liquidity buffers is affected less. These results are essentially in line
with those by Valencia (2013).
One additional aspect of heterogeneity that we are interested in is the degree of
internationalization. Previous literature shows that internationally active or foreign-
owned banks decreased their loan supply more than domestic and locally funded banks
(Haas and Lelyveld, 2014; Ongena et al., 2015). This retrenchment of international
lending can be attributed to a flight home effect (Giannetti and Laeven, 2012), and it
depends on the geographical distance of the foreign market (De Haas and Van Horen,
2013). We contribute to this literature by asking whether the ownership structure of
the individual bank or the degree of financial openness of a country matter for the
response of individual banks to uncertainty. We find weak evidence that foreign-owned
banks react to a minor extent to uncertainty in the host country compared to domestic
banks. Focusing instead on the degree of integration of the banking system as a whole,
we find that the negative effect of uncertainty is less pronounced for banks in financially
more open countries.
In Section 2.2, we present a stylized model to illustrate the concept of uncertainty
in banking and its effect on bank lending. In Section 2.3, we describe the data that we
use and discuss how we measure uncertainty in banking. In Section 2.4, we show the
evolution of uncertainty in banking across countries and time, and we relate uncertainty
in banking derived from bank-level data to alternative measures of uncertainty. In
Section 2.5, we analyze the link between uncertainty and bank lending empirically
taking bank-level heterogeneity into account. In Section 2.6, we conclude.
2 For research on the transmission of shocks across countries through internationally active banks, see
the work by Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011, 2012).
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2.2 Uncertainty and Bank Lending: A Stylized Model
To illustrate the concept of uncertainty which underlies this paper, we present a styl-
ized model. Based on the model by Shin (2010), we can assess the impact of higher
uncertainty in banking on banks’ loan supply. Assume that at time t, the balance sheet
of the bank looks as follows:
Assets Liabilities
Loans lt Deposits dt
Cash and liquid assets ct Equity et
The bank makes loans lt at time t and receives an interest rate on loans at time
t+ 1 of r˜t+1: The loan rate r˜t+1 is uncertain, as borrowers might not pay back the full
loan but larger than zero in expectation (E[r˜t+1] > 0). The deposit rate and the return
on liquid assets are assumed to be risk-free and equal to zero.
The value of equity at time t+ 1 is then given by:
et+1 = lt (1 + r˜t+1) + ct − dt = et + r˜t+1lt (2.1)
The bank defaults in t+ 1 if the value of the equity is negative (et+1 < 0), that is,
if the return on loans is smaller than the amount of equity per unit of loans available
to cover potential losses:
r˜t+1 < −et
lt
(2.2)
The VaR Constraint
We assume that the bank is risk-neutral but operates under a value at risk (VaR)
constraint which is given by:
Prob
(
r˜t+1 < −et
lt
)
≤ 1− α (2.3)
The VaR is defined as the loss not to be exceeded with probability 1 − α, that is,
V aRα = et/lt. We can think of the VaR constraint as reflecting how the bank manages
its risk. A minimum capital requirement imposed by the regulator would have the
same effect as a VaR constraint because any violation of the capital requirement would
trigger regulatory interventions. The VaR constraint can also be defined as a deviation
from the mean measured in terms of its standard deviation σt, which is assumed to be
known at time t, that is
Prob (r˜t+1 < µ− φσt) ≤ 1− α (2.4)
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where φ is some constant.
We assume that the bank maximizes its shareholder value et+1 at time t+ 1. In the
absence of the VaR constraint, the risk-neutral bank would give out as many loans as
possible. The reason for this is that the expected return is larger than zero. In principle,
the size of the balance sheet would thus be indeterminate. However, the VaR constraint
under which the bank operates determines the size of the loan portfolio. This can be
seen by combining Equations (2.3) and (2.4):
lt =
et
φσt − µ (2.5)
Uncertainty in Banking and Loan Rates
We assume that loan rates of bank i follow a stochastic process with time-varying
volatility:
r˜it+1 = µi + σtεit+1 (2.6)
where E[εit] = 0 and εit ∼ N(0, 1), which implies that the mean of the loan rate
conditional on time t information (Iit) is constant, so E[r˜it+1|Iit] = µi. Although the
assumption of µi being constant might appear too restrictive, its interpretation can
easily be generalized to the predicted value of the loan rate at time t without making
a specific assumption on the underlying prediction model. Therefore, we can simply
refer to µi as the predicted portion of the loan rate and to σtεit+1 as the unpredicted
portion for each bank i.
The volatility of the bank-specific shock εit+1 to the loan rate is time-varying.
Regarding the timing convention, we follow Bloom et al. (2012) and assume that banks
know in advance about any potential change in business conditions. This would be
reflected in a change in the distribution of shocks and thus the volatility σt. A higher
σt can be interpreted as higher uncertainty because it widens the distribution of r˜it+1.
Hence, it constitutes a measure of uncertainty in banking. More specifically, we assume
that in t, the bank can condition its portfolio decision on the level of uncertainty σt.
Although the bank knows that the distribution of shocks has widened, the bank does
not learn about the realization of the loan rate r˜it+1 before t+ 1.
Uncertainty in Banking and Loan Supply
We now show how higher uncertainty in banking affects the structure of banks’ assets
and induces the banks to shift from risky to safe assets. Starting from the optimal
size of loans on the asset side given by Equation (2.5) which is assumed to hold in all
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periods, we can derive the change in loans from t − 1 to t relative to total assets at
time t − 1 (tat−1 = et−1 + dt−1).3 This will constitute the dependent variable in the
empirical analysis below:
∆lt
tat−1
= lt − lt−1
tat−1
=
et−1
tat−1
(
1 + rt
φσt−1−µ
)
φσt − µ −
et−1
tat−1
φσt−1 − µ (2.7)
We assume that, at time t, the bank learns about changes in uncertainty in banking
and can incorporate this information into its loan supply decision. The effect of higher
uncertainty on the change in loans relative to total assets in t− 1 is given by the first
partial derivative of Equation (2.7) with respect to uncertainty σt:
∂
(
∆lt
tat−1
)
∂σt
=
−φet−1
tat−1
(
1 + rt
φσt−1−µ
)
(φσt − µ)2 < 0 (2.8)
The bank reduces the volume of loans on its balance sheet, that is, it supplies fewer
loans, if uncertainty in banking increases. The inequality holds as long as rt > µ−φσt−1,
which implies that the bank is solvent in t (see Equation (2.2) combined with Equation
(2.5)).
The Role of the Capital Buffer
In the empirical analysis, we will investigate how the response of banks to uncertainty
depends on bank-level characteristics. One of these characteristics is the capital buffer
that a bank holds. A bank might voluntarily choose to hold capital above the regulatory
requirement to shield itself against unexpected losses. The probability to incur such an
unexpected loss, in turn, depends on the bank’s capital buffer. A bank with a capital
buffer is subject to a more stringent (but voluntarily chosen) VaR constraint at time
t − 1 which can be relaxed at time t (φt−1 > φt). In the Appendix, we show that a
bank holding a capital buffer reduces the loan volume by less as long as it still receives
a positive return on its loans (rt > 0).
Empirical Implications
The model illustrates a specific mechanism how uncertainty in banking – modeled as
an increase in the standard deviation of loan rates – affects banks’ behavior. Under
the assumption that loans are the only risky assets of banks, uncertainty in banking
directly translates into a higher dispersion of shocks to observable bank-level outcomes
such as return on assets or asset growth. We apply this idea to our empirical analysis
3 For notational convenience, we will skip the bank index i in the following.
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and measure uncertainty as the cross-sectional dispersion of bank-specific shocks. In
reality, banks have a more general asset and liability structure and thus might be
affected by uncertainty through a range of other channels. In addition to dispersion
in shocks to asset growth and return on assets, we will thus also account for shocks
to bank productivity and to short-term funding. Heterogeneity in banks’ responses to
these shocks, in turn, will be modeled as a function of their capital buffer, the structure
of their assets, and their ownership status (domestic vs. foreign).
2.3 Data and Measurement Issues
In this paper, we ask two questions: How can we measure uncertainty in banking?
How does higher uncertainty affect bank lending and is the impact of uncertainty
heterogeneous across different types of banks? In this section, we discuss the data
sources that we use and other issues related to measurement.
2.3.1 Bank-Level Data
Banks’ balance sheet and income statement data are taken from Bankscope. Our sam-
ple is based on banks in 48 countries which belong to the OECD, the EU, and/ or
the G20. This ensures having a sufficiently homogenous set of industrialized countries
while at the same time exploiting a sufficient degree of heterogeneity with regard to un-
certainty in banking. We keep only countries with more than 50 bank-year observations
and banks with at least five observations. The sample period spans the years 1998-2012.
In addition to bank capital as a key variable in our theoretical model, our explana-
tory variables include balance sheet strength and banks’ liquidity risk management
as in previous papers in the field such as Cornett et al. (2011). We construct these
variables from Bankscope, and we winsorize them at the top and the bottom per-
centile. Liquidity is measured as the ratio of liquid assets to total assets (in percent).
Capitalization is measured as the Tier 1 regulatory capital relative to total assets (in
percent). We control for customer deposits relative to the total size of the balance sheet
by including the deposits to assets ratio (in percent). Additionally, we include the log
of total assets (in thousand U.S. dollars). We also include the fraction of committed
loans relative to the sum of committed loans and total assets (in percent). For more
information, see the data description in the Appendix and the summary statistics in
Table 2.1.
We use standard procedures to correct for outliers and implausible values. First, we
exclude observations for which total assets are missing as well as the bottom percentile
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of total assets. Second, to account for mergers, we drop observations for which the
annual change in assets is larger than 40 percent (Cornett et al., 2011). Third, we drop
observations if assets, equity, or loans are negative. We do the same if loans to assets,
equity to assets, or non-performing loans ratios are larger than one. Fourth, a bank is
kept in the sample if it is a bank holding company, a commercial bank, a cooperative
bank, or a savings bank.
To account for ownership status and to distinguish domestic from foreign banks,
we resort to data compiled by Claessens and Van Horen (2014). Their data set covers
5,324 banks in 137 countries for the period 1995-2009. Countries are included in the
sample if they have more than five active banks in 2009. For advanced countries, only
the largest 100 banks (based on their assets in the year 2008) are included. Despite
these restrictions, 90 percent of a country’s banking system’s assets are covered.
From this database, we extract information on whether a bank is domestic or
foreign-owned. In addition, if a bank is foreign-owned, we know the country of origin
of the largest foreign shareholder. We can thus test whether the lending decision of a
foreign-owned bank differs from a domestic bank, and we can control for uncertainty
in banking in the residence country of the largest foreign shareholder. We match these
data to the bank-level data obtained from Bankscope. This implies that subsidiaries
are included but not branches. Hence, we can discriminate whether foreign-owned
banks, excluding branches, are affected differently by uncertainty in the host country
compared with domestic banks.
2.3.2 Uncertainty and Cross-Sectional Dispersion
If uncertainty increases, future outcomes become less predictable. From the perspective
of an economic agent such as a bank, weaker predictability due to higher uncertainty
is reflected by a wider distribution of shocks to key bank-level variables. In the theo-
retical model, this was reflected by a widening of the distribution of shocks to the loan
rate. This suggests measuring uncertainty in banking as the cross-sectional dispersion
of shocks to different bank-level variables.
Empirically, uncertainty is often measured using (lagged) stock price volatility as a
measure of historic volatility (Bloom, 2007). This approach is based on high-frequency
market data. Similarly, measures of implied volatility draw on market data such as
prices of stock options (Stein and Stone, 2013). However, for many applications of
interest, such high-frequency market data are not available for all firms. This is the
case in banking. Reliable market data on banks’ share prices are difficult to obtain
for countries in which many banks are not listed and/or in which stock markets are
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shallow. For this reason, we need a measure of uncertainty which can be computed
based on lower frequency balance sheet or profitability data.
As an alternative to measures of uncertainty based on the volatility of high-frequency
data, Bloom et al. (2012) suggest using information on the cross-sectional dispersion
of (productivity) shocks. Dispersion increases if the distribution of shocks widens: on
average across all firms, the future becomes more uncertain. An increase in the cross-
sectional dispersion of shocks can thus be interpreted as a higher degree of uncertainty.
In their empirical application to U.S. manufacturing firms, Bloom et al. (2012) show
that the cross-sectional dispersion derived from firm-level data can be used to explain
variations in business cycle movements.
We apply the dispersion measure proposed by Bloom et al. (2012) to banking.
In line with our theoretical model, we compute the dispersion of shocks to total asset
growth and profitability measured via return on assets. We complement these measures
by the dispersions of shocks to productivity and to short-term funding:
• Dispersion of shocks to profitability (RoA): One measure of higher uncertainty
with regard to loan returns r˜t+1 is a wider dispersion of shocks to bank profitabil-
ity. During crisis times, adverse shocks become more likely. This can cause the
distribution of profitability to widen. These shocks can, for instance, be related
to an increase in credit risk. Profitability is proxied by return on assets (RoA)
defined as the ratio of operating profits to total assets (in percent).
• Dispersion of shocks to total asset growth: Because bank profitability can be
driven by many factors other than shocks to loan rates, we additionally use the
dispersion of shocks to total asset growth as a proxy for asset-side shocks. These
asset-side shocks can be related to loan demand shocks but they can also capture
other factors affecting the volume of banks’ assets.
• Dispersion of shocks to productivity growth: The most straightforward application
of Bloom et al. (2012) would be to measure shocks to bank productivity. In
banking though, the distinction between inputs and outputs is less clear (Degryse
et al., 2009). Deposits may be considered as being an input into the “production”
of loans, but overdraft deposits might also turn into loans. Also, banks have to
balance the optimal use of inputs and outputs to generate sufficient returns while
also managing the risk of their operations. We thus estimate bank productivity
using an empirical methodology in the spirit of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and
applied to banks by Nakane and Weintraub (2005) (see the Appendix for details).
• Dispersion of shocks to short-term funding growth: Finally, we account for the
fact that uncertainty affects not only asset returns but also funding conditions. In
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uncertain times, access to funding might differ significantly across banks. Banks
which heavily rely on customer deposits may be affected less by a funding shock
than banks relying on wholesale funding. As a result, the dispersion of shocks
to short-term funding across banks widens. We measure short-term funding as
deposits from banks, repos and cash collateral, and other deposits and short-term
borrowings.
Uncertainty in banking is measured as the cross-sectional dispersion of shocks. To
compute the cross-sectional dispersion of shocks, we proceed in two steps. In a first step,
we derive bank-year-specific shocks for each of these four variables from the following
regression model:
logXijt − logXijt−1 = ∆logXijt = αi + αjt + εijt (2.9)
where ∆logXijt is the growth rate of bank i’s assets (short-term funding or produc-
tivity) in percent at time t in country j and αi are bank fixed effects. Because return
on assets (RoA) is a flow variable, we estimate this equation for the levels of RoA.
Results remain unaffected if we estimate Equation (2.9) separately for all banks in
one country. We account for heterogeneous effects of common factors at the country
level by including time-varying country fixed effects αjt. The residuals εijt are used to
calculate the cross-sectional dispersion measures.
Note that we do not aim at setting up a forecasting model for banks. Nevertheless,
Equation (2.9) removes the impact of any bank-specific or time-varying country-specific
factors on the bank-level variables. The residual from this regression thus provides us
with a measure of shocks to these variables at the bank level. If banks have access to
the type of information that is captured by bank and country-year fixed effects, and if
we assume that they make use of this information, our measure will reflect the uncer-
tainty that is perceived by banks. This perceived uncertainty should then affect banks’
lending decisions.4 From a technical point of view, our approach is similar to De Veir-
man and Levin (2016) who derive firm-specific volatility measures from residuals of
sales or earnings growth regressions of U.S. firms. Also, Jurado et al. (2015) argue that
a meaningful measure of uncertainty needs to relate to the unpredicted component of
a given variable.
In a second step, we calculate uncertainty in banking as the cross-sectional dis-
persion across all bank-specific shocks εijt per country and year. We compute the
cross-sectional dispersion as the standard deviation (SD). This gives the measure for
4 Measures of perceived uncertainty have also been used by Bachmann et al. (2010) for firms, and by
Leduc and Liu (2015) for consumers.
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uncertainty in banking derived from bank-level data, which we call UncBankjt for
country j at time t:
UncBankjt = SD(εijt) (2.10)
This is a conditional cross-sectional dispersion measure because it is based on bank-
level variables from which all bank-specific and time-varying, country-specific factors
have been removed. It is a measure of the second moment of the distribution of shocks
to key bank-level variables. Therefore it is conceptually related to uncertainty in the
banking sector as a whole. Furthermore, it can be seen as the empirical counterpart of
the time-varying volatility σt capturing uncertainty in banking in the theoretical part.
Note that we derive a measure of uncertainty that is common to all banks in one
country.5 In our regression analysis, we then allow for heterogeneous responses of
banks to uncertainty conditional on their balance sheet strength or liquidity manage-
ment. Nevertheless, banks might have already perceived uncertainty differently. For
example, in response to a common event, one bank might perceive a higher level of
uncertainty while, for another bank, perceived uncertainty might have decreased. De-
riving a bank-specific measure of uncertainty could thus be an interesting avenue for
future research.
The corresponding summary statistics of the dispersion measures are provided in
Table 2.1. Note that the values cannot be easily compared across the different measures.
The reason is that the summary statistics of the standard deviations depend on the
definition and the levels of the underlying variable.
2.3.3 Alternative Measures of Uncertainty
To compare our measures of uncertainty in banking derived from bank-level data to
other uncertainty measures, we use the following alternative variables:
First, we compare our cross-sectional measure of uncertainty in banking to mea-
sures based on time-series variation in the data. For this purpose, we calculate the
volatility of bank stock returns based on weekly bank stock price indices taken from
Datastream. To capture uncertainty in overall stock markets, we construct a measure
of stock market volatility using monthly stock price indices from Datastream.
5 For robustness tests, we have changed the level of aggregation for the cross-sectional dispersion
measure. Instead of taking the standard deviation across all banks in one country per year, we have
aggregated by banks’ size, that is, small and large banks, as well as banks’ specialization type, that
is, commercial banks vs. savings banks and credit unions. Regression results using these uncertainty
measures can be found in Section 2.5.6
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Second, we compare the measure for uncertainty in banking to measures of uncer-
tainty in the real economy. We use the dispersion in firm returns obtained from Bloom
(2014), and we compute the three-year rolling volatility of quarterly (year-over-year)
real GDP growth taken from the IMF International Financial Statistics. Figure 2.1
shows the time-series pattern of these four alternative measures.
2.4 What Have Been Patterns of Uncertainty in
Banking?
2.4.1 Uncertainty in Banking
In Figure 2.2, we plot the cross-sectional dispersion measures over time. For compara-
bility, we have standardized these uncertainty measures, and we distinguish countries
inside and outside the euro area to check whether patterns in the data are affected by
the European debt crisis.
Overall, there has been a downward trend in the bank-level dispersion of shocks
which has been interrupted by the financial crisis. Although the overall picture is
similar for shocks to assets, profitability, and productivity, patterns of the dispersion
of shocks to short-term funding are different from this general picture. Dispersion of
short-term funding growth increased in the run-up to the crisis, and it has declined
subsequently. Overall, interpreting a higher standard deviation as a higher degree
of uncertainty, these patterns indicate that uncertainty in banking was transmitted
through a wider dispersion of shocks to bank-level variables.
With respect to the pattern of the short-term funding dispersion, it should be noted
that our data do not allow distinguishing between private and public sources of short-
term funding. Therefore, the decline in the dispersion of funding shocks during the
crisis might be related to monetary policy interventions. During the crisis, central
banks all over the world immediately provided funding liquidity via their monetary
policy operations. The initial shock to short-term funding of banks was thus miti-
gated. Banks which were hit by a funding shock might have replaced dried-up funding
in private interbank markets with central bank liquidity. This might have narrowed
down the heterogeneity in shocks to short-term funding across banks and made the
peak in the aggregate dispersion measure during the crisis less pronounced, when mon-
etary policy was strongly expansive.
These trends in the data are very similar for countries inside and outside the euro
area. The levels of uncertainty differ though between euro area and non-euro area
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countries. Generally, there is a lower degree of dispersion in the euro area countries
compared with the countries outside the euro area.
2.4.2 Do Different Measures of Uncertainty Evolve Similarly?
Figure 2.3 compares the development of the common measures for uncertainty with
the standardized dispersion measures derived from bank-level data. Measures based
on high-frequency data like bank stock return volatility fluctuate more. Such short-
term fluctuations are smoothed out in the dispersion measures derived from annual
bank-level data.6 To test more explicitly whether the cross-sectional dispersion mea-
sures differ in their information content compared with the measures based on higher
frequency, we conduct a simple regression analysis.
Table 2.2 gives results of univariate panel regressions using the dispersion measures
as the dependent and alternative uncertainty measures as the explanatory variables.
These regressions include country and year fixed effects. All variables are positively and
significantly correlated with bank stock return volatility, except the cross-sectional un-
certainty measure based on the dispersion of shocks to productivity (column 1). Hence,
our cross-sectional measures for uncertainty in banking behave similarly to commonly
used time-series measures for uncertainty in the banking sector.
For the remaining common uncertainty measures, the picture is less clear-cut. Three
out of four measures show a positive and significant relation with the volatility of GDP
(column 4). This suggests that uncertainty in banking and the real economy are linked.
For stock market volatility or firm return dispersion, the relationship with the measures
for uncertainty in banking is weak except if the dispersion of shocks to profitability is
considered.
In sum, uncertainty in banking is related to alternative uncertainty measures like
bank stock return volatility and GDP volatility. Yet, the link with alternative and
commonly used measures like stock market volatility or firm return dispersion is rather
weak. Hence, the result suggests that our uncertainty measures based on bank-level
data contain additional information on uncertainty in the banking sector.
6 The key advantage of using annual bank-level data is that these data are available for a broad set of
banks and not only for stock listed banks. Even if higher frequency balance sheet data were available,
we would not expect the cross-sectional measures to vary much more given that balance sheet data
move more slowly than stock market data and capture changes in the longer-term business model
of banks.
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2.5 How does Uncertainty Affect Bank Lending?
To analyze the effect of uncertainty in banking on bank lending, we follow Cornett
et al. (2011) and set up the following empirical model:
∆Loansijt
Assetsijt−1
= vi+vt+α1Xjt+α2Xijt−1 +α3UncBankjt+α4UncBankjt×Xijt−1 +εijt
(2.11)
where ∆Loansijt/Assetsijt−1 denotes the difference in the loan volume relative to total
assets of bank i in country j in t− 1 (in percent). In line with our theoretical model,
we analyze how banks adjust the structure of their assets in response to higher uncer-
tainty. We account for time invariant bank characteristics and common time trends
by including the fixed effects vi and vt. Uncertainty (UncBankjt) is measured through
the cross-sectional dispersion across bank-specific shocks. Note that uncertainty varies
across countries and time; hence, we cannot include country-year effects in the baseline
model if we want to estimate α3. Below, we will comment on robustness tests including
country-year fixed effects.
Macroeconomic factors are captured by Xjt which includes the change in the nat-
ural logarithm of the GDP deflator (GDPdeflatorjt) and in real GDP (realGDPjt)
taken from the IMF World Economic Outlook. Xijt−1 are time-varying bank character-
istics capturing liquidity, capitalization, the share of customer deposits in total assets,
size, and committed loan obligations. Lagging the bank characteristics accounts for
simultaneity but not necessarily for endogeneity.
When analyzing the impact of uncertainty on bank lending, we face two identifi-
cation issues. The first relates to the endogeneity of uncertainty. Uncertainty might
drive bank lending, but the dynamics of lending might also affect uncertainty. This
endogeneity concern is partly remedied because lending and uncertainty are measured
at different levels: our dependent variable is bank-level lending, while uncertainty is
measured at the country level. Given that individual banks do not drive aggregate
uncertainty, this should be a minor concern.
The second identification issue relates to demand and supply effects. Uncertainty
affects banks – the supply of loans – as well as the firms and thus the demand side.
We disentangle demand and supply effects by making use of bank-level heterogeneity.
Assuming a differential response conditional on these bank-level variables allows
identifying supply-side effect. A similar identification strategy has been applied by
Cornett et al. (2011) for the case of funding shocks or Valencia (2013) for aggregate
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uncertainty. This identification scheme is valid as long as borrowers are not systemat-
ically similar in the respective balance sheet characteristic to the banks they borrow
from. The measure for uncertainty in banking is interacted with the bank-level ex-
planatory variables UncBankjt × Xijt−1. This allows for different responses of banks
to uncertainty depending on their balance sheet strength and liquidity management.
We start from a benchmark regression, including macroeconomic control variables
(Table 2.3), distinguishing domestic and foreign banks (Table 2.4) and controlling
for the degree of financial integration of a country’s banking system as such (Table
2.5). We then perform several robustness tests using stock market volatility or firm
return dispersion to measure uncertainty (Table 2.6), we replace the macroeconomic
controls by country-year fixed effects (Table 2.7), and we change the construction of
the uncertainty measure (Tables 2.8 and 2.9).
2.5.1 Baseline Regression Results
Table 2.3 shows the results for the baseline regressions including macroeconomic con-
trols. The average bank reduces lending in response to higher uncertainty in banking
(UncBank).7 This holds for all cross-sectional uncertainty measures derived from bank-
level data except the dispersion of shocks to short-term funding. For the latter, the
effect is significantly negative only for banks with low liquidity. A one unit increase in
uncertainty in banking reduces bank lending on average from 1.3 percentage points in
the case of the dispersion of shocks to profitability to 4.3 percentage points in the case
of the dispersion of shocks to total assets. Given that we have standardized our uncer-
tainty measures, a one unit increase in UncBank corresponds to one standard deviation.
Note that the negative impact of uncertainty on the loan supply is significant also
in regressions not including interaction terms or macroeconomic controls. Also, the
effects are not driven by a certain time period or group of countries, as we have re-
stricted estimates to OECD countries and to the crisis period (2008-12).8
Based on the estimated coefficients, we can assess the quantitative impact of how
uncertainty in banking affects banks’ loan supply at the aggregate level. Across all
bank-year observations included in the estimations, the change in loans relative to to-
tal assets of the previous period amounts to 3.9 percent on average. We do an in-sample
prediction which sets uncertainty in banking first to its minimum value as observed in
7 The bank-level variables entering the interaction terms are demeaned. Therefore, the estimated
coefficient of uncertainty in banking (UncBank) can be interpreted as the marginal effect of uncer-
tainty in banking on bank lending for the average bank. The average bank is defined as a bank for
which all bank-level variables are set to their sample means.
8 These results are available in the web appendix accompanying the published article.
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the sample and then to its maximum value. For the sake of brevity, only the results
for the dispersion of shocks to profitability are considered. It turns out that bank
lending would have been equal to 5.7 percent, that is, 1.8 percentage points higher, if
uncertainty in banking had been at its minimum. Equivalently, bank lending would
have been equal to -1.5 percent on average, that is, 5.4 percentage points lower, if
uncertainty in banking had been at its maximum.9
Regarding the macroeconomic controls, we find that both higher growth and higher
inflation increase the loan supply. For a 1 percentage point increase in the inflation
rate (measured as GDP deflator), the nominal loan supply increases by 0.34 percentage
points. If real GDP growth increases by 1 percentage point, bank lending increases by
0.62 percentage points (column 1).
2.5.2 Is the Effect of Uncertainty Heterogeneous Across Banks?
As regards bank-level determinants, Table 2.3 confirms prior research. Banks have a
higher loan supply if they are better capitalized, have a higher deposits-to-assets ra-
tio, and if they hold more liquid assets. To account for the effect of (predetermined)
characteristics of banks, we interact UncBank with the bank-level variables. These
interaction terms show that the effect of uncertainty on bank lending is heterogeneous.
In line with theoretical priors, Table 2.3 shows that higher levels of capital might
isolate bank lending against higher uncertainty (columns 1 and 4). Better capitalized
banks reduce loans by less relative to their peers if the dispersion of shocks to total
assets or profitability increases. This would be in line with regulatory capital require-
ments becoming increasingly binding in uncertain times. Banks with low capital buffers
have to adjust by shifting their portfolio from risky investments such as loans to less
risky ones. In contrast, better capitalized banks decrease lending if the dispersion of
shocks to short-term funding increases (column 2). Figure 2.4 confirms that the average
marginal effect of uncertainty on loan supply is negative, even in the case of short-term
funding uncertainty. The negative average marginal effect declines in absolute terms
with a higher capital ratio if uncertainty is measured as the dispersion of shocks to
total assets or profitability. In the latter case, the marginal effect even turns positive
(albeit insignificant) for highly capitalized banks.
In addition to capital, liquidity matters. More liquid banks reduce lending by less
given a rise in uncertainty in banking (Table 2.3, columns 1-3). In uncertain times,
these banks can draw on their liquidity buffers to stabilize lending. Figure 2.5 shows
9 For the other three measures for uncertainty in banking, the numbers are as follows: dispersion
of asset shocks: 11.2 percent (UncBank at minimum) and -14.8 percent (UncBank at maximum);
short-term funding shocks: 7.4 and 0.5 percent; productivity shocks: 6.5 and -6.9 percent.
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average marginal effects of uncertainty in banking on loan supply, conditional on the
liquidity ratio of banks. It not only shows the point estimates presented in Table 2.3,
but it also varies the liquid asset share from 0 to 80 percent.
For all dispersion measures, the contraction in lending following an increase in un-
certainty is smaller the more liquid assets a bank holds. More liquid banks can thus
shield their supply of loans against an increase in uncertainty. For banks with suffi-
ciently high liquidity, the marginal effects even turn insignificant. In this case, bank
lending is not affected by uncertainty in a significant way. A possible explanation is
that in the presence of liquidity freezes, these banks have the option to sell part of their
liquid assets and reduce the need for refinancing. An alternative explanation is that
liquidity injections from central banks matter, as these banks should have sufficient
collateral to refinance via the central bank.
Finally, banks with a higher share of committed credit lines reduce lending by more
if they face an increase in uncertainty measured as the dispersion of shocks to short-
term funding (column 2). This is plausible as firms tend to draw on their credit lines
in uncertain times.10 Banks compensate for the increase in loan demand by reducing
their supply of noncommitted (new) loans accordingly. Cornett et al. (2011) document
a similar effect in response to (first-order) liquidity shocks for U.S. banks during the
crisis.
2.5.3 Does Heterogeneity with Regard to Internationalization
Matter?
The analysis so far has shown that bank lending declines when uncertainty increases,
and that this effect can be heterogeneous across banks depending on their balance sheet
structure. However, we have not yet accounted for the effect of uncertainty depending
on heterogeneity in the degree of internationalization. In recent decades, banking has
become more international, and shocks might be transmitted through international
activities of banks (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011; De Haas and Van Horen, 2012). We
contribute to this literature by asking whether foreign-owned banks or banks that are
located in more financially integrated countries are affected less by uncertainty because
they can diversify shocks across borders.
We measure internationalization at the level of the individual bank (Table 2.4) and
at the level of the country (Table 2.5). We begin by exploiting the (foreign) owner-
ship data by Claessens and Van Horen (2014). These data allow analyzing whether
10Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) and Campello et al. (2011) document that private firms drew ex-
tensively on committed credit lines during the recent financial crisis.
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foreign-owned banks react differently to uncertainty in their host country compared
with domestically owned banks while controlling for uncertainty in the residence coun-
try of the foreign owner. As the database is limited to the years 1995-2009, we assume
that the ownership status of the banks has remained unchanged in the years 2010-
12 compared with 2009. The database indicates whether a bank is domestically or
foreign-owned. A bank is identified as foreign-owned if foreigners hold 50 percent or
more of its shares. In case a bank is foreign-owned, the country of the largest foreign
shareholder is indicated.11
Using the information on ownership status, we essentially estimate the baseline
model except for the interactions with bank-level variables, but we now include a
foreign ownership dummy. The measure for uncertainty in banking derived from bank-
level data in country j – the host country, if foreign banks are considered – is captured
by UncBankjt. We interact the uncertainty measure in the country of location with
the foreign ownership status Fown(0/1). The dummy takes a value of one if the bank
is foreign-owned and zero otherwise. Given that a bank is foreign-owned, we addition-
ally consider the effect of uncertainty in the country of residence of the foreign owner
UncBankkt. If a bank is domestically owned, we set UncBankkt to zero.
Table 2.4 shows the regression results. Signs and quantities of bank characteristics
are comparable with our previous results and, in particular, the effect of uncertainty on
bank lending is significantly negative for domestic banks. We only find weak support
for the hypothesis that foreign-owned banks are differently affected by host country
uncertainty than domestically owned banks. The coefficients on the interaction terms
of the uncertainty measure with Fown(0/1) are mostly insignificant. Only in column
3, for the case of the dispersion of shocks to productivity, we find that foreign-owned
banks respond differently to uncertainty in the host country than domestically owned
banks: the average marginal effects reveal that foreign-owned banks increase their loan
supply by 0.6 percent, while domestically owned banks reduce it by 1.1 percent if un-
certainty increases by one standard deviation.
We control for the impact of uncertainty in banking in the country of the largest
shareholder, as this might impact and presumably reduce the loans supplied by foreign-
owned banks. This is indeed the case if we consider the dispersion of shocks to short-
term funding (column 2) or productivity (column 3). This arises due to the fact that
foreign-owned banks can be affected by developments in the home and the host country.
In Table 2.5, we turn to the question whether it may not be the ownership status
11There might be cases in which the bank is identified as foreign-owned, but the largest foreign
shareholder does not hold the largest amount of shares. However, we cannot identify such cases
from the information in the database.
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of individual banks which affects the response to uncertainty but the openness of the
financial system. Inter alia, we would expect that lending by banks in financially open
countries is affected less by uncertainty because cross-border lending and borrowing
can be used to mitigate the impact of uncertainty shocks.
To focus on the question whether banks in more financially integrated countries
respond differently to uncertainty, we use data on cross-border activities of a country’s
banking system of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). We calculate an open-
ness measure for each country reporting to the Locational Banking Statistics, which is
defined as total assets held by the banking system in reporting country j toward the
rest of the world relative to nominal GDP in country j (in percent). The standardized
variable Opennesst is then interacted with our measure of uncertainty in banking.
Table 2.5 shows the results. Financial openness in and of itself has a negative im-
pact on loan supply. Given that our dependent variable measures changes in bank loans
relative to the balance sheet total of banks, this result implies that, in countries that
are financially more open, traditional lending business of banks is less important than
in financially closed economies. The signs of the remaining variables again remain un-
changed. The sign of the interaction term between openness and uncertainty confirms
our prior: the significant and positive coefficient of the interaction term indicates that
in more financially open countries, the negative effect of uncertainty on loan supply
is mitigated. Although the effect of ownership status was rather weak, this suggests
that it is the openness of the banking system as such that affects banks’ response to
uncertainty.
2.5.4 Robustness 1: Alternative Measures of Uncertainty
For comparison, we next consider the effect of the alternative uncertainty measures
which are related to the financial and the real sector: bank stock return volatility,
stock market volatility, firm return dispersion, and GDP volatility (Table 2.6). In line
with our descriptive statistics, volatility of bank stock returns yields results similar
to those for the cross-sectional dispersion measures: lending declines as uncertainty
increases. Hence, cross-sectional dispersion and time-series volatility measures related
to the banking sector capture similar features of uncertainty. Stock market volatility
as such has no significant effect.
A higher level of firm return dispersion, which might capture uncertainty in the real
sector and borrower default risk, has a negative effect on bank lending. The result for
uncertainty stemming from the real sector is supported by the significantly negative
effect of GDP volatility on bank lending. The finding is in line with Valencia (2013),
69
Chapter 2: Uncertainty, Bank Lending, and Bank-Level Heterogeneity
who shows that banks reduce lending in times of increased default risk of banks but
also of borrowers due to higher uncertainty.
In unreported regressions, we simultaneously include one dispersion measure and its
interactions with the bank-level variables and one of the four alternative measures and
the interactions with the bank-level variables. This helps ensure that the estimated
effect of our dispersion measure on lending is not driven by omitted variables. The
effect of our cross-sectional dispersion measures on bank lending remains qualitatively
unaltered, except for the case of dispersion of shocks to profitability: the coefficient
becomes insignificant if bank stock return volatility is included simultaneously.
2.5.5 Robustness 2: Including Country-Year Fixed Effects
In order to control for macroeconomic conditions affecting all banks in one country,
we include country-year fixed effects vjt. Now, the country-level variables – including
our measure of uncertainty in banking (UncBank) – are omitted, and we focus on the
interaction effects. The advantage of this specification is that it controls for a wide
range of potentially unobservable factors influencing bank lending. The disadvantage
is that it no longer allows assessing the direct impact of uncertainty in banking on bank
lending.
Table 2.7 shows the results. The interaction effects, which measure if the effect of
uncertainty on bank lending differs between banks with higher and lower values of the
respective bank-level variable, are still identified in the regressions. These interaction
effects remain robust in most of the cases: in columns 1 and 3, the interaction term
of uncertainty in banking with the liquidity ratio remains significant and positive; in
columns 1 and 4 the same holds true for the interaction of uncertainty in banking and
the capital ratio. The results for uncertainty measured as the dispersion of shocks to
short-term funding deviate from the general picture.
2.5.6 Robustness 3: Alternative Aggregation of the Measure
of Uncertainty
In order to aggregate bank-specific shocks and to construct our measure of uncertainty,
we use the country as the cross-sectional aggregator. This approach is based on the
assumption that uncertainty in the country of residence matters for a bank. In most
countries, only large banks maintain a wide range of cross-border activities, including
foreign affiliates. Because many smaller banks conduct business mostly at home while
holding only a small fraction of foreign assets (Buch et al., 2011), aggregating by coun-
try seems reasonable. Also, Cetorelli and Goldberg (2014) find that, in most countries,
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global banks have a large fraction of their affiliates at home.
Nevertheless, as observed in Section 2.5.2, heterogeneity in banks’ business models
is an important driver of how uncertainty affects banks. This should hold in particular
if uncertainty is not driven by country-specific developments. To look in more detail
at the possibility that different types of banks are affected differently by uncertainty,
we derive the uncertainty measure for subgroups of banks.
The subgroups are defined along the two dimensions size and business model in
the following way: (1) Small and large banks. Large banks are defined as banks with
total assets above the median of all banks in a given country. (2) Cooperative/ savings
banks and commercial banks. Hence, aggregation is not specific to one country but
based on certain criteria, for example, the dispersion is computed across the shocks
for all small banks and across the shocks of all large banks and then assigned to the
respective bank type.
Results in Table 2.8 show that the direct effect of uncertainty remains negative for
the dispersion in total assets and return on assets (columns 1 and 4). In Table 2.9,
in which subgroups are defined based on the specialization of the bank, the negative
effect of uncertainty on loan supply is statistically significant across all specifications.
Although the interaction terms partly lose significance, the interaction term with the
share of committed loans becomes negative and significant. This might indeed be a
result of banks being affected heterogeneously by uncertainty depending on the bank
type and related business model.
2.6 Conclusions
During the financial crisis, loan supply by banks has contracted, both domestically and
across borders. Lending to the real sector has decreased, and the international bank-
ing system has become more fragmented. This paper explores whether the adjustment
of banks could be the result of increased uncertainty. The paper uses a measure of
uncertainty in banking based on the cross-sectional dispersion of shocks across banks
and analyzes the heterogeneous responses of bank loans to uncertainty.
Our measure of uncertainty in banking is constructed from bank-level data. In a
first step, we compute bank-level shocks to growth rates of total assets, short-term
funding, productivity, and profitability. In a second step, we measure uncertainty in
banking as the cross-sectional dispersion of these shocks. A higher cross-sectional dis-
persion is interpreted as a higher degree of uncertainty in banking.We find that uncer-
tainty in banking fluctuates over time, and that it has increased during the recent crisis.
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We then use our uncertainty measure derived from bank-level data to analyze the
impact of uncertainty in banking on the loan supply by domestic and foreign-owned
banks. Our results show that banks decrease their loan supply during periods of higher
uncertainty. This effect is heterogeneous across banks: lending by banks which are
better capitalized and have higher liquidity buffers tends to be affected less. We find
evidence that the effect of uncertainty on bank lending is mitigated in financially open
economies. This effect is driven by the openness of countries as such and not the
ownership of specific banks, because there is only weak evidence that foreign-owned
and domestic banks react differently to higher uncertainty.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
2.A Extensions
Bank Loan Supply and Capital Buffers
In the following, we show how the response of a bank’s loan supply (relative to assets
in t− 1) to higher uncertainty in banking depends on its capital buffer in t− 1.
If we consider φ to be time-varying, we obtain from Equation (2.8):
∂
(
∆lt
tat−1
)
∂σt
=
−φtet−1
tat−1
(
1 + rt
φt−1σt−1−µ
)
(φtσt − µ)2 < 0
The relevant cross derivative is given by:
∂
(
∆lt
tat−1
)
∂σt∂φt−1
=
φtσt−1et−1
tat−1
rt
(φtσt − µ)2(φt−1σt−1 − µ)2
which is > 0 if rt > 0 and < 0 if rt < 0.
Calculating Bank Productivity
We estimate bank productivity using an empirical methodology in the spirit of Levin-
sohn and Petrin (2003) and applied to banks by Nakane and Weintraub (2005):
log yit = β0 + βlxit + βkkit + βmmit + ωit + ηit
Bank output is given by yit, xit denotes the free input variables, kit the fixed input
and mit the intermediate input. The error consists of an unobserved productivity
term ωit and a random term ηit. The approach accounts for simultaneity between
productivity and the factor input choices of banks. This is achieved by introducing
the intermediate input which correlates with productivity. Productivity shocks thus
primarily account for supply-side factors. The output of banks is defined as the total
lending volume. We choose two free input variables. The first is total long-term
funding. The second accounts for bank staff and is proxied by personnel expenses.
Banks have to maintain branches or subsidiaries to provide loans. These cannot be
adjusted rapidly and we capture the fixed input by fixed assets. For the intermediate
input good, we choose total equity.
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2.B Data
The results in this paper are based on various data sources. Data at the bank level
are obtained from Bankscope. Information on foreign ownership of banks comes from
the database provided by Claessens and Van Horen (2014). Country-level data are
obtained from Bloom (2014), Datastream, the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
List of Countries
Euro Area Non-Euro Area
OECD Austria, Belgium, Den-
mark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Slo-
vakia, Slovenia, Spain
Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech
Republic, Hungary, Iceland,
Israel, Japan, Mexico, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, South
Korea, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States
Non-OECD Cyprus, Latvia, Malta Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria,
China, Croatia, India, Indone-
sia, Lithuania, Romania, Russia,
Saudi Arabia, South Africa
Bank-Level Variables
Bank lending: Our measure for bank lending is the difference in total loans relative
to total assets in t− 1 (in percent). The data come from Bankscope and the variable
total loans is defined as gross loans minus impaired loans.
Capital/assets: To measure capitalization, we use the Tier 1 regulatory capital rela-
tive to total assets (in percent) as obtained from Bankscope.
Committed loans/(committed loans + assets): To control for committed loan
obligations, we use committed loans relative to the sum of committed loans and total
assets (in percent). Data are provided by Bankscope.
Deposits/assets: The variable deposits/assets denotes the share of customer deposits
to balance sheet total (in percent) as obtained from Bankscope.
Liquid assets/assets: The liquidity ratio is defined as the ratio of banks’ liquid assets,
that is, the sum of trading securities, loans and advances to banks, reverse repos and
cash collateral, cash and due from banks minus mandatory reserves included in these
positions, relative to total assets (in percent). Data are taken from Bankscope.
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Log total assets: To obtain a measure for bank size we use the logarithm of banks’
total assets (in thousands of USD) as obtained from Bankscope.
Uncertainty in Banking Measures
Total assets: We use total assets in thousands of USD as provided by Bankscope.
Productivity: Productivity is estimated as proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
For the free input variables, we choose total long-term funding and personnel expenses.
The intermediate input good is proxied by total equity and the fixed input is given by
fixed assets. For the output variable, we use total loans defined as gross loans minus
impaired loans. Data are in thousands of USD and obtained from Bankscope.
Profitability (RoA): Return on assets (RoA) is the ratio of operating profits to total
assets (in percent) and calculated from data available in Bankscope.
Short-term funding: The variable short-term funding (in thousands of USD) is
obtained by taking the sum of deposits from banks, repos and cash collateral, and
other deposits and short-term borrowings as provided by Bankscope.
Alternative Uncertainty Measures
Bank stock return volatility: To construct a measure for bank stock return volatil-
ity, we use weekly bank price indices from Datastream. As they are not available for
some countries, we resort to aggregates for the particular region. The measure for bank
stock return volatility is computed as the volatility of weekly bank index returns for
each year (in percent).
Firm return dispersion: From Bloom (2014), we take a measure to control for un-
certainty in the real sector. Data come from the WRDS international equity database
and are used to construct the standard deviation of quarterly returns across firms. For
our analysis, we use the value for the last quarter of the respective year (in percent).
GDP volatility: GDP volatility is computed as the three-year rolling volatility of
quarterly (year-over-year) real GDP growth taken from the IMF International Finan-
cial Statistics (in percent).
Stock market volatility: To construct a measure for stock market volatility, we use
monthly stock price indices from Datastream. We resort to monthly frequency as this
is available for all countries. The stock market volatility measure is computed as the
volatility of monthly stock market index returns for each year (in percent).
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Internationalization
Foreign ownership: Data on foreign ownership are taken from Claessens and Van Horen
(2014) and matched with bank-level information from Bankscope. The data are avail-
able for 5,324 banks in 137 countries for the period 1995-2009. We keep all banks
which are located in one of our sample countries. For the years 2010-12, we project
the ownership status of the year 2009 forward.
Openness: The variable openness is defined as total assets held by the banking system
in reporting country j toward the rest of the world relative to nominal GDP in country
j (in percent). Data on a country’s banking system’s cross-border activities come from
the Locational Banking Statistics of the BIS.
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2.C Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: Alternative measures of uncertainty
The graph shows the evolution of alternative uncertainty measures over time. The variables
that proxy uncertainty include Bank stock return volatility computed as the volatility of
weekly bank index returns for each year, Stock market volatility computed as the volatility
of monthly stock market index returns for each year, Firm return dispersion calculated as
the standard deviation of quarterly returns across firms, and GDP volatility computed as
the three-year rolling volatility of quarterly (year-over-year) real GDP growth. The graphs
show the average across all countries in the sample (solid line), the average across euro area
countries (dashed line) and the average across non-euro area countries (dotted line) for the
period 1998-2012. For better comparison, all variables are standardized (zero sample mean,
unit sample standard deviation). Data source: Own calculations based on data taken from
Bloom (2014), Datastream, and the IMF.
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Figure 2.2: Uncertainty in banking
The graph shows the evolution of our cross-sectional uncertainty measures derived from
bank-level data over time. The measures are based on balance sheet data (total assets/short-
term funding), productivity (productivity shock), and profitability (RoA). Total assets is
in thousands of USD. Short-term funding (in thousands of USD) is obtained by taking the
sum of deposits from banks, repos and cash collateral, and other deposits and short-term
borrowings. Productivity is estimated as proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). RoA
is the ratio of operating profits to total assets (in %). For each of these variables, we
compute in a first step time-varying bank-specific shocks as described in Section 2.3.2. In
a second step, we calculate the cross-sectional dispersion per country and year by taking
the standard deviation across the shocks of all banks in one country and year. The graphs
show the average across all countries in the sample (solid line), the average across euro area
countries (dashed line), and the average across non-euro area countries (dotted line). For
better comparison, all variables are standardized (zero sample mean, unit sample standard
deviation). Data source: Own calculations based on data taken from Bankscope.
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Figure 2.3: Uncertainty in banking vs. alternative measures of uncertainty
The graph shows time-series plots of our cross-sectional uncertainty measures derived from
banklevel data against alternative measures of uncertainty. The measures for uncertainty
in banking are based on (a) Total assets in thousands of USD, (b) Short-term funding
(in thousands of USD) obtained by taking the sum of deposits from banks, repos and
cash collateral, and other deposits and short-term borrowings, (c) Productivity estimated as
proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), (d) RoA, which is the ratio of operating profits to
total assets (in %). The variables that proxy uncertainty include Bank stock return volatility
computed as the volatility of weekly bank index returns for each year, Stock market volatility
computed as the volatility of monthly stock market index returns for each year, Firm return
dispersion calculated as the standard deviation of quarterly returns across firms, and GDP
volatility computed as the three-year rolling volatility of quarterly (year-over-year) real
GDP growth. For better comparison, all variables are standardized (zero sample mean,
unit sample standard deviation). Data source: Own calculations based on data taken from
Bankscope, Bloom (2014), Datastream, and the IMF.
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Figure 2.4: Average marginal effects conditional on the capital ratio
The graph shows the average marginal effects of our cross-sectional uncertainty measures
derived from bank-level data (UncBank) on loan supply conditional on the range of values
for the Ratio of Tier 1 regulatory capital to assets (in %) as observed in the sample. The
measures for uncertainty in banking are based on (a) Total assets in thousands of USD,
(b) Short-term funding (in thousands of USD) obtained by taking the sum of deposits
from banks, repos and cash collateral, and other deposits and short-term borrowings, (c)
Productivity estimated as proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), (d) RoA, which is the
ratio of operating profits to total assets (in %). The estimated marginal effects are denoted
by dots, which are surrounded by 95 percent confidence bands.
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Figure 2.5: Average marginal effects conditional on the liquidity ratio
The graph shows the average marginal effects of our cross-sectional uncertainty measures
derived from bank-level data (UncBank) on loan supply conditional on the range of values
for the Ratio of liquid assets to assets (in %) as observed in the sample. The measures
for uncertainty in banking are based on (a) Total assets in thousands of USD, (b) Short-
term funding (in thousands of USD) obtained by taking the sum of deposits from banks,
repos and cash collateral, and other deposits and short-term borrowings, (c) Productivity
estimated as proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), (d) RoA, which is the ratio of
operating profits to total assets (in %). The estimated marginal effects are denoted by dots,
which are surrounded by 95 percent confidence bands.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics
The table shows summary statistics for the explanatory variables. Panel (a) provides descrip-
tive statistics for the bank-level variables that are based on the banks belonging to one of the
sample countries, over the period 1998-2012. Liquid assets/assets measures the fraction of
the liquidity held by a bank relative to total assets (in %). To measure capitalization we use
the Capital/assets ratio (in percent). Deposits/assets denotes the share of customer deposits
to balance sheet total (in percent). Log total assets denotes the logarithm of bank assets in
thousands of USD. To control for committed loan obligations, we use the ratio Committed
loans/(committed loans + assets) (in %).
Panel (b) shows summary statistics for the cross-sectional uncertainty measures derived from
bank-level data. The measures are based on balance sheet data (total assets and short-term
funding), productivity, and profitability (RoA). Total assets are in thousands of USD. Short-
term funding (in thousands of USD) is obtained by taking the sum of deposits from banks,
repos and cash collateral, and other deposits and shortterm borrowings. Productivity is esti-
mated as proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). RoA is the ratio of operating profits to
total assets (in %). For each of these variables, we first compute time-varying bank-specific
shocks as described in Section 2.3.2. We then calculate the cross-sectional dispersion per
country and year by taking the standard deviation across the shocks of all banks in one
country and year. For more details, see the description in the Data Appendix.
Observa-
tions Mean
Standard
deviation Skewness Kurtosis Min Max
(a) Bank-level variables
Liquid assets/assets 34,686 17.47 15.85 1.64 5.68 1.14 77.55
Capital/assets 27,762 14.04 8.08 2.92 14.22 4.86 58.74
Deposits/assets 73,683 65.84 22.83 −1.18 3.87 0.58 95.81
Log total assets 74,537 13.81 1.91 0.59 3.49 9.80 19.73
Comm. loans/ (comm.
loans + assets)
43,456 5.85 7.37 2.69 11.75 0.00 44.09
(b) Uncertainty in banking
Total assets 684 11.64 5.55 0.79 3.78 0.00 36.88
Short-term funding 676 64.98 29.30 0.70 4.71 0.00 223.99
Productivity 536 16.06 13.75 3.27 20.29 0.00 132.06
RoA 683 1.05 0.65 1.66 8.98 0.00 5.95
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Table 2.2: Uncertainty in banking vs. alternative uncertainty measures
The table shows regressions in which the dependent variables are our uncertainty measures
based on (a) total assets, (b) short-term funding, (c) productivity, and (d) return on assets
(RoA). The sample covers 48 countries over the period 1998-2012. The explanatory variables
that vary across columns are alternative measures of uncertainty and include Bank stock
return volatility computed as the volatility of weekly bank index returns for each year, Stock
market volatility computed as the volatility of monthly stock market index returns for each
year, Firm return dispersion calculated as the standard deviation of quarterly returns across
firms, and GDP volatility computed as the three-year rolling volatility of quarterly (year-
over-year) real GDP growth. All regressions are estimated with a (nonreported) constant
and include time fixed effects as well as country fixed effects. For more information on the
variables, see the Data Appendix. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bank stock
return
volatility
Stock
market
volatility
Firm return
dispersion
GDP
volatility
Dispersion of shocks to total
assets growth
0.332∗∗∗ 0.104 −0.016 0.285∗
(0.121) (0.108) (0.067) (0.168)
Observations 658 647 405 652
R2 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.09
Number of countries 48 47 31 47
Dispersion of shocks to
short-term funding growth
1.861∗∗ 0.245 −0.128 1.977∗∗
(0.843) (0.771) (0.252) (0.949)
Observations 651 639 397 645
R2 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.05
Number of countries 48 47 31 47
Dispersion of shocks to
productivity growth
−0.032 0.310 0.343 −0.121
(0.430) (0.329) (0.237) (0.187)
Observations 528 517 318 524
R2 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.04
Number of countries 47 46 30 46
Dispersion of shocks to return
on assets (RoA)
0.074∗∗∗ 0.034∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗
(0.022) (0.018) (0.006) (0.019)
Observations 657 646 404 651
R2 0.16 0.09 0.09 0.10
Number of countries 48 47 31 47
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Table 2.3: Uncertainty and loan supply: baseline regressions
The table reports fixed effects regressions. The dependent variable is the change in loans
divided by total assets of the previous period. The explanatory variables include macro
variables, bank-level variables, the cross-sectional uncertainty measures derived from bank-
level data (UncBank) (as denoted in columns 1-4), and interactions of the latter with the
bank-level variables. All bank-level variables are lagged by one period. The sample comprises
yearly data of banks in 48 countries over the time period 1998-2012. The regressions take into
account bank and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by individual bank and
depicted in parentheses. All variables are centered around their means if they are interacted
to facilitate interpretation of estimated coefficients. All measures for uncertainty in banking
derived from bank-level data are standardized. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable:
∆Loans/assetst−1
Measure of uncertainty
Total assets
dispersion
Short-term
funding
dispersion
Productivity
dispersion
RoA
dispersion
Macro variables
∆Log GDP deflatort 0.341∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.322∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
∆Log real GDPt 0.618∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗ 0.563∗∗∗ 0.623∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.088) (0.084) (0.083)
Bank-level variables
Liquid assets/assetst−1 0.082∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.029) (0.023) (0.022)
Capital/assetst−1 0.108∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.081
(0.056) (0.062) (0.056) (0.054)
Deposits/assetst−1 0.058∗ 0.070∗∗ 0.069∗∗ 0.065∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031)
Log total assetst−1 −3.962∗∗∗ −3.393∗∗∗ −3.527∗∗∗ −3.771∗∗∗
(0.924) (0.913) (0.906) (0.869)
Comm. loans/(comm. loans + assets)t−1 0.101∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗ 0.087∗∗
(0.045) (0.053) (0.048) (0.044)
Uncertainty and interaction terms
Uncertainty in banking (UncBankt) −4.309∗∗∗ −0.355 −2.510∗∗∗ −1.335∗∗∗
(0.674) (0.504) (0.512) (0.339)
Liquid assets/assetst−1 ×UncBankt 0.036∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.019) (0.016) (0.022) (0.014)
Capital/assetst−1 ×UncBankt 0.086∗∗ −0.132∗∗∗ 0.001 0.085∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.036) (0.039) (0.028)
Deposits/assetst−1 ×UncBankt −0.001 −0.016 −0.006 −0.027∗
(0.014) (0.012) (0.019) (0.015)
Log total assetst−1 ×UncBankt 0.720∗∗∗ −0.248∗ 0.270 0.130
(0.175) (0.146) (0.185) (0.127)
Comm. loans/(comm. loans + assets)t−1
×UncBankt
−0.045 −0.118∗∗∗ −0.020 0.023
(0.033) (0.036) (0.040) (0.021)
Observations 10,282 10,282 10,164 10,282
R2 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.21
Number of banks 2,355 2,355 2,323 2,355
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Table 2.4: Uncertainty and loan supply: foreign ownership status
The table reports fixed effects regressions. The dependent variable is the change in loans
divided by total assets of the previous period. The explanatory variables include macro
variables, bank-level variables, the dummy variable Fown(0/1) indicating a bank’s foreign
ownerships status (0: domestically owned; 1: foreign-owned), the cross-sectional uncertainty
measures derived from bank-level data (UncBank) (as denoted in columns 1-4) in the host
country j, its interaction with the dummy variable Fown(0/1), and the cross-sectional un-
certainty measure derived from bank-level data in the residence country k of the largest
shareholder. All bank-level variables are lagged by one period. The sample comprises yearly
data of banks in 48 countries over the time period 1998-2012. All banks for which (foreign)
ownership status is available in the database by Claessens and Van Horen (2014) are in-
cluded. The regressions take into account bank and year fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered by individual bank and depicted in parentheses. All variables are centered around
their means if they are interacted (except for the dummy variable) to facilitate interpretation
of estimated coefficients. All measures for uncertainty in banking derived from bank-level
data are standardized. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable:
∆Loans/assetst−1
Measure of uncertainty
Total assets
dispersion
Short-term
funding
dispersion
Productivity
dispersion
RoA
dispersion
Macro variables
∆Log GDP deflatorjt 0.325∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.062) (0.062) (0.061)
∆Log real GDPjt 0.862∗∗∗ 0.853∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.118) (0.120) (0.115)
Bank-level variables
Liquid assets/assetst−1 0.096∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗ 0.080∗∗ 0.088∗∗
(0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.035)
Capital/assetst−1 0.223∗∗ 0.230∗∗ 0.245∗∗ 0.231∗∗
(0.108) (0.107) (0.113) (0.104)
Deposits/assetst−1 −0.012 −0.014 0.023 −0.008
(0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.043)
Log total assetst−1 −5.396∗∗∗ −5.385∗∗∗ −5.389∗∗∗ −5.685∗∗∗
(1.036) (0.996) (1.003) (1.081)
Comm. loans/(comm. loans + assets)t−1 0.026 0.027 0.054 −0.001
(0.065) (0.072) (0.060) (0.065)
Fown(0/1) 2.809 4.669 2.474 1.127
(4.409) (3.708) (3.569) (3.719)
Uncertainty and interaction terms
Uncertainty in banking (UncBankjt) −1.608∗∗ 0.229 −1.084∗∗ −1.778∗∗∗
(0.669) (0.410) (0.503) (0.631)
Fown(0/1)×UncBankjt −0.642 0.033 1.648∗∗ 0.516
(0.927) (0.628) (0.720) (1.024)
Uncertainty in banking (UncBankkt) −0.935 −1.618∗∗ −0.778∗∗ −0.020
(0.743) (0.740) (0.325) (0.431)
∆Log GDP deflatorkt −0.151 −0.215∗∗ −0.064 −0.171
(0.112) (0.105) (0.145) (0.107)
∆Log real GDPkt 0.038 0.011 0.011 0.014
(0.139) (0.139) (0.141) (0.155)
Observations 2,572 2,563 2,464 2,569
R2 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.28
Number of banks 633 633 611 633
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Table 2.5: Uncertainty and loan supply: financial integration
The table reports fixed effects regressions. The dependent variable is the change in loans
divided by total assets of the previous period. The explanatory variables include macro vari-
ables, bank-level variables, the openness measure, the cross-sectional uncertainty measures
derived from bank-level data (UncBank) (as denoted in columns 1-4), and its interaction with
the openness variable. All bank-level variables are lagged by one period. The sample com-
prises yearly data of banks in 48 countries over the time period 1998-2012. The regressions
take into account bank and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by individual
bank and depicted in parentheses. All variables are centered around their means if they are
interacted to facilitate interpretation of estimated coefficients. The openness measure and all
measures for uncertainty in banking derived from bank-level data are standardized. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable:
∆Loans/assetst−1
Measure of uncertainty
Total assets
dispersion
Short-term
funding
dispersion
Productivity
dispersion
RoA
dispersion
Macro variables
∆Log GDP deflatort 0.196 0.203 0.190 0.156
(0.247) (0.240) (0.232) (0.267)
∆Log real GDPt 0.190∗ 0.638∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.114) (0.102) (0.101)
Bank-level variables
Liquid assets/assetst−1 0.080∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Capital/assetst−1 0.127∗∗ 0.147∗∗ 0.152∗∗ 0.133∗∗
(0.063) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063)
Deposits/assetst−1 0.071∗∗ 0.077∗∗ 0.065∗ 0.073∗∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035)
Log total assetst−1 −3.581∗∗∗ −3.541∗∗∗ −3.478∗∗∗ −3.647∗∗∗
(0.969) (0.969) (0.952) (0.981)
Comm. loans/(comm. loans + assets)t−1 0.063 0.081 0.096∗ 0.071
(0.049) (0.050) (0.051) (0.050)
Opennesst −1.986∗∗∗ −2.004∗∗∗ −1.614∗∗∗ −1.958∗∗∗
(0.504) (0.639) (0.608) (0.578)
Uncertainty and interaction terms
Uncertainty in banking (UncBankt) −5.250∗∗∗ −2.450∗∗∗ −4.148∗∗∗ −0.561∗∗
(0.634) (0.399) (0.463) (0.260)
Opennesst ×UncBankt 0.798∗∗∗ 0.666∗∗∗ 0.879∗∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.169) (0.231) (0.196)
Observations 8,810 8,810 8,810 8,810
R2 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.21
Number of banks 1,942 1,942 1,942 1,942
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Table 2.6: Uncertainty and loan supply: alternative measures of uncertainty
The table reports fixed effects regressions. The dependent variable is the change in loans
divided by total assets of the previous period. The explanatory variables include macro
variables, bank-level variables, an alternative uncertainty measure (UNC) (as denoted in
columns 1-4), and interactions of the latter with the bank-level variables. All bank-level
variables are lagged by one period. The sample comprises yearly data of banks in 48 countries
over the time period 1998-2012. The regressions take into account bank and year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered by individual bank and depicted in parentheses. All variables
are centered around their means to facilitate interpretation of estimated coefficients. All
measures for uncertainty are standardized. The p-values are as follows: ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable:
∆Loans/assetst−1
Measure of uncertainty
Bank stock
return
volatility
Stock
market
volatility
Firm return
dispersion
GDP
volatility
Macro variables
∆Log GDP deflatort 0.361∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.063) (0.171) (0.095)
∆Log real GDPt 0.488∗∗∗ 0.619∗∗∗ 0.283∗ 0.399∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.087) (0.145) (0.086)
Bank-level variables
Liquid assets/assetst−1 0.087∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.025) (0.027) (0.024)
Capital/assetst−1 0.142∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.056) (0.059) (0.054)
Deposits/assetst−1 0.052∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.032 0.055∗
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.030)
Log total assetst−1 −3.727∗∗∗ −3.579∗∗∗ −3.723∗∗∗ −3.513∗∗∗
(0.893) (0.900) (1.018) (0.867)
Comm. loans/(comm. loans + assets)t−1 0.095∗∗ 0.086∗ 0.104∗∗ 0.090∗∗
(0.044) (0.045) (0.051) (0.046)
Uncertainty and interaction terms
Uncertainty (UNCt) −1.555∗∗∗ −0.291 −1.180∗∗ −3.669∗∗∗
(0.246) (0.294) (0.550) (0.434)
Liquid assets/assetst−1 ×UNCt 0.005 0.019 0.031∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012)
Capital/assetst−1 ×UNCt 0.071∗∗∗ 0.020 −0.018 0.148∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.024) (0.039) (0.032)
Deposits/assetst−1 ×UNCt 0.010 0.017∗ 0.026 0.000
(0.007) (0.009) (0.020) (0.013)
Log total assetst−1 ×UNCt 0.195∗∗∗ −0.033 0.011 0.366∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.066) (0.152) (0.099)
Comm. loans/(comm. loans + assets)t−1
×UNCt
−0.003 −0.011 −0.059∗ 0.012
(0.012) (0.019) (0.033) (0.035)
Observations 10,277 10,248 8,562 10,230
R2 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.22
Number of banks 2,354 2,344 1,828 2,348
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Table 2.7: Uncertainty and loan supply: country-year fixed effects
The table reports fixed effects regressions. The dependent variable is the change in loans
divided by total assets of the previous period. The explanatory variables include bank-level
variables, the cross-sectional uncertainty measures derived from bank-level data (UncBank)
(as denoted in columns 1-4), and interactions of the latter with the bank-level variables. All
bank-level variables are lagged by one period. The sample comprises yearly data of banks
in 48 countries over the time period 1998-2012. The regressions take into account bank and
country-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by individual bank and depicted in
parentheses. All variables are centered around their means if they are interacted to facilitate
interpretation of estimated coefficients. All measures for uncertainty in banking derived from
bank-level data are standardized. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable:
∆Loans/assetst−1
Measure of uncertainty
Total assets
dispersion
Short-term
funding
dispersion
Productivity
dispersion
RoA
dispersion
Bank-level variables
Liquid assets/assetst−1 0.075∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.029) (0.025) (0.023)
Capital/assetst−1 0.124∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.110∗
(0.058) (0.070) (0.061) (0.057)
Deposits/assetst−1 0.059∗ 0.042 0.058∗ 0.064∗
(0.033) (0.037) (0.033) (0.033)
Log total assetst−1 −3.608∗∗∗ −3.052∗∗∗ −3.370∗∗∗ −3.594∗∗∗
(0.969) (0.999) (0.978) (0.895)
Comm. loans/(comm. loans + assets)t−1 0.098∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗ 0.088∗
(0.047) (0.055) (0.048) (0.046)
Uncertainty and interaction terms
Liquid assets/assetst−1 ×UncBankt 0.082∗∗∗ −0.004 0.098∗∗∗ 0.025
(0.023) (0.015) (0.023) (0.017)
Capital/assetst−1 ×UncBankt 0.118∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗ −0.064∗ 0.082∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.039) (0.035) (0.030)
Deposits/assetst−1 ×UncBankt −0.024 0.010 0.005 −0.043∗∗
(0.021) (0.018) (0.025) (0.017)
Log total assetst−1 ×UncBankt 0.479∗∗∗ −0.456∗∗∗ −0.372∗ 0.255∗∗
(0.166) (0.165) (0.216) (0.130)
Comm. loans/(comm. loans + assets)t−1
×UncBankt
−0.066∗ −0.105∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.019
(0.035) (0.037) (0.045) (0.025)
Observations 10,282 10,282 10,164 10,282
R2 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.31
Number of banks 2,355 2,355 2,323 2,355
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Table 2.8: Uncertainty and loan supply: subgroup size
The table reports fixed effects regressions. The dependent variable is the change in loans
divided by total assets of the previous period. The explanatory variables include macro
variables, bank-level variables, the cross-sectional uncertainty measures derived from bank-
level data (UncBank) (as denoted in columns 1-4), and interactions of the latter with the
bank-level variables. The level of aggregation is changed from the country to bank size,
that is, standard deviations are taken across (i) small and (ii) large banks in the sample.
A bank is defined as large if its assets are above the median of all banks in the respective
country. All bank-level variables are lagged by one period. The sample comprises yearly
data of banks in 48 countries over the time period 1998-2012. The regressions take into
account bank and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by individual bank and
depicted in parentheses. All variables are centered around their means if they are interacted
to facilitate interpretation of estimated coefficients. All measures for uncertainty in banking
derived from bank-level data are standardized. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable:
∆Loans/assetst−1
Measure of uncertainty
Total assets
dispersion
Short-term
funding
dispersion
Productivity
dispersion
RoA
dispersion
Macro variables
∆Log GDP deflatort 0.335∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
∆Log real GDPt 0.658∗∗∗ 0.650∗∗∗ 0.630∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.085) (0.084) (0.084)
Bank-level variables
Liquid assets/assetst−1 0.100∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Capital/assetst−1 0.128∗∗ 0.138∗∗ 0.140∗∗ 0.136∗∗
(0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
Deposits/assetst−1 0.056∗ 0.058∗ 0.065∗∗ 0.062∗∗
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Log total assetst−1 −3.814∗∗∗ −3.597∗∗∗ −3.620∗∗∗ −3.838∗∗∗
(0.862) (0.914) (0.906) (0.915)
Comm. loans/(comm. loans + assets)t−1 0.097∗∗ 0.099∗∗ 0.092∗∗ 0.092∗∗
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044)
Uncertainty and interaction terms
Uncertainty in banking (UncBankt) −0.747∗∗ −0.256 0.077 −1.224∗∗∗
(0.314) (0.352) (0.127) (0.391)
Liquid assets/assetst−1 ×UncBankt −0.003 0.021∗ −0.030∗∗∗ 0.015
(0.009) (0.013) (0.007) (0.010)
Capital/assetst−1 ×UncBankt −0.051∗∗∗ −0.013 0.011 0.016
(0.019) (0.026) (0.013) (0.019)
Deposits/assetst−1 ×UncBankt 0.005 −0.008 −0.027∗∗∗ 0.008
(0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.008)
Log total assetst−1 ×UncBankt −0.122∗∗ −0.066 −0.122∗∗ 0.075
(0.057) (0.078) (0.050) (0.066)
Comm. loans/(comm. loans + assets)t−1
×UncBankt
−0.019 0.010 −0.023∗∗ −0.009
(0.016) (0.019) (0.011) (0.017)
Observations 10,283 10,283 10,283 10,283
R2 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.21
Number of banks 2,355 2,355 2,355 2,355
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Table 2.9: Uncertainty and loan supply: subgroup specialization
The table reports fixed effects regressions. The dependent variable is the change in loans
divided by total assets of the previous period. The explanatory variables include macro
variables, bank-level variables, the cross-sectional uncertainty measures derived from bank-
level data (UncBank) (as denoted in columns 1-4), and interactions of the latter with the
bank-level variables. The level of aggregation is changed from the country to bank special-
ization, that is, standard deviations are taken across (i) savings and cooperative banks and
(ii) commercial banks in the sample. All bank-level variables are lagged by one period. The
sample comprises yearly data of banks in 48 countries over the time period 1998-2012. The
regressions take into account bank and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by
individual bank and depicted in parentheses. All variables are centered around their means
if they are interacted to facilitate interpretation of estimated coefficients. All measures for
uncertainty in banking derived from bank-level data are standardized. The p-values are as
follows: ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable:
∆Loans/assetst−1
Measure of uncertainty
Total assets
dispersion
Short-term
funding
dispersion
Productivity
dispersion
RoA
dispersion
Macro variables
∆Log GDP deflatort 0.307∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.058)
∆Log real GDPt 0.662∗∗∗ 0.598∗∗∗ 0.590∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.084) (0.086) (0.086)
Bank-level variables
Liquid assets/assetst−1 0.094∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.026) (0.025) (0.023)
Capital/assetst−1 0.146∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.083
(0.048) (0.058) (0.051) (0.052)
Deposits/assetst−1 0.063∗∗ 0.066∗∗ 0.078∗∗ 0.058∗
(0.029) (0.033) (0.033) (0.031)
Log total assetst−1 −3.692∗∗∗ −3.423∗∗∗ −3.313∗∗∗ −3.962∗∗∗
(0.923) (0.905) (0.907) (0.935)
Comm. loans/(comm. loans + assets)t−1 0.163∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.057) (0.050) (0.048)
Uncertainty and interaction terms
Uncertainty in banking (UncBankt) −2.651∗∗∗ −1.368∗ −1.987∗∗∗ −2.526∗∗∗
(0.941) (0.816) (0.433) (0.432)
Liquid assets/assetst−1 ×UncBankt 0.000 −0.021 0.013 0.023
(0.016) (0.022) (0.014) (0.016)
Capital/assetst−1 ×UncBankt −0.012 −0.066 −0.007 0.070∗
(0.037) (0.048) (0.031) (0.036)
Deposits/assetst−1 ×UncBankt −0.009 −0.017 −0.033∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.020) (0.019) (0.013) (0.018)
Log total assetst−1 ×UncBankt 0.131 −0.348∗ −0.287∗∗ 0.367∗∗
(0.198) (0.180) (0.137) (0.156)
Comm. loans/(comm. loans + assets)t−1
×UncBankt
−0.082∗∗ −0.139∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.040) (0.025) (0.030)
Observations 10,283 10,283 10,283 10,283
R2 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21
Number of banks 2,355 2,355 2,355 2,355
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Liquidity Provision, Financial Vulnerability,
and Internal Adjustment to a Sudden Stop
3.1 Motivation
The global financial crisis and the euro area sovereign debt crisis led to massive reversals
in capital flows into European periphery countries. In response to these developments
– and the associated stress in the financial sector – the Eurosystem has launched mas-
sive liquidity assistance programs. While countries in the euro area periphery (Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain; henceforth GIIPS) could access liquidity provided by
the Eurosystem, European periphery countries pegging against the euro but outside
the euro area could not (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania; BELL). Because of the
fixed exchange rate regime, neither the GIIPS nor the BELL countries could respond
immediately to this liquidity shock through a devaluation of their currency. Hence, the
necessary adjustment to the liquidity shock had to take place internally.
In this paper, we exploit this setting to shed light on the following questions: Did
enhanced liquidity provision by the Eurosystem, e.g. long-term refinancing operations
and the full allotment policy, affect the pattern of internal adjustment after the 2008
financial crisis? And if it did, what is the key channel through which it affected ad-
justment dynamics?
Figures 3.1 to 3.3 illustrate the macroeconomic background in the BELL and the
GIIPS countries. The private capital flows series of BELL and GIIPS countries demon-
strate that private liquidity inflows into these countries evaporated rapidly (Figure
3.1). The Eurosystem responded by means of non-standard monetary policy measures.
These measures are implemented by the national central banks, and their balance sheets
record increased liquidity provision through lending operations on the asset side, and
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a corresponding increase in liabilities vis-à-vis the entire Eurosystem (ECB, 2013).
Because cross-border payment flows in the euro area are settled via the TARGET2
payment system, net balances of the national central banks in TARGET2 reflect the
uneven distribution of central bank liquidity within the Eurosystem (Cour-Thimann,
2013; ECB, 2013; Lipponer and Ulbrich, 2012). The strong increase in TARGET2 net
liabilities of the national central banks in the GIIPS countries as shown in Figure 3.2
documents that banks in these countries increasingly turned to liquidity provided by
the Eurosystem as a substitute for dried-up or even reversing private capital inflows
(Cecchetti et al., 2012). In contrast, the BELL countries – not being members of the
Eurosystem – did not have access to those liquidity support measures.
Figure 3.3 illustrates that the macroeconomic adjustment dynamics in the GIIPS
and the BELL countries are also markedly different: In the GIIPS countries, nominal
and real unit labor costs have decreased modestly, while prices have remained basically
constant since the crisis. In the BELL countries, by contrast, real and nominal unit
labor costs have decreased strongly, while prices in fact increased.
To identify the impact of Eurosystem liquidity provision on the internal adjust-
ment since the liquidity shock, we draw on cross-sector, cross-country panel data. Two
sources of variation in the data allow us to identify this effect. First, we use the vari-
ation in the access to and amount of liquidity provided by the Eurosystem across the
BELL and the GIIPS countries. Second, we use the variation in the degree of financial
vulnerability across the sectors of the economy. Our empirical specification builds on
the seminal work of Rajan and Zingales (1998). We focus on identifying the interac-
tion of liquidity support by the Eurosystem with a measure of financial vulnerability.
Using sectoral data and focusing on this interaction effect enables us to disentangle the
effect of liquidity provision on adjustment to the liquidity shock from other common
omitted variables by including time-varying country-specific and time-varying sector-
specific fixed effects. Hence, concerns about potential omitted variables constituting
conflicting alternative explanations are minimized.
Our analysis yields the following robust results: First, liquidity provision by the
Eurosystem reduces adjustment in real unit labor costs and real wages, especially in
financially vulnerable sectors. Second, financially vulnerable sectors with access to
central bank liquidity increase prices by a smaller amount relative to financially vul-
nerable sectors without liquidity support. Third, we do not find a significant effect on
either the adjustment in labor productivity or the adjustment in nominal unit labor
costs and nominal wages.
Our finding that liquidity provision by the Eurosystem affects adjustment by reduc-
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ing price increases in financially vulnerable sectors relates to recent theoretical work
analyzing the effects of liquidity shocks in models featuring financial frictions. In a
standard New-Keynesian DSGE model with financial frictions, Christiano et al. (2015)
show that a jump in financing costs induces firms to increase prices. The intuition is
that the increase in the costs of working capital increases marginal costs, which firms
pass on to consumers by increasing prices. We conjecture that the more financially
vulnerable the sector, the stronger this channel should be.
Similarly, Gilchrist et al. (2015) develop a menu-cost model with heterogeneous
firms, in which firms face financial frictions while setting prices in a customer-markets
setting. Firms with limited access to external liquidity have an incentive to increase
prices in response to adverse financial shocks compared to firms with better access
to liquidity. These results are consistent with firms that aim at preserving internal
liquidity in order to avoid raising (costly) external finance. Lastly, Dou and Ji (2015)
build a dynamic structural finance model with imperfect capital markets. One of their
key findings is that financially constrained firms are more inclined to increase markups.1
Although these papers do not directly analyze how liquidity provision by the cen-
tral bank interacts with liquidity shocks, it is straightforward to link these theoretical
mechanisms to our findings: A number of recent studies have convincingly shown that
liquidity provision by the Eurosystem has successfully improved funding conditions in
the euro area. Rogers et al. (2014) and Fratzscher et al. (2014) use high-frequency data
and show that the Eurosystem’s non-standard policy measures increased asset prices
and reduced borrowing costs and the fragmentation in bond markets. Von Borstel
et al. (2016) show that non-standard monetary policy was effective in lowering bank
lending rates for non-financial firms in the GIIPS countries as well. Liquidity provision
by the Eurosystem thus improved the liquidity situation of banks and, through this
channel, improved access to external funds for firms. Specifically, central bank liquidity
provision alleviated the impact of the liquidity shock induced by the sudden stop in
the GIIPS countries. From a theoretical point of view, the alleviation of the liquidity
shock in the GIIPS countries relative to the BELL countries should have lowered the
incentive for firms in the GIIPS countries to increase prices relative to firms in the
BELL countries. Furthermore, this relative difference should be most pronounced for
financially vulnerable firms. Our results show that this mechanism seems to be sup-
ported by the data.
Our findings suggest that differences in the adjustment of prices are potentially a
1 Fagan and McNelis (2014) use a modified version of the model in Mendoza (2010) to show that
access to central bank liquidity mitigates adverse real effects on GDP, consumption, and investment
due to sudden stops.
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key channel through which liquidity provision affects internal adjustment after sudden
stops. In this respect, our analysis is related to the arguments put forth by Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2016), who stress the importance of downward nominal wage rigidi-
ties. They argue that the optimal policy in this setting should be geared towards
generating price inflation to deflate real wages. Specifically, we find that liquidity pro-
vision by the Eurosystem reduces price increases in financially vulnerable sectors. The
weaker increase in prices together with nominal wages not being affected differentially
leads to lower adjustment in real wages. Ultimately, real unit labor costs are adjusted
less due to the Eurosystem’s liquidity provision.
Furthermore, the analysis in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016) implies that without
sufficient inflation, downward nominal wage rigidities prevent real wages from falling
to levels consistent with full employment. Hence, our finding that liquidity provision
mitigated the reduction in real wages in financially vulnerable sectors motivates testing
whether liquidity support had differential effects also on employment dynamics across
sectors after the sudden stop. Consistent with the channels described in Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2016), we find evidence that more financially vulnerable sectors reduce em-
ployment more strongly in countries with higher liquidity support.
Our finding that liquidity provision mitigates the reduction in real wages and, at
the same time, increases unemployment in financially vulnerable sectors is also related
to the literature on wageless versus jobless recoveries after financial crises. Calvo et al.
(2012) document that recoveries after financial shocks are followed by greater unem-
ployment the lower inflation is during the recovery. Our results add to this literature
by emphasizing the role of liquidity provision in the recovery from financial crises.
Specifically, our findings suggest that liquidity provision tends to support the making
of a jobless recovery in financially vulnerable sectors.
The analysis in this paper also highlights an important trade-off with respect to
adjustment: On the one hand, liquidity provision mitigates adjustment pressure in
certain sectors, which allows the burden of the shock to be distributed over a longer
period of time. On the other hand, there is the risk of a substantial delay or even
prevention of the necessary structural adjustment. Indeed, our results show that the
effect of liquidity provision is not limited to the absorption of the shock in the early
quarters after the sudden stop but seems to shape the adjustment path quite persis-
tently. However, it is important to bear in mind that our cross-country/cross-sector
analysis – while allowing for a cleaner identification of the effect of liquidity provision
than a purely aggregate analysis – is not suitable to draw conclusion about the role
of central bank liquidity in the adjustment dynamics since the crisis in the aggregate.
For instance, it could be that liquidity provision shifts adjustment in real wages and
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employment growth to the less financially vulnerable sectors without any effect in the
aggregate.
Our main results are robust to the inclusion of various control variables which
account for potential alternative explanations for our findings. These variables in-
clude information on financial support from the EU and/or the IMF, on reforms aimed
at increasing labor market flexibility and expectations of devaluations in the BELL
countries. In addition, we check the sensitivity of the results to alternative measures
of financial vulnerability and liquidity provision. Furthermore, we analyze the effect
of potential indirect flows of Eurosystem liquidity to BELL countries through global
banks. Finally, the results are robust to different clustering of standard errors and to
controlling for country-sector specific fixed effects.
There is already a small volume of literature studying internal adjustment in the
BELL and the GIIPS countries after the crisis. Blanchard et al. (2013) argue that in
the case of Latvia, adjustment via internal devaluation was successful but came at high
costs in terms of output and employment losses. Gros and Alcidi (2015) provide an
overview of the differences in the adjustment in the GIIPS and the BELL countries.
They find that adjustment was weaker in the euro area periphery. Similar results are
provided by Lindner (2011) and Hansson and Randveer (2013). Kang and Shambaugh
(2014) analyze adjustment in relative prices and unit labor costs in the GIIPS countries
and Baltic countries. They find that adjustment in unit labor costs was mainly due to
falling employment.
Similarly to this strand of literature, we compare the GIIPS and the BELL countries
to shut down the currency devaluation channel. However, in contrast to the existing
literature we use this set-up to identify the role of liquidity provision by the Eurosys-
tem in shaping adjustment dynamics in the GIIPS relative to the BELL countries.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we discuss the empir-
ical implementation and the data needed to answer the question of whether liquidity
provision by the Eurosystem affected internal adjustment dynamics after the liquidity
shock. In Section 3.3, we present and discuss the main results. Additional results
and robustness analyses are presented in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5 we investigate the
effects of liquidity provision on the employment dynamics. Section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2 Empirical Implementation and Data
3.2.1 Empirical Model
We aim to identify the effect of enhanced liquidity provision by the Eurosystem on in-
ternal adjustment since the liquidity shock induced by the sudden stop accompanying
the crises in the European periphery. Our main hypothesis is that adjustment pressure
due to the liquidity shock is higher in more financially vulnerable sectors. As a conse-
quence, liquidity provided by the Eurosystem – mitigating the liquidity shock – could
affect the path of internal adjustment differently across this sectoral dimension. We
are, therefore, interested in exploring an empirical relationship of the following form:
∆tlog(Yikt) = αiτ + αit + αkτ + αkt + γ [FVk × LPit] + [FVk ×Xit] + εikt (3.1)
where i indicates the country, k the sector, t the quarter since the country-specific
sudden stop, and τ is the actual (calendar) quarter. ∆tlog(Yikt) corresponds to adjust-
ment since the liquidity shock in either nominal unit labor costs, real unit labor costs,
and their components, i.e. nominal wages, real wages, labor productivity or prices.
We include a full set of time-varying fixed effects α, to control for all observed and
unobserved time-varying country-specific and sector-specific effects. We account for
arbitrary shocks occurring at actual calendar quarters (αiτ and αkτ ) because shocks
hit at a given point in (calendar) time rather than in a given quarter since the sudden
stop. This accounts for differences in timing of sudden stops across countries. FVk is
the measure for financial vulnerability. Following a large section of literature building
on Rajan and Zingales (1998) (e.g. Aghion et al., 2014; Manova, 2013), the measure of
financial vulnerability varies across sectors but is time-invariant, as indicated by the
subscript k. LPit refers to the measure of liquidity provision by the Eurosystem. The
measure varies over time and across countries. Xit is a vector of time-varying country
controls which we also interact with our measure of financial vulnerability to control
for potentially confounding factors.
The parameter of interest is γ, capturing the differential effect of an increase in
the provision of Eurosystem liquidity on adjustment given a higher sectoral financial
vulnerability. A positive (negative) coefficient indicates that, conditional on financial
vulnerability, adjustment was higher (lower) given more liquidity provision. We identify
this parameter by exploiting two sources of variation. The first is the variation between
countries in liquidity provision by the Eurosystem. The second is the within-country
variation in financial vulnerability across sectors. Throughout the analysis, unless
otherwise specified, we base our inference on standard errors clustered at the country
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level to control for within-country correlation of the errors over time and across sectors
(Bertrand et al., 2004; Petersen, 2009). In order to investigate our question empirically,
we need data and information on:
• country-specific timing of the liquidity shock
• country-specific measure of liquidity provision by the Eurosystem
• sector-specific measure of financial vulnerability
• internal adjustment since the liquidity shock
We discuss each of these items in the following. An overview of the various data
sources we rely on is presented in the Data Appendix. Summary statistics for the
variables are given in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
3.2.2 Dating the Liquidity Shock
Previous literature shows that European periphery countries experienced a sudden stop
in private capital flows (Gros and Alcidi, 2015; Merler and Pisani-Ferry, 2012; Tornell
and Westermann, 2012). We interpret sudden changes in private net capital flows into
the BELL and GIIPS countries as a substantial liquidity shock that necessitates inter-
nal adjustment.
Private capital inflows are defined as the total financial account (where a positive
entry reflects a capital inflow) minus capital transfers due to official rescue programs.
Changes in TARGET2 net liabilities are also reflected in the financial account. They
can be roughly interpreted as a measure for the substitution of dried-up private capital
inflows with central bank liquidity in the euro area crisis countries. Therefore, in the
case of the GIIPS countries, we also subtract the increase in TARGET2 net liabilities
of their national central banks.
To determine the liquidity shock periods in the BELL and the GIIPS countries,
we apply the Zivot-Andrews (1992) endogenous break-point test to the private capital
inflow series. For the time series of private capital flows into each country, we test the
null of a unit root against the alternative of a stationary process with a break in the
intercept at an endogenously determined point in time. Depending on data availability,
the time range spans from the 1990s or early 2000s to the 3rd quarter of 2013. The
number of lags included is based on the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), the time
range is trimmed by 15% from both sides.
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Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) identify sudden stops by applying a methodology
proposed by Calvo et al. (2004). They show that Greece and Ireland experienced mul-
tiple sudden stop periods during the crisis. We are only interested in the adjustment
since the first of these sudden stops. Shocks occurring after the first sudden stop will
be accounted for by the time-varying country-specific fixed effects included in the em-
pirical model. Hence, for Greece and Ireland, we only use data until the first quarter
of 2010 in order to capture the first occurrence of the sudden stop in Greece and Ireland.
The private capital inflows series for the GIIPS and the BELL countries are shown
in Figure 3.4. The vertical lines indicate the last quarter before the sudden stop period
as identified by the break-point test. Greece, Ireland, and the Baltics experienced a
sudden stop as early as 2008. Bulgaria followed in the 1st quarter of 2009. For Portugal,
the sudden stop occurred in the 2nd quarter of 2010; in Italy and Spain, the sudden
stop happened in the 2nd quarter of 2011. For most countries, the sudden stop led not
only to a reduction in net capital inflows, but also to net capital outflows (Figure 3.4).
For the BELL countries, results of the break-point test support the impression
gained by visual inspection. The same holds for the GIIPS countries, for which the
results are also in line with the sudden stop periods identified by Merler and Pisani-
Ferry (2012).
3.2.3 Liquidity Provision by the Eurosystem
As our baseline measure of liquidity provision by the Eurosystem, we use data on
TARGET2 net balances. Cour-Thimann (2013) shows that the presence of TARGET2
net balances is closely related to the liquidity provided by the Eurosystem through non-
standard measures, including the fixed-rate, full-allotment refinancing policy, the ex-
panded collateral framework, long-term refinancing operations, and outright purchases
(Securities Markets Programme, SMP, and the Covered Bond Purchase Programme,
CBPP).2
These data provide a direct measure of when and to what extent banks in the GIIPS
countries have drawn on central bank liquidity as a substitute for dried-up private
liquidity inflows. This can be seen by looking at the composition of (a simplified version
of) the total financial account (TotalFA) in the balance of payments (Cour-Thimann,
2013):
TotalFA = PrivateFA + OfficialInflows + ∆T2NetLiab−∆ForeignReserves (3.2)
2 For the discussion on TARGET2 balances, see also Auer (2014); Bindseil and König (2011); Kohler
(2012); Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2012).
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Given that private liquidity – captured in the private financial account (PrivateFA)
– stops flowing into the country or even flows out of the country, ceteris paribus the
compensation of these flows through liquidity provided by the Eurosystem leads to an
increase in TARGET2 net liabilities (T2NetLiab). This holds true for any kind of cen-
tral bank liquidity provision, hence also for national central banks’ emergency liquidity
assistance, or ELA (Cour-Thimann, 2013). Therefore, we use TARGET2 net liabili-
ties as our preferred measure of central bank liquidity provision in the GIIPS countries.3
Non-euro area members cannot accumulate liabilities vis-à-vis the Eurosystem in
the TARGET2 payment system. We therefore set TARGET2 net balances to zero for
Estonia and Latvia prior to their introduction of the euro in 2011 and 2014 respectively,
and for the whole period for Bulgaria and Lithuania.
TARGET2 net liabilities in the GIIPS countries were negligible before the crisis but
grew considerably starting from the 2nd quarter of 2008 in Ireland and Greece, the 2nd
quarter of 2010 in Portugal, and the 2nd quarter of 2011 in Italy and Spain. TARGET2
net liabilities peaked in the 4th quarter of 2010 in Ireland at about 74% of GDP and in
the 3rd quarter of 2012 at about 48% in Greece. The peak amounted to roughly 44%
in Portugal in the 2nd quarter of 2012, 39% in Spain in the 2nd quarter of 2012, and
18% in Italy in the 3rd quarter of 2012. Since then, TARGET2 net liabilities decreased
but remained well above the pre-crisis figures in most countries. Estonia had mostly
positive net claims against the Eurosystem since introducing the euro, while Latvia’s
net liabilities amount to about 10% of GDP at the end of the observation period, i.e.
in the 2nd quarter of 2014.4
3.2.4 Financial Vulnerability
Wemeasure financial vulnerability using the euro area-wide aggregate borrowing growth
rate of a given sector over the period from 2003 (1st quarter) to 2008 (1st quarter). This
measure varies across sectors but not across countries. Growth in borrowing acts as
a measure of financial vulnerability because sectors borrowing more before the crisis
should also be most affected by a negative liquidity shock.
The measure might reflect the structural need to obtain external funding, but could
also be partly driven by the pre-crisis credit boom. What is important for our purpose
is that, in either case, sectors relying more on external funding before the sudden stop
should be most affected by the withdrawal of liquidity induced by the sudden stop.
Consequently, the need for internal adjustment should be highest in these sectors.
3 In a robustness exercise, we also measure liquidity provision by the refinancing operations of the
Eurosystem.
4 This description is based on country-specific data on TARGET2 net liabilities that are not reported.
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We use this variation in financial vulnerability across sectors to identify the differen-
tial effect of Eurosystem liquidity provision on adjustment dynamics at the sector level.
Financial vulnerability is measured at the euro area level. We thus assume that
financial frictions vary across sectors, not across countries. Because our financial vul-
nerability measure varies across sectors but not across countries, it is related to the
measure of financial dependence by Rajan and Zingales (1998). They build a mea-
sure of financial dependence based on the fraction of firms’ capital expenditure not
financed by cash flows, which has been used extensively in subsequent work.5 How-
ever, the financial vulnerability measure of Rajan and Zingales (1998) is available only
for industries within the manufacturing sector. Hence, using their measure is not an
option for us because our data also include other sectors, such as services. Finally, an
important feature of our measure is that it is predetermined, i.e. it is not affected by
developments after the sudden stop. Otherwise, we could not rule out reverse causality
because the path of internal adjustment might in turn affect the need for (domestic or
cross-border) funding.
We show the measure of financial vulnerability in Figure 3.5. The construction,
real estate, and science sectors are the most financially vulnerable. The high value for
construction partly reflects the pre-crisis boom in the housing market. However, as
noted above, a high value for the vulnerability measure implies that the construction
sector should be affected more by the withdrawal of liquidity and needs to make a
greater adjustment. The sectors that are least dependent on external finance are total
industry and the information technology sector.
We run a number of robustness tests to check the sensitivity of our results to
changing the exact definition of the financial vulnerability measure. We also construct
an alternative measure of financial vulnerability based on asset tangibility along the
lines of Manova (2013) and show that our findings are robust.
3.2.5 Internal Adjustment Since the Sudden Stop
Both the BELL and the GIIPS countries were unable to respond to the liquidity shock
induced by the sudden stop through currency devaluations. Because of the fixed ex-
change rate regime, they had to adjust entirely through internal adjustment. Our
variables measuring internal adjustment are sectoral nominal and real unit labor costs.
These variables are proxies for cost competitiveness. In addition to real and nominal
unit labor costs, we also analyze their components, i.e. real and nominal wages, la-
5 The measure is derived as the median of this fraction across publicly traded firms in each industry
in the US manufacturing sector.
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bor productivity, and prices to investigate any potential compositional effects (Darvas,
2012).6 We compute sectoral unit labor costs using Eurostat data for nine sectors
based on the NACE Rev. 2 classification.7 Nominal unit labor costs (ULC ) (i.e. labor
costs over labor productivity) in sector i in country k are defined as the ratio of total
compensation to real gross value added (GVA) in each sector for each quarter t. To
account for the number of self-employed people in a given sector, we multiply this ratio
by the total number of employees (total employment) relative to the total number of
dependent employees:8
ULC ikt =
Labor costikt
Labor prod.ikt
= Total compen.iktReal GVAikt
× Total empl.(pers.)iktTotal dep.employees (pers.)ikt
(3.3)
We construct real unit labor costs (RULC ) by dividing ULC ikt by the sectoral price
deflator Pikt :
RULC ikt =
ULC ikt
P ikt
(3.4)
By applying log differences, (approximate) percentage changes in unit labor costs
can be decomposed into the following components:
∆logULC ikt = ∆logRULC ikt + ∆logP ikt
= ∆logRealWagesikt −∆logLabor prod.ikt + ∆logP ikt (3.5)
Real wages are defined as real total compensation divided by total hours worked,
and labor productivity as real gross value added divided by total hours worked.
We calculate internal adjustment to the sudden stop based on nominal and real
6 There are no seasonally adjusted data on the sectoral variables used to compute unit labor costs for
all countries. We account for seasonality by computing four-quarter moving sums of flow variables
(total compensation, gross value added) and four-quarter moving averages of stock variables (total
employment, number of employees) for each quarter. This approach provides us with annualized
measures of the variables which enter the computation of unit labor costs. As a result, unit labor
costs have the interpretation of an annualized variable as well.
7 Estimation is based on 9, not the usual 10, sectors as there are no data for dependence on external
finance for the financial & insurance sector. See the Data Appendix for a detailed overview of the
sectoral disaggregation.
8 The methodology used by Eurostat to compute the nominal unit labor cost index as part of
the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure is essentially the same but includes real GDP instead
of real gross value added in the denominator (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/macroeconomic-
imbalances-procedure/methodology). Our time series of nominal and real unit labor costs based on
all sectors (not reported) closely tracks the seasonally adjusted series provided by Eurostat as part
of the quarterly national accounts database (ESA 95).
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unit labor costs, nominal and real wages, and sectoral prices as follows:
∆tlogY ikt = −1× [logY ikt − logY ikt=0] (3.6)
where Y = [ULC ,RULC ,Nominal wages,Real wages,P], i denotes the country, k the
sector and t the quarter since the sudden stop. We define t = 0 as the last quarter
before the sudden stop. The term in brackets measures the change in unit labor costs
since the sudden stop period relative to the pre-sudden stop value. The term is mul-
tiplied by minus one to capture the fact that more adjustment is associated with a
reduction in the respective variable. Regarding labor productivity, an increase reflects
more adjustment so we do not multiply the term by minus one.
Table 3.1 shows summary statistics for the adjustment measures based on sectoral
nominal and real unit labor costs as well as their components for the GIIPS and the
BELL countries. Based on nominal unit labor costs, adjustment in the GIIPS countries
was strongest in the real estate sector (10.3%) and weakest in the trade, travel, and
food services sector (-9.3%). For the BELL countries, the highest (lowest) adjustment
took place in the industry (information and communication) sector, with a reduction
in unit labor costs of 3.7% (-22.7%). The table shows that real and nominal unit labor
costs vary considerably. Additionally, the high standard deviations indicate that there
is also considerable variation over time within sectors, which will be relevant for the
subsequent empirical analysis.9
3.3 The Effect of Liquidity Provision on Internal
Adjustment
We report the results for adjustment in nominal unit labor costs in Table 3.3 and the
results for real unit labor costs in Table 3.4. All regressions include the full set of
time-varying country-specific and time-varying sector-specific fixed effects. Column 1
in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 shows the results of a “plain vanilla” regression which – besides
the fixed effects – includes only the interaction of TARGET2 net liabilities with the
measure of financial vulnerability. In the remaining columns we show the results from
regressions including additional control variables. Note that all control variables are
interacted with the financial vulnerability measure.
In column 2, we show the results of a regression that controls for official rescue
packages from the European Union and the IMF. Countries in our sample have had
9 These numbers are based on detailed summary statistics for individual sectors which, for the sake
of brevity, are not reported. They may be obtained from the authors upon request.
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access to official rescue programs, such as funds provided under the European rescue
facilities EFSF (European Financial Stability Facility), EFSM (European Financial
Stabilization Mechanism), ESM (European Stability Mechanism), bilateral loans from
EU countries, and IMF loans. We include the official rescue packages because they are
an additional channel through which the effects of the liquidity shock induced by the
sudden stop can be mitigated. In column 3 we add employment figures at the sector
level. As argued by Kang and Shambaugh (2014), part of the internal adjustment
might be induced by mass lay-offs during the crisis. This labor shedding reflects a col-
lapse in demand rather than structural internal adjustment. We account for this labor
shedding effect. We lag the employment variable by one quarter to avoid simultaneity
problems when including this sectoral variable. In column 4 we add the real and nom-
inal effective exchange rate as well as the 3-month forward exchange rate. Even in a
fixed exchange rate regime, the value of the domestic currency might vary. By including
both nominal and real effective exchange rates we implicitly control for trade-weighted
inflation differentials. The 3-month forward exchange rate captures potential currency
devaluation expectations in the BELL countries. In column 5 we control for the general
macroeconomic conditions by including year-on-year growth rates of nominal GDP and
of the GDP deflator. In addition, we add trade openness, defined as the sum of exports
and imports over GDP. Finally, column 6, which is our preferred specification, includes
all control variables simultaneously.10
Turning to the parameter of interest – the interaction effect of liquidity provision
by the Eurosystem and financial vulnerability – the results in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 give a
robust message. We find no statistically significant effects in the regressions on nominal
unit labor costs. That is, enhanced liquidity provision did not affect the differential
adjustment pattern between more and less financially vulnerable sectors. By contrast,
for real unit labor costs, the point estimate is always negative and significant at conven-
tional significance levels. Based on our preferred specification in column 6, an increase
of one standard deviation in liquidity provision reduces real unit labor cost adjustment
by roughly 8 percentage points for each one standard deviation higher value of financial
vulnerability.
To illustrate the magnitude of this effect, the sector with the highest financial vul-
nerability (construction) should reduce real unit labor costs by 1.3% less than the
sector with the lowest financial vulnerability (trade, travel and food services) when
increasing liquidity support by one standard deviation (approximately 0.19).11 By way
of comparison, the average adjustment in real unit labor costs is 2.5%.
10Summary statistics of all control variables are presented in Table 3.2.
11The calculation is based on the following formula: 0.08× 0.19× (1.12− 0.26) = 0.0132
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The differences in the responses of real and nominal unit labor costs pose the ques-
tion as to what mechanism drives the reaction of real unit labor costs but is missing
for nominal unit labor costs. To dig deeper into the transmission mechanism, we re-
estimate Equation (3.1) for adjustment in real and nominal wages, labor productivity,
and prices. We show the results of these exercises in Table 3.5. Column 1 shows the
results using real wages as the dependent variable, column 2 using nominal wages,
column 3 labor productivity and column 4 prices. We report only the results from
our preferred specification including all control variables (interacted with the financial
vulnerability measure) simultaneously.
The results show that liquidity support by the Eurosystem does not differentially
affect the adjustment dynamics of nominal wages (column 2) and labor productivity
(column 3). By contrast, the parameter on the interaction of liquidity support with
financial vulnerability is negative and highly significant in the regression using real
wages as the dependent variable (column 1). Hence, more financially constrained sec-
tors adjust real wages less when liquidity provision through the Eurosystem increases.
This is akin to the results for real unit labor costs. Probably most surprising is the pos-
itive and highly significant coefficient in the price regression (column 4). The positive
coefficient implies that, conditional on financial vulnerability, higher liquidity provi-
sion by the Eurosystem leads to lower price increases. This is surprising given that
non-standard monetary policy measures are considered to be inflationary. Our result,
however, reflects the interplay between liquidity provision and a large negative liquidity
shock. In this respect, our finding is consistent with theories emphasizing the inflation-
ary effects of liquidity shocks as reviewed in the introduction (Gilchrist et al., 2015).
By mitigating the liquidity shock, the liquidity support program has also reduced the
inflationary pressure of the shock, and this effect is most pronounced for financially
vulnerable sectors.
The results for the components of (real) unit labor costs shed light on the channel
through which liquidity provision by the Eurosystem affects adjustment dynamics after
the liquidity shock induced by the sudden stop. We find that liquidity provision does
not affect adjustment of nominal wages. However, prices increase by a lower amount
in countries with access to Eurosystem liquidity (GIIPS countries), and this effect is
particularly strong in financially vulnerable sectors. As Equation (3.4) illustrates, a
lower price increase coupled with constant nominal wages and nominal unit labor costs
leads to a lower reduction in real wages and real unit labor costs in the GIIPS countries
relative to the BELL countries (the countries without access to Eurosystem liquidity).
These effects are most pronounced in the sectors that are most financially vulnerable.
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3.4 Additional Results and Robustness
3.4.1 Alternative Measures of Liquidity Provision
We have so far captured the effect of liquidity provision by the Eurosystem through
TARGET2 net liabilities. TARGET2 net liabilities reflect liquidity provision by the
Eurosystem as long as the latter meets asymmetric funding needs of banking systems
across national borders of the euro area. This is the case during the period under
review because the banking systems in distressed countries lost access to private inter-
bank markets as a whole.
To demonstrate that our approach is sensible, we replace TARGET2 net liabilities
in Equation (3.1) with the refinancing operations of banks in the GIIPS countries with
their respective national central banks (NCBs). The refinancing operations give us
the most direct measure of liquidity provision by the Eurosystem to the financial sys-
tem. The drawback is that we do not capture liquidity provision by NCBs outside the
common monetary policy framework, such as Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA)
Cour-Thimann (2013). For the BELL countries, we set the amount of refinancing at
zero. Consistent with the treatment of the TARGET2 net liabilities, we include the
volume of refinancing operations relative to 2007 GDP in the regression equation.
We present the results of this exercise in Table 3.6. We show the results for the six
dependent variables (real and nominal unit labor costs, real and nominal wages, labor
productivity and prices) from our preferred specification, which includes all control
variables simultaneously. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar
to our main result. The effect of the interaction between central bank refinancing op-
erations and financial vulnerability is negative and highly significant in the regression
using real unit labor costs and real wages. Also, the effect remains positive and highly
significant in the regression using prices as the dependent variable.
All in all, the results from this robustness test suggest that TARGET2 net liabilities
do indeed capture, first and foremost, the effect emanating from liquidity provision by
the Eurosystem.
We have so far assumed that the central banks of the BELL countries were unable to
support their financial system because they committed to defending the fixed exchange
rate peg to the euro. However, insofar as foreign currency reserves were sufficiently
high, the BELL central banks potentially had scope to provide liquidity support to the
financial system. If this is the case, our previous results would be misleading. We test
for this alternative by replacing in Equation (3.1) the TARGET2 net liabilities with
the accumulated change in the size of the respective national central banks’ balance
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sheets over the adjustment horizon, that is, since the liquidity shock. The idea is that
central bank operations providing additional liquidity support increase the asset side
of the central bank balance sheet.
In Table 3.7, we present the results of the regressions using the size of the central
bank balance sheet (scaled by 2007 GDP) as a measure of liquidity provision. Our
results are qualitatively the same as in our benchmark model. In line with the findings
of the baseline regression, the effect is negative and statistically significant for real unit
labor costs and real wages, and positive and significant for prices. The point estimates
are somewhat smaller compared to the baseline regressions in Tables 3.3 to 3.5.
3.4.2 Reverse Causality
A potential concern with respect to our analysis so far is the fact that liquidity provi-
sion by the Eurosystem might not be exogenous to the adjustment dynamics. If this
is the case, reverse causality might bias our findings.12
We address the issue of reverse causality in two ways. In a first exercise, instead of
using the contemporaneous TARGET2 net liabilities, we use TARGET2 net liabilities
lagged by four quarters. We argue that liquidity provision by the Eurosystem one
year ago should not be determined by today’s stance of adjustment at the sector level.
The results of this test, presented in Table 3.8, are similar to our benchmark results.
The interaction effect is insignificant in the regressions for nominal unit labor costs and
nominal wages, but negative and highly significant in the real wages and real unit labor
costs regression, and positive and highly significant in the price regression. However,
the interaction effect now becomes significant in the labor productivity regression (at
the 5% level). The point estimate of the interaction effect in the price, real wages and
real unit labor costs regressions is similar in size to the effect in the baseline regression.
We take this as an additional indication against reverse causality.
The second approach we take to address the issue of reverse causality consists
of replacing the TARGET2 net liabilities with a dummy variable indicating whether
or not a country was a member of the euro area at the time of the sudden stop.
In our case, prior to the Baltic countries’ EMU membership, this is identical to an
indicator variable taking the value of one for the GIIPS countries and zero for the BELL
countries. The main advantage of this “GIIPS dummy” is that it is clearly exogenous
and predetermined. We assume that euro area membership captures, first and foremost,
the effects emanating from access to liquidity provided by the Eurosystem. The results
12We again emphasize here that reverse causality or endogeneity is not an issue for our measure of
dependence on external finance because it is calculated based on a period preceding our estimation
period.
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are presented in Table 3.9. All our previous results are confirmed by this exercise.
3.4.3 International Liquidity Flows through Global Banks
An implicit assumption in the analysis so far is that banks in the BELL countries could
not tap the liquidity provided by the Eurosystem. This assumption holds true only
for truly domestic banks in the BELL countries. However, some large European banks
have a presence in the BELL countries either through affiliates or subsidiaries (Ce-
torelli and Goldberg, 2011; De Haas et al., 2012). These large European banks might
have channeled liquidity provided by the Eurosystem to the BELL countries via their
internal capital market. For this reason, we take the full specification and additionally
add a variable capturing the cumulative change in the private financial account for
the BELL countries (relative to 2007 GDP). Any capital inflow through banks, other
financial intermediaries and private investors increases the private financial account.13
Hence, the private financial account gives a complete picture of private liquidity flows
into the BELL countries. We allow this variable to affect internal adjustment condi-
tional on financial vulnerability.
We show the results in Table 3.10. First, our key results are not affected by this
exercise. Second, except for nominal wages, the effect of the interaction between the
cumulated private financial account and the measure of financial vulnerability is always
insignificant. Hence, additional external liquidity inflows, for example through large
European banks, did not differentially affect the adjustment path since the sudden
stop.
3.4.4 Alternative Measures of Financial Vulnerability
We replace our baseline measure of financial vulnerability with the share of tangible
assets in total assets at the sector level (averages over the period from 2000 to 2007).14
Sectors with a better supply of tangible assets that can be posted as collateral to obtain
external financing should be less vulnerable to the liquidity shock (Manova, 2013). We
include the inverse of asset tangibility in the regression equation to facilitate comparison
with our baseline measure of financial vulnerability.
13Controlling for this channel seems particularly important in the BELL countries, especially towards
the end of the sample when private capital flows reversed. We do not add the private financial
account alongside the TARGET2 net liabilities for the GIIPS countries because TARGET2 net
liabilities and the private financial account are almost perfectly negatively correlated for the GIIPS
countries. That is, whenever there was a capital outflow from the GIIPS countries, the TARGET2
net liabilities increased to offset the outflow. In this respect, for the GIIPS countries the private
financial account does not contain additional information above and beyond the TARGET2 net
liabilities.
14Balance sheet data at the sector level are obtained from the BACH database. See the Data Appendix.
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According to the results in Table 3.11, replacing the financial vulnerability measure
based on MFI loan growth with the measure of financial vulnerability based on the
share of tangible and liquid assets in total assets does not affect our main finding. In
fact, both statistical significance and the size of the interaction effect are very similar
to the baseline results presented above.
We also conducted a host of robustness tests directly concerning our baseline mea-
sure of financial vulnerability. We used a dummy variable indicating whether a sector
is above-average in terms of financial vulnerability, we ranked the sectors according to
the financial vulnerability measure, and we changed the window over which we calcu-
late the growth rate in borrowings from MFIs. We give a compact presentation of the
findings in Table 3.12. In general, these sensitivity tests confirm our previous findings.
All in all, we conclude from the results presented in this section that our findings
are not very sensitive to the exact specification of the external financial vulnerability
measure based on growth in MFI loans. Also, our results are robust against the use of
alternative indicators of financial vulnerabilities proposed in the literature.
3.4.5 Controlling for Country-Sector Specific Effects
So far, we have identified the differential effect of liquidity provision on the adjustment
dynamics from the variation in financial vulnerability across sectors within and between
countries. We explicitly included the variation between countries for identification
purposes because we aim to understand the different adjustment dynamics in the GIIPS
versus the BELL countries. A drawback of this strategy is that we cannot rule out that
structural, time-invariant country-sector specific characteristics might bias our results.
To address this issue, we re-estimate our baseline specification given in Equation (3.1)
but add a full set of (time-invariant) country-sector specific fixed effects. The regression
equation now reads:
∆tlog(Yikt) = αiτ +αit +αkτ +αkt +αik + γ [FVk × LPit] + [FVk ×Xit] + εikt (3.7)
The country-sector specific fixed effects αik capture all observed and unobserved
country-sector specific structural characteristics. The parameter on the interaction
between liquidity provision and financial vulnerability, γ, is now identified only from
the within-country variation in financial vulnerability across sectors. Given that we
now use the within-country-sector variation for identification, we base our inference
on standard errors clustered at the country-sector level.15 In this way, we explicitly
15Using clustered standard errors at the country-sector level in the baseline regression does not change
our main finding.
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control for potential error correlation within the country-sector pairs over time (see,
e.g., Jiménez et al., 2014).
The results are shown in Table 3.13. All in all, the results suggest that our findings
are robust to controlling for structural country-sector specific effects.
3.4.6 Controlling for Adjustment in Labor Productivity
Our results so far show that liquidity provision by the Eurosystem reduced adjust-
ment in real wages and real unit labor costs, and reduced price inflation in financially
vulnerable sectors. We test whether this result holds if we additionally control for
past adjustment in labor productivity. The idea is that sectors that can adjust labor
productivity faster, for instance for technological reasons, due to sector-specific labor
market characteristics or due to labor market reforms with sectoral effect, might also
exhibit faster adjustment in prices, wages and unit labor costs. To study these effects
– and to check the robustness of our results – we include adjustment in lagged labor
productivity in our baseline regressions.
The results are presented in Table 3.14. The results show that labor productivity
enters all regressions, except the price regression, with a significant coefficient. The
parameter is positive in the real unit labor costs and the nominal unit labor costs re-
gression. Hence, sectors with a faster adjustment in labor productivity also adjusted
faster in terms of real and nominal unit labor costs. Interestingly, sectors with a faster
adjustment in labor productivity adjusted more slowly in terms of real and nominal
wages. This indicates that part of the adjustment in labor productivity is passed
through to the labor force.
Turning to the interaction effect, the results show that our main findings are not
affected by including lagged labor productivity adjustment. The effect remains neg-
ative in the real wages and real unit labor costs regression, and positive in the price
regression.
3.5 The Effect of Liquidity Provision on Employ-
ment
Our analysis so far has provided robust evidence that more financially vulnerable sec-
tors reduced real wages less in countries with more liquidity provision by the Eu-
rosystem. This finding motivates testing whether liquidity support had differential
effects also on employment dynamics across sectors after the sudden stop. Accord-
ing to Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016), the lower reduction in real wages over the
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adjustment period should lead to a higher reduction in employment (i.e. higher unem-
ployment) after the sudden stop. We test this hypothesis by redoing our entire exercise
including all robustness checks for adjustment in employment after the sudden stop.
We provide the results for adjustment in employment in Table 3.15. The interaction
between liquidity provision and financial vulnerability always enters the regression with
a negative sign and is significant in most specifications. The negative coefficient implies
that more financially vulnerable sectors have, on average over the adjustment horizon,
reduced employment more strongly in countries with higher liquidity provision.
3.6 Conclusions
Did the enhanced liquidity provision by the Eurosystem, e.g. long-term refinancing op-
erations and the full allotment policy, affect the pattern of internal adjustment after the
sudden stop following the 2008 financial crisis? And if it did, what is the key channel
through which it affects adjustment dynamics? This paper sheds light on this issue.
We directly compare the GIIPS countries and the Eastern European BELL countries.
Both groups of countries experienced a sudden stop in capital flows during the recent
crisis. But they could not adjust via devaluation of their currency, either because of
their membership in the euro area or because their currencies were pegged to the euro.
As part of our empirical strategy to identify the effect, we turn to sectoral data for the
BELL and the GIIPS countries. We analyze the effects of liquidity provision by the
Eurosystem on adjustment depending on the external financing needs of the sectors,
controlling for all time-varying observed and unobserved country and sector hetero-
geneity with country-time and sector-time fixed effects.
The analysis yields the following results. Enhanced liquidity provision by the Eu-
rosystem significantly lowers the adjustment in real unit labor costs in sectors that
depend more on external finance. We do not find robust evidence for an effect on
adjustment in nominal unit labor costs. The analysis of the components of unit labor
cost adjustment shows that higher liquidity provision leads to a lower reduction in real
wages, conditional on financial vulnerability. The main channel behind these results is
that financially vulnerable sectors increase prices by a smaller amount when liquidity
provision by the Eurosystem increases. Eurosystem liquidity provision has no signif-
icant effect on the adjustment in labor productivity. Moreover, we cannot find any
evidence of an effect on the adjustment in nominal wages, pointing to the existence of
substantial nominal wage rigidities.
Our results indicate that liquidity assistance leads to differential adjustment paths
across the sectors of the economy. A policy conclusion from this result would therefore
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require an answer to the question of whether or not it is desirable for sectors with a high
degree of financial vulnerability, such as construction, to make lower adjustments rela-
tive to sectors with a low degree of vulnerability, such as the public sector. Obviously,
the answer depends, first, on how important a specific sector is considered to be for the
overall economy. Such an assessment should, not least, take into account the fact that
adjustment processes in certain sectors, such as the construction sector, might have
wider implications for financial stability. Second, it depends on an evaluation of an
important trade-off with respect to adjustment: On the one hand, liquidity provision
mitigates adjustment pressure in certain sectors, which allows the burden of the shock
to be distributed over a longer period of time. On the other hand, there is the risk of
a substantial delay or even the prevention of necessary structural adjustment. Indeed,
our results show that the effect of liquidity provision is not limited to the absorption
of the shock in the early quarters after the sudden stop, but seems to shape the entire
adjustment path quite persistently. Clearly, the answers to these questions are beyond
the scope of this paper. In the light of our key finding that enhanced central bank
liquidity plays an important role for asymmetric internal adjustment to sudden stops,
it contributes to the foundation on which the discussion should take place.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
3.A Data
Data Sources
TARGET2 net balances: Original data on the TARGET2 net balances of the na-
tional central banks vis-à-vis the Eurosystem are taken from the Deutsche Bundesbank.
Since September 2015, the data from May 2008 onwards have been made publicly avail-
able via the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse (SDW). Where individual country data
for periods prior to May 2008 are shown, we use publicly available data on TARGET2
net balances provided on the website Eurocrisismonitor.com instead. These data are
compiled mainly from the balance sheets of national central banks (see Steinkamp and
Westermann, 2014, for details).
Rescue programs: Data on rescue programs were compiled from information and
reports provided on the websites of the European Commission, the EFSF, and the
ESM. Data on IMF programs were compiled using the IMF Financial Data Query
Tool. Websites:
• http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/index_en.htm (Euro-
pean Commission)
• http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/index.htm (EFSF)
• http://www.esm.europa.eu/ (ESM)
• http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/query.aspx (IMF)
Financial accounts: Data on financial accounts are taken from the financial accounts
database of Eurostat (BPM5).
National accounts: Macroeconomic data on GDP, GDP deflators, and trade as well
as sectoral data on gross value added, compensation of employees, total hours worked,
total employment, and total number of employees are from the quarterly national ac-
counts database of Eurostat (ESA 95).
Exchange rates: Data on three-month forward exchange rates for the BELL countries
are taken from Datastream. Data for nominal and CPI-based real effective exchange
rates are taken from Eurostat.
Financial vulnerability: The pre-sudden stop MFI loan growth measure is based
on data about MFI loans to sectors in the euro area from the ECB Statistical Data
Warehouse. The sectors given in our dataset are matched with the sector aggrega-
tion as given in the Eurosystem data in the following way (Eurosystem classification
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in parentheses): A (A); B-E (B,C,D+E); F (F); G-I (G, H+J, I); J (H+J); K (-), L
(L+M+N); M-N (L+M+N); O-Q (Z=all remaining activities); R-U (Z).
Asset tangibility: Asset tangibility is measured as the ratio of firms’ tangible fixed
assets to total assets. The balance sheet data is obtained from the BACH database
(https://www.bach.banque-france.fr/). The BACH database contains comparable in-
formation on the financial statements and balance sheets of eleven European countries
aggregated by sectors. The BACH database covers the following countries: Austria,
Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and
Spain. For each country-sector we calculate the median asset tangibility ratio over
time until the year 2007. For most countries, the sample starts in the year 2000, and
for some countries it starts later. The sector-specific asset tangibility ratio is then
calculated by taking the cross-country median.
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List of Sectors According to NACE Rev. 2
Sector
symbol Sector name NACE Rev. 2 sectors contained
A Agriculture, forestry & fishing A Agriculture, forestry and fishing
B-E Industry excl.
construction
B Mining and quarrying
C Manufacturing
D Electricity, gas, steam and air
conditioning supply
E Water supply; sewerage,
waste management and reme-
diation activities
F Construction F Construction
G-I Trade, travel & food
Service
G Wholesale and retail trade;
repair of motor vehicles and
motorcycles
H Transportation and storage
I Accommodation and food
service activities
J Information & communi-
cation
J Information and
communication
L Real estate L Real estate activities
M-N Professional, science, tech
& admin
M Professional, scientific and
technical activities
N Administrative and support
service activities
O-Q Public admin, education
& social work
O Public administration and
defence; compulsory social
security
P Education
Q Human health and social
work activities
R-U Arts, recreation & other
services
R Arts, entertainment and
recreation
S Other service activities
T Activities of households as
employers; undifferentiated
goods- and services-producing
activities of households for own
use
U Activities of extraterritorial
organisations and borders
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3.B Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1: Private capital inflows in BELL and GIIPS countries
The graphs show private net capital inflows in BELL and GIIPS countries (in % of 2007
GDP). Private net capital flows are defined as the total net financial account minus payments
due to EU and IMF rescue programs and changes in TARGET2 net liabilities. Data source:
Deutsche Bundesbank, Eurostat, European Commission, ECB, and IMF.
(a) BELL countries
Ͳ35
Ͳ25
Ͳ15
Ͳ5
5
15
25
2003Q1 2007Q1 2011Q1
(b) GIIPS countries
Ͳ35
Ͳ25
Ͳ15
Ͳ5
5
15
25
2003Q1 2007Q1 2011Q1
120
Chapter 3: Liquidity Provision, Financial Vulnerability, and Internal Adjustment to a Sudden Stop
Figure 3.2: TARGET2 net liabilities in BELL and GIIPS countries
The graphs show the TARGET2 net liabilities of BELL and GIIPS countries (in % of 2007
GDP). Data source: Deutsche Bundesbank, ECB.
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Figure 3.3: Macroeconomic adjustment in BELL and GIIPS countries
The graphs show nominal unit labor costs, real unit labor costs and the producer price
level in the GIIPS and BELL countries indexed to the first quarter of 2008. Data source:
Eurostat.
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Figure 3.4: Sudden stops in private capital flows
The graphs show private net capital inflows (in billion euros) in GIIPS and BELL countries.
Private net capital flows are defined as the total net financial account minus payments due
to EU and IMF rescue programs and changes in TARGET2 net liabilities. The vertical line
indicates the last quarter before the sudden stop period: BG 2008Q4, EE LT LV 2008Q3, EL
2008Q1, ES 2011Q1, IE 2008Q1, IT 2011Q1, PT 2010Q1. Country legend: BG Bulgaria, EE
Estonia, LT Lithuania, LV Latvia, EL Greece, ES Spain, IE Ireland, IT Italy, PT Portugal.
Data source: Eurostat, European Commission, Eurocrisismonitor.com, ECB, and IMF.
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Figure 3.5: Financial vulnerability
The graph shows the measure of financial vulnerability across sectors. Financial vulnera-
bility is measured based on the pre-sudden stop MFI loan growth rate across sectors. The
MFI loan growth rate is the aggregate growth rate from 2003Q1 to 2008Q1. The sector
classification is based on NACE Rev. 2. Data source: ECB.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics: sectoral adjustment variables
The table shows summary statistics for the sectoral adjustment variables of the baseline
empirical model: Sectoral nominal unit labor costs (ULC), real unit labor costs (RULC),
real wages, nominal wages, labor productivity, and prices. All variables are defined in terms
of adjustment, i.e. as percentage of their pre-sudden stop values. The sample is based on
the estimation sample.
Variable Countrygroup
Obser-
vations Mean
Standard
deviation Min. Max.
Nominal unit labor costs (ULC)
(% of pre-sudden stop)
BELL 828 −6.1 20.8 −108.2 36.8
GIIPS 828 −0.9 13.5 −60.3 49.5
Total 1656 −3.5 17.7 −108.2 49.5
Real unit labor costs (RULC)
(% of pre-sudden stop)
BELL 828 −2.4 21.1 −116.1 47.6
GIIPS 828 −2.6 23.6 −172.3 53.2
Total 1656 −2.5 22.4 −172.3 53.2
Real wages
(% of pre-sudden stop)
BELL 828 −4.2 23.1 −106.2 37.9
GIIPS 828 −4.1 27.1 −228.1 29.1
Total 1656 −4.2 25.2 −228.1 37.9
Nominal wages
(% of pre-sudden stop)
BELL 828 −7.9 21.9 −89.9 31.2
GIIPS 828 −1.7 6.6 −36.3 21.8
Total 1656 −4.8 16.5 −89.9 31.2
Labor productivity
(% of pre-sudden stop)
BELL 828 3.2 16.8 −34 54.5
GIIPS 828 2.5 13.8 −41.6 58.9
Total 1656 2.9 15.4 −41.6 58.9
Prices
(% of pre-sudden stop)
BELL 828 −4.5 12.2 −46.2 37.1
GIIPS 828 −0.4 12.8 −43.7 65.8
Total 1656 −2.5 12.7 −46.2 65.8
125
Chapter 3: Liquidity Provision, Financial Vulnerability, and Internal Adjustment to a Sudden Stop
Table 3.2: Summary statistics: control variables
The table shows summary statistics for the control variables of the baseline empirical model.
The sample is based on the estimation period (quarter since sudden stop 0 to 22). REER
and NEER denote the real and nominal effective exchange rate. Growth rates are indicated
as quarter-on-quarter (qoq) or year-on-year (yoy) rates. For variables which only vary across
countries but not sectors, the number of observations and summary statistics are based on
the same values for each sector in a given country and quarter.
Variable Countrygroup
Obser-
vations Mean
Standard
deviation
TARGET2 net liabilities
(% of 2007 GDP)
Total 2024 14.58 19.25
Total rescue program
(% of 2007 GDP)
BELL 1012 3.57 6.74
GIIPS 1012 15.37 22.86
Total 2024 9.47 17.85
REER
(CPI based, qoq growth, %)
BELL 1012 0.13 1.22
GIIPS 1012 −0.10 1.38
Total 2024 0.02 1.31
NEER
(qoq growth, %)
BELL 1012 0.11 0.88
GIIPS 1012 0.07 1.10
Total 2024 0.09 1.00
3m-forward exchange rate
(LCU per EUR, qoq growth, %)
BELL 1012 −0.02 0.36
GIIPS 1012 0.00 0.00
Total 2024 −0.01 0.25
GDP
(nominal, yoy growth, %)
BELL 1012 2.34 9.18
GIIPS 1001 −1.34 4.02
Total 2013 0.51 7.33
GDP deflator
(yoy growth, %)
BELL 1012 2.47 3.92
GIIPS 1001 0.54 2.01
Total 2013 1.51 3.27
Trade
(% of GDP)
BELL 1012 135.41 24.81
GIIPS 1012 89.98 46.54
Total 2024 112.70 43.66
Total employees
(lagged, thous. pers.)
BELL 1012 141.02 176.35
GIIPS 1012 758.87 1093.99
Total 2024 449.94 842.10
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Table 3.3: Liquidity provision and adjustment in nominal unit labor costs
The table shows the differential effect of liquidity provision by the Eurosystem on sectoral
adjustment in nominal unit labor costs (ULC) since the sudden stop. The specifications (1) to
(6) are based on Equation (3.1) and vary with respect to the control variables included. The
measure for liquidity provision is given by the TARGET2 net liabilities relative to 2007 GDP.
The measure for financial vulnerability (FV) is based on pre-sudden stop MFI loan growth
(2003Q1-2008Q1). The dependent variable is defined in terms of adjustment, i.e. an increase
(decrease) corresponds to a reduction (increase) in unit labor costs. All control variables are
standardized (zero mean, unit standard deviation). All control variables are interacted with
FV. All specifications include country-time and sector-time fixed effects, standard errors in
parentheses are cluster-robust at the country level. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Dependent variable:
Adjustment in ULC
(% of pre-sudden-stop)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FV ×
Target2 net liabilities/GDP −1.603 0.248 −1.395 −1.749 −0.075 0.251
(3.366) (2.824) (3.078) (3.269) (1.761) (1.527)
Rescue program/GDP −3.929∗∗ −1.099
(1.860) (1.516)
Employment −7.670 −5.274
(11.115) (5.681)
REER −1.386∗∗ −1.647∗∗∗
(0.659) (0.497)
NEER −0.019 1.402
(2.143) (1.469)
3m-forward exchange rate −0.040 −0.137
(0.299) (0.332)
Nominal GDP growth 1.308 1.243
(1.122) (1.412)
GDP deflator −1.022∗ −0.864
(0.688) (0.829)
Trade openness 5.284∗∗∗ 4.689∗∗
(1.781) (1.927)
Country × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,656 1,656 1,656 1,656 1,647 1,647
R2 0.57 0.60 0.63 0.57 0.63 0.65
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Table 3.4: Liquidity provision and adjustment in real unit labor costs
The table shows the differential effect of liquidity provision by the Eurosystem on sectoral
adjustment in real unit labor costs (RULC) since the sudden stop. The specifications (1) to
(6) are based on Equation (3.1) and vary with respect to the control variables included. The
measure for liquidity provision is given by the TARGET2 net liabilities relative to 2007 GDP.
The measure for financial vulnerability (FV) is based on pre-sudden stop MFI loan growth
(2003Q1-2008Q1). The dependent variable is defined in terms of adjustment, i.e. an increase
(decrease) corresponds to a reduction (increase) in unit labor costs. All control variables are
standardized (zero mean, unit standard deviation). All control variables are interacted with
FV. All specifications include country-time and sector-time fixed effects, standard errors in
parentheses are cluster-robust at the country level. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Dependent variable:
Adjustment in RULC
(% of pre-sudden-stop)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FV ×
Target2 net liabilities/GDP −8.297∗∗∗ −8.986∗∗∗ −7.853∗∗∗ −8.241∗∗∗ −9.055∗∗∗ −8.005∗∗∗
(2.282) (2.217) (2.093) (2.205) (1.793) (0.949)
Rescue program/GDP 1.462 −2.128∗
(1.480) (1.120)
Employment −12.266∗∗∗ −17.507∗∗∗
(2.710) −(4.871)
REER −0.089 −0.377
(0.915) (0.694)
NEER 2.074 1.31
(1.620) (1.524)
3m-forward exchange rate −0.329 −0.385
(0.557) (0.380)
Nominal GDP growth 0.547 0.362
(1.371) (1.167)
GDP deflator −0.436 −0.712
(1.140) (0.942)
Trade openness −2.984 −4.947∗∗∗
(1.699) (1.069)
Country × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,656 1,656 1,656 1,656 1,647 1,647
R2 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.63 0.63
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Table 3.5: Liquidity provision and adjustment in wages, labor productivity and prices
The table shows the differential effect of liquidity provision by the Eurosystem on sectoral
adjustment since the sudden stop in real wages (column (1)), nominal wages (column (2)),
labor productivity (column (3)), and prices (column (4)). The specifications (1) to (4) are
based on Equation (3.1). The measure for liquidity provision is given by the TARGET2 net
liabilities relative to 2007 GDP. The measure for financial vulnerability (FV) is based on
pre-sudden stop MFI loan growth (2003Q1-2008Q1). In columns (1), (2), and (4), the de-
pendent variable is defined in terms of adjustment, i.e. an increase (decrease) corresponds to
a reduction (increase). All control variables are standardized (zero mean, unit standard de-
viation). All control variables are interacted with FV. All specifications include country-time
and sector-time fixed effects, standard errors in parentheses are cluster-robust at the country
level. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Real
wages
Nominal
wages
Labor
productivity Prices
FV x
LP −10.010∗∗∗ −0.465 2.246 3.710∗∗∗
(2.029) (1.373) (1.277) (1.095)
Rescue program/GDP −1.006 −0.418 −0.188 0.874
(1.383) (0.714) (1.717) (0.745)
Employment −15.355∗∗∗ −2.008 1.223 6.721∗∗
(3.071) (2.343) (6.143) (2.026)
REER 0.915 −0.662 −0.943 −0.641∗
(0.839) (0.829) (0.743) (0.287)
NEER −0.081 0.356 1.124 −0.116
(1.210) (1.352) (1.762) (0.485)
3m-forward exchange rate −0.714 −0.314 0.387 0.029
(0.515) (0.296) (0.215) (0.189)
Nominal GDP growth −1.361 −0.076 0.846 1.252∗
(3.002) (0.816) (1.909) (0.671)
GDP deflator 0.199 −0.139 −0.579 −0.531
(2.060) (0.383) (1.154) (0.836)
Trade openness −12.616∗∗∗ −1.461 6.546∗∗∗ 5.117∗∗∗
(1.951) (1.899) (1.370) (1.129)
Country × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,647 1,647 1,647 1,647
R2 0.72 0.71 0.47 0.63
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Table 3.6: Measuring liquidity provision using central bank refinancing operations
The table shows the differential effect of liquidity provision by the Eurosystem on sectoral
adjustment since the sudden stop in real unit labor costs (column (1)), nominal unit labor
costs (column (2)), real wages (column (3)), nominal wages (column (4)), labor productivity
(column (5)), and prices (column (6)). The specifications (1) to (6) are based on Equation
(3.1) and include the full set of control variables as given in column (6) of Tables 3.3 and
3.4. The measure for liquidity provision is given by the amount of central bank refinancing
operations relative to 2007 GDP. The measure for financial vulnerability (FV) is based on
pre-sudden stop MFI loan growth (2003Q1-2008Q1). Except for column (5), the depen-
dent variable is defined in terms of adjustment, i.e. an increase (decrease) corresponds to a
reduction (increase). All control variables are standardized (zero mean, unit standard devi-
ation). All control variables are interacted with FV. All specifications include country-time
and sector-time fixed effects, standard errors in parentheses are cluster-robust at the country
level. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Real
unit labor
costs
Nominal
unit labor
costs
Real
wages
Nominal
wages
Labor
productivity Prices
FV ×
Refinancing operations −7.444∗∗∗ −0.158 −9.104∗∗∗ −0.683 1.939 3.272∗∗∗
(0.882) (1.245) (1.760) (1.297) (1.380) (0.925)
Country × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FV × control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,647 1,647 1,647 1,647 1,647 1,647
R2 0.65 0.65 0.71 0.71 0.47 0.62
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Table 3.7: Measuring liquidity provision using the size of national central banks’ balance
sheet
The table shows the differential effect of liquidity provision by the Eurosystem on sectoral
adjustment since the sudden stop in real unit labor costs (column (1)), nominal unit labor
costs (column (2)), real wages (column (3)), nominal wages (column (4)), labor productivity
(column (5)), and prices (column (6)). The specifications (1) to (6) are based on Equation
(3.1) and include the full set of control variables as given in column (6) of Tables 3.3 and 3.4.
The measure for liquidity provision is given by the size of national central banks’ balance
sheet relative to 2007 GDP (CB balance sheet). The measure for financial vulnerability
(FV) is based on pre-sudden stop MFI loan growth (2003Q1-2008Q1). Except for column
(5), the dependent variable is defined in terms of adjustment, i.e. an increase (decrease)
corresponds to a reduction (increase). All control variables are standardized (zero mean, unit
standard deviation). All control variables are interacted with FV. All specifications include
country-time and sector-time fixed effects, standard errors in parentheses are cluster-robust
at the country level. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Real
unit labor
costs
Nominal
unit labor
costs
Real
wages
Nominal
wages
Labor
productivity Prices
FV ×
CB balance sheet −5.682∗∗ 1.053 −8.682∗∗∗ −0.763 3.128 2.805∗∗
(1.836) (1.294) (2.514) (1.788) (1.789) (1.131)
Country × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FV × control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,647 1,647 1,647 1,647 1,647 1,647
R2 0.66 0.65 0.71 0.71 0.48 0.61
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Table 3.8: Lagging the liquidity provision variable
The table shows the differential effect of liquidity provision by the Eurosystem on sectoral
adjustment since the sudden stop in real unit labor costs (column (1)), nominal unit labor
costs (column (2)), real wages (column (3)), nominal wages (column (4)), labor productivity
(column (5)), and prices (column (6)). The specifications (1) to (6) are based on Equation
(3.1) and include the full set of control variables as given in column (6) of Tables 3.3 and 3.4.
The measure for liquidity provision is four-quarter lagged TARGET2 net liabilities relative
to 2007 GDP. The measure for financial vulnerability (FV) is based on pre-sudden stop MFI
loan growth (2003Q1-2008Q1). Except for column (5), the dependent variable is defined
in terms of adjustment, i.e. an increase (decrease) corresponds to a reduction (increase).
All control variables are standardized (zero mean, unit standard deviation). All control
variables are interacted with FV. All specifications include country-time and sector-time
fixed effects, standard errors in parentheses are cluster-robust at the country level. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Real
unit labor
costs
Nominal
unit labor
costs
Real
wages
Nominal
wages
Labor
productivity Prices
FV ×
LPt−4 −8.745∗∗∗ 0.853 −11.613∗∗∗ −0.661 3.187∗∗ 4.545∗∗∗
(0.661) (1.917) (1.878) (1.581) (1.352) (0.883)
Country × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FV × control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,647 1,647 1,647 1,647 1,647 1,647
R2 0.65 0.65 0.72 0.71 0.47 0.63
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Table 3.9: GIIPS indicator as a proxy for liquidity provision
The table shows the differential effect of liquidity provision by the Eurosystem on sectoral
adjustment since the sudden stop in real unit labor costs (column (1)), nominal unit labor
costs (column (2)), real wages (column (3)), nominal wages (column (4)), labor productivity
(column (5)), and prices (column (6)). The specifications (1) to (6) are based on Equation
(3.1) and include the full set of control variables as given in column (6) of Tables 3.3 and
3.4. The measure for liquidity provision is given by the GIIPS indicator, which takes a
value of one for GIIPS and zero for BELL countries. The measure for financial vulnerability
(FV) is based on pre-sudden stop MFI loan growth (2003Q1-2008Q1). Except for column
(5), the dependent variable is defined in terms of adjustment, i.e. an increase (decrease)
corresponds to a reduction (increase). All control variables are standardized (zero mean, unit
standard deviation). All control variables are interacted with FV. All specifications include
country-time and sector-time fixed effects, standard errors in parentheses are cluster-robust
at the country level. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Real
unit labor
costs
Nominal
unit labor
costs
Real
wages
Nominal
wages
Labor
productivity Prices
FV ×
GIIPS indicator −18.693∗∗∗ −1.254 −22.764∗∗∗ −2.657 4.763 7.979∗∗
(2.165) (2.700) (4.814) (2.284) (3.348) (3.259)
Country × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FV × control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,647 1,647 1,647 1,647 1,647 1,647
R2 0.66 0.65 0.72 0.71 0.47 0.62
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Table 3.10: International liquidity flows
The table shows the differential effect of liquidity provision by the Eurosystem on sectoral
adjustment since the sudden stop in real unit labor costs (column (1)), nominal unit labor
costs (column (2)), real wages (column (3)), nominal wages (column (4)), labor productivity
(column (5)), and prices (column (6)). The specifications (1) to (6) are based on Equation
(3.1) and include the full set of control variables as given in column (6) of Tables 3.3 and
3.4. The measure for liquidity provision is given by the TARGET2 net liabilities relative
to 2007 GDP. The measure for financial vulnerability (FV) is based on pre-sudden stop
MFI loan growth (2003Q1-2008Q1). The regressions include the private financial account
relative to 2007 GDP in addition to the baseline set of control variables. Except for column
(5), the dependent variable is defined in terms of adjustment, i.e. an increase (decrease)
corresponds to a reduction (increase). All control variables are standardized (zero mean,
unit standard deviation). All control variables are interacted with FV. All specifications
include country-time and sector-time fixed effects, standard errors in parentheses are cluster-
robust at the country level. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Real
unit labor
costs
Nominal
unit labor
costs
Real
wages
Nominal
wages
Labor
productivity Prices
FV ×
LP −8.405∗∗∗ 0.873 −10.337∗∗∗ 0.370 1.920 4.561∗∗∗
(1.218) (1.732) (2.020) (1.472) (1.809) (0.649)
Private financial account 0.562 −1.208 0.492 −1.530∗∗ 0.573 −1.536∗∗
(1.219) (2.005) (1.197) (0.617) (1.837) (0.633)
Country × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FV × control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,620 1,620 1,620 1,620 1,620 1,620
R2 0.65 0.64 0.72 0.70 0.47 0.64
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Table 3.11: Alternative measure of financial vulnerability: asset tangibility
The table shows the differential effect of liquidity provision by the Eurosystem on sectoral
adjustment since the sudden stop in real unit labor costs (column (1)), nominal unit labor
costs (column (2)), real wages (column (3)), nominal wages (column (4)), labor productivity
(column (5)), and prices (column (6)). The specifications (1) to (6) are based on Equation
(3.1) and include the full set of control variables as given in column (6) of Tables 3.3 and
3.4. The measure for liquidity provision is given by the TARGET2 net liabilities relative to
2007 GDP. The measure for financial vulnerability (FV) is given by the share of tangible
and liquid assets in the total balance sheet. Except for column (5), the dependent variable
is defined in terms of adjustment, i.e. an increase (decrease) corresponds to a reduction
(increase). All control variables are standardized (zero mean, unit standard deviation).
All control variables are interacted with FV. All specifications include country-time and
sector-time fixed effects, standard errors in parentheses are cluster-robust at the country
level. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Real
unit labor
costs
Nominal
unit labor
costs
Real
wages
Nominal
wages
Labor
productivity Prices
FV ×
LP −8.014∗∗∗ 0.409 −9.888∗∗∗ −0.155 1.814 3.347∗∗∗
(0.937) (1.161) (1.816) (0.698) (1.105) (0.490)
Country × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FV × control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,647 1,647 1,647 1,647 1,647 1,647
R2 0.67 0.65 0.73 0.72 0.50 0.60
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Table 3.12: Alternating the measure of financial vulnerability
The table shows the differential effect of liquidity provision by the Eurosystem on sectoral
adjustment since the sudden stop in real unit labor costs (column (1)), nominal unit labor
costs (column (2)), real wages (column (3)), nominal wages (column (4)), labor productivity
(column (5)), and prices (column (6)). The specifications (1) to (6) are based on Equation
(3.1) and include the full set of control variables as given in column (6) of Tables 3.3
and 3.4. The measure for liquidity provision is given by the TARGET2 net liabilities
relative to 2007 GDP. The measure for financial vulnerability (FV) is based on pre-sudden
stop MFI loan growth and varies as indicated in panels (a) and (b). Except for column
(5), the dependent variable is defined in terms of adjustment, i.e. an increase (decrease)
corresponds to a reduction (increase). All control variables are standardized (zero mean,
unit standard deviation). All control variables are interacted with FV. All specifications
include country-time and sector-time fixed effects, standard errors in parentheses are cluster-
robust at the country level. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Real
unit labor
costs
Nominal
unit labor
costs
Real
wages
Nominal
wages
Labor
productivity Prices
(a) Dummy variable indicating high vs. low financial vulnerability
FV ×
LP −11.352∗∗∗ 2.683 −17.856∗∗∗ −1.881 7.637∗∗ 7.579∗∗
(1.762) (3.297) (3.581) (2.960) (2.668) (2.703)
R2 0.57 0.63 0.65 0.71 0.48 0.61
(b) MFI loan growth 2003Q1-2003Q4
FV ×
LP −8.200∗∗∗ −0.823 −9.033∗∗∗ −0.451 0.762 2.990∗∗∗
(1.125) (1.151) (1.899) (1.184) (1.194) (0.647)
R2 0.64 0.64 0.67 0.71 0.43 0.58
Country × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FV × control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,647 1,647 1,647 1,647 1,647 1,647
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Table 3.13: Controlling for country-sector fixed effects
The table shows the differential effect of liquidity provision by the Eurosystem on sectoral
adjustment since the sudden stop in real unit labor costs (column (1)), nominal unit labor
costs (column (2)), real wages (column (3)), nominal wages (column (4)), labor productivity
(column (5)), and prices (column (6)). The specifications (1) to (6) are based on Equation
(3.1) and include the full set of control variables as given in column (6) of Tables 3.3 and 3.4.
The measure for liquidity provision is given by the TARGET2 net liabilities relative to 2007
GDP. The measure for financial vulnerability (FV) is based on pre-sudden stop MFI loan
growth (2003Q1-2008Q1). Except for column (5), the dependent variable is defined in terms
of adjustment, i.e. an increase (decrease) corresponds to a reduction (increase). All control
variables are standardized (zero mean, unit standard deviation). All control variables are
interacted with FV. All specifications include country-time, sector-time, and country-sector
fixed effects, standard errors in parentheses are cluster-robust at the country-sector level.
∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Real
unit labor
costs
Nominal
unit labor
costs
Real
wages
Nominal
wages
Labor
productivity Prices
FV ×
LP −6.175∗∗∗ 0.160 −6.611∗∗ 0.850 0.497 2.164∗∗∗
(0.908) (1.314) (2.028) (0.705) (1.407) (0.645)
Country × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country × sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FV × control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,647 1,647 1,647 1,647 1,647 1,647
R2 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.92 0.84 0.88
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Table 3.14: Controlling for adjustment in labor productivity
The table shows the differential effect of liquidity provision by the Eurosystem on sectoral
adjustment since the sudden stop in real unit labor costs (column (1)), nominal unit labor
costs (column (2)), real wages (column (3)), nominal wages (column (4)), labor productivity
(column (5)), and prices (column (6)). The specifications (1) to (6) are based on Equation
(3.1) and include the full set of control variables as given in column (6) of Tables 3.3
and 3.4. The measure for liquidity provision is given by the TARGET2 net liabilities
relative to 2007 GDP. The measure for financial vulnerability (FV) is based on pre-sudden
stop MFI loan growth (2003Q1-2008Q1). The regressions include lagged adjustment in
labor productivity in addition to the baseline set of control variables. Except for column
(5), the dependent variable is defined in terms of adjustment, i.e. an increase (decrease)
corresponds to a reduction (increase). All control variables are standardized (zero mean,
unit standard deviation). All control variables are interacted with FV. All specifications
include country-time and sector-time fixed effects, standard errors in parentheses are cluster-
robust at the country level. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Real
unit labor
costs
Nominal
unit labor
costs
Real
wages
Nominal
wages
Labor
productivity Prices
FV ×
LP −9.005∗∗∗ −1.058 −8.844∗∗∗ 0.437 −0.017 3.432∗∗∗
(1.278) (1.355) (1.411) (1.298) (0.109) (0.832)
Labor productivityt−1 0.468∗∗ 0.593∗∗∗ −0.519∗∗ −0.412∗∗∗ 1.022∗∗∗ 0.119
(0.181) (0.143) (0.165) (0.111) (0.009) (0.111)
Country × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector × quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FV × control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,566 1,566 1,566 1,566 1,566 1,566
R2 0.70 0.78 0.77 0.78 0.98 0.64
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Chapter4
How Effective is Macroprudential Policy
During Financial Downturns? Evidence
from Caps on Banks’ Leverage
4.1 Motivation
The use of macroprudential policy is an important aspect of the regulatory response
to the global financial crisis, and several advanced economies have updated their reg-
ulatory and supervisory structures over the last few years in consequence.1 Various
macroprudential policy tools are available, and they are expected to prevent the build-
up of systemic risk in the financial system. Using these tools sensibly is challenging
however. On the upside, lower systemic risk might reduce the probability and severity
of financial crises, but on the downside, there might be leakages or other unintended
consequences. Against this backdrop, the topic has gained a lot of attention among
policy makers and researchers alike. Besides comprehensive theories that grasp the
relevant trade-offs and channels, an empirical evaluation of the effects of macropruden-
tial policies is key to understanding their usefulness and shortcomings. In this respect,
countries which have already implemented macroprudential tools in the past provide
valuable examples for a study of these effects.
1 In the USA for instance, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) was established under the
Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 with a mandate to identify and respond to threats to financial stability. In
Europe, countries have designated national macroprudential authorities (following the proposal by
the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) in 2011) that conduct macroprudential policies. Within
the euro area, this responsibility is shared with the supranational Single Supervisory Mechanism
(SSM). The SSM, which entered into operation in November 2014, has not only microprudential
but also macroprudential responsibilities and has tools at its disposal such as the countercyclical
capital buffer and capital buffers for systemically important institutions (see the capital requirements
regulation and directive CRR/CRD IV).
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An important intermediate goal of macroprudential policy is to smooth the credit
or financial cycle (Arregui et al., 2013). It particularly aims to prevent excessive credit
booms building up, as they might ultimately lead to systemic financial crises with
potentially adverse effects on the real economy. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) show
that crises in emerging market usually follow credit-fuelled booms in economic activ-
ity.2 Similarly, empirical evidence for advanced economies suggests that credit booms
help to predict periods of financial distress (Schularick and Taylor, 2012) and that
recessions were deeper if they had been preceded by a financial crisis (Jordà et al.,
2013). At the same time, macroprudential policy aims at easing the adverse effects
like excessive deleveraging that are caused by binding constraints during downturns.
The results of recent studies such as Cerutti et al. (2016) suggest that macropruden-
tial policies are indeed effective in reducing excessive lending and in dampening the
financial cycle during boom times. However, less is known about the stabilising role
of macroprudential policy during financial downturns. This point deserves attention
because it is especially the years after a financial crisis, which can be defined as an
extreme financial downturn, that are more likely to see financial markets not working
properly in their function of channelling funds to productive investments in the real
economy. It is during precisely these periods that macroprudential policy might con-
tribute to reducing these financial strains.
This paper addresses the question of whether there is a stabilising role for macro-
prudential policy in the aftermath of a financial crisis. To answer this question, I focus
on the implementation of a cap on the leverage of banks (often referred to simply as
the leverage ratio), which obliges banks to hold a minimum amount of equity capital
relative to their total assets. Evidence of the relevance of this for the current regula-
tory debate is that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is currently
testing the implementation of a 3% leverage ratio until the end of 2017 as part of the
Basel III framework (BCBS, 2014). The stated goal of the leverage ratio is to prevent
excessive leverage building up in the financial system and to function as a backstop
for the risk-weighted regulatory capital ratios (BCBS, 2014). If there is an unforeseen
increase in asset risk, it is this backstop function in particular which makes such a
leverage cap a useful buffer against excessive deleveraging by banks in their attempt
to meet regulatory requirements for risk-weighted equity capital ratios.3 In addition,
2 For the literature on the ability of financial indicators such as the credit-to-GDP gap to predict
systemic financial crises, see also Borio and Drehmann (2009), Alessi and Detken (2011), and Duca
and Peltonen (2013).
3 The findings by Behn et al. (2016) provide empirical support for this line of reasoning. They
show that in response to a credit risk shock, German banks using the internal ratings-based (IRB)
approach of Basel II to determine risk weights reduced lending by more than banks applying the
standard approach with fixed risk weights did.
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a leverage cap can mitigate the externalities generated by a potential run on banks’
short-term funding liabilities such as repos during a liquidity crisis (Morris and Shin,
2008). For this reason, the cap on banks’ leverage can be classified as a macropruden-
tial policy instrument which increases the resilience of the financial system (Claessens,
2015), and so it is worthwhile to assess its role in the provision of real credit after the
crisis more carefully.
To answer this question empirically, we apply a difference-in-differences approach
in order to compare real credit growth before and after the crisis across countries that
implemented a cap on leverage before the crisis and those that did not. The sample
I draw on is a panel of 69 advanced and emerging countries of which eight countries
introduced a leverage cap prior to the crisis.4 The data on the use of macropruden-
tial policy, which includes the implementation of the leverage cap, are taken from the
dataset by Cerutti et al. (2016). This dataset in turn is based on the Global Macro-
prudential Policy Instruments (GMPI) survey conducted by the IMF.
The results show, first, that real credit growth in countries that introduced a lever-
age cap before the crisis – as compared to those that did not – was significantly higher
in economic and statistical terms in 2009-14, after the crisis, than it was in 2002-
08 before the crisis. In the baseline regression, the effect amounts to a real credit
growth rate that is about six percentage points higher on average. This indicates that
macroprudential policy can indeed have a stabilising effect during financial downturns.
Second, the stabilising effect is stronger for those countries in which banks entered the
crisis with a higher equity capital ratio. This suggests that banks can draw on the capi-
tal buffers built up before the crisis to stabilise lending to the private sector afterwards.
This paper relates to several empirical studies dealing with the impact of macro-
prudential policy on financial markets and real outcomes. Several papers analyse the
impact of one or more macroprudential policy instruments on bank behaviour in single
countries. Bruno and Shin (2014) find that the macroprudential policies that Korea
introduced in 2010 and that were targeted at banks’ short-term liabilities effectively
reduced the vulnerability to capital inflow reversals. For the UK banks, Aiyar et al.
(2014b) document that there is a significant amount of leakage around macroprudential
policy, as branches of foreign banks which are not under the regulation of the national
supervisor counteract the reduction in lending by UK-owned banks and foreign sub-
sidiaries that is induced by higher time-varying bank-specific capital requirements.
Jiménez et al. (2014) use detailed Spanish credit register data to analyse the effect of
4 Clearly, the small number of “treated” countries makes it important to check how far the results
are driven by individual countries in the treatment group and how sensitive the results are to the
different choices of the control group. These checks are provided in the robustness section.
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dynamic provisioning on the credit supply cycle and the real economy. The authors
find that the regulation effectively smoothes the credit supply cycle and supports firm
performance in bad times. Buch et al. (2014) show that banks which were affected by
the German bank levy introduced in 2011 reduced lending and increased their deposit
rates. Danisewicz et al. (2015) find a significant differential effect on lending to other
banks between UK branches and subsidiaries of global banks after the introduction of
macroprudential regulation in the home countries of the banks. Like three of these
papers, this study also uses a difference-in-differences approach to identify the effect of
macroprudential regulation on the outcome variable. I deviate in so far as I focus on
the effect of one instrument in several countries. I also focus on the aggregate growth
rate of credit to the private sector and do not look at lending by individual banks.
There are other studies which investigate the effect of macroprudential policy across
different countries. The finding by Aiyar et al. (2014a) is that higher capital require-
ments in the UK led to a slowdown in cross-border credit provided by UK banks.
Claessens et al. (2013) analyse bank-level data from 48 countries over 2000-10 and
show that macroprudential policies such as caps on debt-to-income and loan-to-value
ratios are effective in reducing leverage and asset growth during boom times. They
find only limited evidence that countercyclical measures have a stabilising effect in
downturns though. These results are confirmed for a panel of 119 countries over 2000-
13 by Cerutti et al. (2016), who assess the impact of a combined index of several
macroprudential policy instruments and find that macroprudential policy is effective
in dampening credit growth but works less well in busts. Complementing these existing
studies, I take a closer look at the years after the Global Financial Crisis and focus on
one instrument to analyse the stabilising role of macroprudential policy during finan-
cial downturns more deeply.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 describes the data
and provides descriptive statistics. Section 4.3 presents the empirical specification and
identifying assumptions. Section 4.4 shows the estimation results. Section 4.5 provides
several robustness checks. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
4.2.1 Caps on Banks’ Leverage
A regulatory cap on the leverage of banks requires banks to hold a minimum amount of
equity capital relative to their total assets. The data on the caps on leverage are taken
from the dataset on macroprudential policy measures by Cerutti et al. (2016). This
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is in turn based on the Global Macroprudential Policy Instruments (GMPI) survey by
the IMF. In this paper I consider the sample of emerging and advanced economies that
is defined in the IMF World Economic Outlook 2014 (Cerutti et al., 2016; IMF, 2014).
There are 69 countries in the final estimation sample, and they are shown in Table 4.1.
Eight countries actually introduced a cap on the leverage of banks prior to the crisis,
and these were Canada, Chile, Ecuador, Jordan, Paraguay, Saudi Arabia, St. Kitts
and Nevis, and the United States. Most of them brought in the leverage cap in the
year 2000 or earlier. The exceptions are Ecuador, which introduced the cap in 2001,
and Jordan, which introduced one in 2003. It is mostly emerging market economies
that have had experience with macroprudential policy in the past, and this is reflected
in the presence of only two advanced countries in this sample, Canada and the USA.
Information is only available on the year of implementation and not on the actual size
of the cap.
To gain a first impression of the data, I compare the countries which implemented
the leverage cap with those that did not in terms of the descriptive statistics of their
key macroeconomic variables. The descriptive statistics shown in Table 4.2 illustrate
that countries which introduced the cap had higher GDP growth rates on average but
lower interest rates and inflation. The private credit-to-GDP ratio was more than 11
percentage points lower at about 53.4 rather than 65.1 in these countries. The ratio of
equity capital to total assets held by banks was also smaller, by about 1.5 percentage
points. While not all of these observable differences are very large, it is important
to account for country-specific differences when evaluating the effect of the macropru-
dential policy tool. Clearly the implementation of the leverage cap was not random
but was based on several country characteristics. These might be observed variables
such as GDP growth, the level of the interest rate, or the credit-to-GDP ratio. It is,
however, more likely that implementation was based on unobservable characteristics
such as the preference for leverage or financial stability in general or the overall quality
of institutions. This line of argumentation supports the application of a difference-in-
differences approach, which directly incorporates the idea that the selection through
the decision to implement the regulation is based on unobservable characteristics.
Figure 4.1 shows the evolution of the capital-to-assets ratios of banks over time in
both groups of countries. It can be seen that capital ratios were relatively stable in
countries without the cap over the whole sample but they increased steadily in the
countries which introduced the cap in the pre-crisis period. By 2009 the capital ratios
were on average at a very similar level of about 10 percent for both groups of coun-
tries. Capital ratios also increased in the post-crisis period while staying slightly lower
in the countries with the cap. The former observation might appear surprising as it
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contradicts the idea that in times of crisis we expect banks to deleverage. However,
given the sudden increase in the risk of certain assets, stable or even increasing capital
ratios are likely to be the result of banks trying to keep their capital stable relative
to risk-weighted assets in order to meet the regulatory minimum requirements. If this
was achieved primarily through a reduction of mainly risky assets, capital relative to
total unweighted assets might actually increase. The important point is that a higher
capital-to-assets ratio might make the minimum regulatory capital requirement based
on risk-weighted assets less binding during times of higher asset risk.
To test this channel directly it would be necessary to evaluate whether the leverage
caps do indeed relax the binding regulatory minimum capital requirements. However,
this study does not have access to any information on regulatory capital ratios. Equally,
we do not know whether the build-up of capital ratios prior to the crisis was really the
result of the introduction of the leverage cap. This is because banks might choose to
hold the same buffer even in the absence of the regulation. Therefore the study will
take an indirect approach so as to shed some light on the buffer channel, and it relies
on narrative evidence for countries such as Canada, showing that the cap might indeed
have worked as described by Bordeleau et al. (2009).
4.2.2 Real Credit Growth
A key variable is the growth of credit, the rate of which can be seen as an intermediate
target of macroprudential policy (Arregui et al., 2013). Achieving this target in prac-
tice means restricting the build-up of potentially excessive credit booms and stabilising
credit provision in downturns. This study follows this approach and considers the im-
pact on the growth rate of real credit from a multi-country perspective. It takes the
period after the global financial crisis as an example of a pronounced financial down-
turn in which the stabilising role of macroprudential policy on credit growth can be
analysed. The direct crisis response was a mixture of various immediate rescue mea-
sures, but this study analyses the stabilising effect in the years after the crisis and thus
takes a medium-term perspective. Some studies have evaluated the countercyclical role
of macroprudential policy tools, but the countercyclical effects might not come into full
effect if the financial downturn is not so large. Therefore, I explicitly analyse the period
after the global financial crisis, and my main focus is on how the policy increases the
loss-absorbing capacity of the financial system for dealing with sizable systemic shocks.
Taking this further, this study focuses on real credit provided by domestic banks
to the domestic private sector. The choice of this variable is guided by the notion that
it is resident banks that will be affected primarily by the regulation and that regula-
tory authorities care most about credit provision to the private sector when they are
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looking to stabilise the economy as a whole. Figure 4.2 shows the evolution of the real
credit growth rate over time. It can be seen from visual inspection that the difference
in levels is considerable prior to the crisis, but the paths of real credit growth rates in
both groups of countries nevertheless show a similar pattern described by an upward
trend. The rates declined sharply in the crisis year 2009 and remained at lower levels
in both groups of countries. However, the rate fell by less in those countries which
had a leverage cap in place. Interestingly, rates remain at lower levels throughout the
post-crisis period.
Clearly, there are competing explanations for the effect observed. It might be that
the countries which implemented the cap prior to the crisis were those countries which
were affected less by the crisis. It might also be that we are only seeing a standard
adjustment to a pre-crisis boom that was more pronounced in the countries which had
not introduced the measure. I will check the sensitivity of my result to these alternative
explanations. In sum, the descriptive analysis gives a first indication of the stabilising
effect of caps on the leverage of banks on real credit growth after the crisis, and this
will be analysed in detail in the following sections.
4.3 Empirical Specification
4.3.1 Difference-in-Differences Approach
I identify the effect of caps on leverage on real credit growth after the crisis using a
difference-in-differences approach with two-way fixed effects:
∆lnRealCreditit = αi + αt + β [DPostCrisis ×DLEV] + x′itγ + εit (4.1)
The dependent variable is the growth rate of real credit (∆lnRealCredit). Index
i indicates the country and t the year. DPostCrisis is a dummy variable indicating the
post-crisis period starting from 2009. DLEV is a dummy indicating whether a given
country had a leverage cap prior to the crisis.5 The time period of the baseline esti-
mation covers the years 2002 to 2014. The parameter of interest is β as it captures
the differential effect on real credit growth of the leverage cap in the post-crisis period.
If it turns out to be positive we can conclude that macroprudential regulation has a
stabilising effect on real credit growth. A possible channel through which this effect
works is that banks can draw on pre-crisis capital buffers that they built up before the
5 The indicator is equal to one if the country had introduced the cap before 2008 so that it was in
place before the crisis. However, all the countries with a leverage cap prior to the crisis had already
introduced it by 2003.
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crisis because of the regulation, and this prevents them from deleveraging and cutting
back lending.
My approach differs in its terminology from the usual difference-in-differences set-
ting for two reasons. First, the treatment is not fully defined by the introduction of the
leverage cap itself, but rather it is defined as the leverage cap being already in place
conditional on the crisis happening. Theoretically, the treatment would thus be absent
if either i) no financial crisis hit or ii) no country had caps on leverage when the crisis
hit. Second, I do not claim that the control group is not affected by the event, entirely
the contrary in fact, as it will very much be affected by the crisis. The point is that the
countries in the treated group, i.e. those which had a cap on leverage in place when
the crisis hit, were affected differently. Despite these subtle distinctions, it is valid to
use the difference-in-difference methodology to measure the intended effect as long as
the identifying assumptions hold.
4.3.2 Identifying Assumptions
Two main assumptions have to hold for the effect to be identified: both groups of
countries have to exhibit a parallel trend for the real credit growth rate and the crisis
has to be an exogenous event. The parallel trend assumption states that in the absence
of treatment, real credit growth would have developed in a similar way in both groups
of countries after the crisis. This assumption cannot be tested directly, but one can
shed light on its plausibility by testing whether there is a significant differential effect
for the years before the crisis. One way to do this is to allow the difference-in-differences
coefficient to vary over time and to set the post-crisis period artificially equal to one
in the three years preceding the actual post-crisis period, 2006 to 2008.
∆lnRealCreditit = αi + αt + βt [DYear≥2006 ×DLEV ×Dt] + x′itγ + εit (4.2)
All variables have the same definition as in Equation (4.1). The difference is that
DYear≥2006 is now equal to one starting from as early as 2006 and the interaction with
Dt captures dummies indicating a specific year to get a time-varying coefficient. My
assumption is that it is only in the post-crisis period that there should be a significant
differential effect on credit growth between the countries with a leverage cap and those
without one. Therefore the coefficients βt should turn out not to be significantly dif-
ferent from zero in the three years before the post-crisis period. Figure 4.3 illustrates
the results of the test for the pre-treatment effect. In all three years preceding the
actual post-crisis period, there is no significant difference between the two groups of
countries, and this argues in favour of parallel trends. Taking this evidence, I proceed
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further with the analysis.
The assumption that the global financial crisis was exogenous in the sense that it
was unexpected appears plausible. Only if countries expected that they would be hit
by a financial crisis and introduced the leverage cap for that reason would the results
be invalidated by this assumption. I argue that this case is rather implausible as it
would require first that countries implementing the measure correctly predict the date
and severity of the crisis and, second, that countries introduce their caps on leverage
for precisely this reason.
Regarding the anticipation of the crisis, Figure 4.2 shows that real credit growth
rates are also lower after the crisis than before the crisis in countries which had lever-
age caps. This argues against the hypothesis that the impact of the crisis was fully
anticipated. In this sense my approach is similar to that of others who have used the
global financial crisis as an exogenous event and compared post-crisis and pre-crisis
outcomes, such as Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011), who analyse lending by global banks.
Furthermore, the reasons for introducing a leverage cap are likely to differ across
countries. As described above, the desire to smooth the credit cycle and prevent ex-
cessive credit booms emerging can be seen as one of the main reasons for having a
macroprudential policy. Lim et al. (2011) argue that for the United States the cap on
the leverage of banks was not even introduced for macroprudential purposes but rather
to limit risks at the individual bank level. In Canada, the regulatory constraint on
leverage has been in place since the 1980s and is mainly intended to reduce the overall
leverage in the system (Bordeleau et al., 2009). It appears that prior to the crisis,
the leverage cap was generally seen not as a macroprudential tool but primarily as a
microprudential tool. I thus argue that the decision to implement caps on the leverage
of banks is driven not by expectations about financial crises but rather by country
characteristics such as institutional quality or a preference for a more stable financial
system, though not all of these characteristics are necessarily observable. The two
groups of countries might well differ in this important respect, but these potentially
unobservable characteristics are exactly those which are captured by the difference-in-
differences approach. To show the relevance of the difference-in-differences approach,
and how it is meaningful, I will show the impact on the outcome variable of some key
country-specific variables which are constant over time.6
It might still be that countries which had caps on leverage before the crisis were
hit less hard by the financial crisis and thus also experienced a less pronounced fall
6 As the impact of constant country-specific variables is absorbed in the baseline specification, I will
use the correlated random effects approach (Mundlak, 1978; Wooldridge, 2010), which allows us to
measure the impact of time-constant variables even in a fully specified fixed-effects regression.
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in their credit growth rates. For this reason it will be important to test whether the
country-specific severity of the financial crisis itself can explain the differential effect
in post-crisis real credit growth as a competing explanation for the stabilising effect.
The results will be shown in the section on robustness.
4.4 Estimation Results
4.4.1 The Stabilising Effect of Caps on Banks’ Leverage
The specification for identifying the stabilising effect of macroprudential regulation on
domestic credit to the private sector as presented in Equation (4.1) in Section 4.3.1 is
estimated via OLS. Standard errors are clustered at the country level to account for
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of the errors (Bertrand et al., 2004; Petersen,
2009).
Table 4.3 shows the estimation results. The results give evidence of a stabilising
effect on real credit growth from caps on banks’ leverage. The point estimate in column
1 for the baseline specification suggests that the real credit growth rate was about six
percentage points higher after the crisis for those countries that had a leverage cap
prior to the crisis than for those that did not. The effect can be considered sizeable
in economic terms given that the average real credit growth rate in the sample is 13.6
percent with a standard deviation of 16.4 percent. The estimated coefficient is statis-
tically significant at the 1 percent level. The baseline specification includes the real
GDP growth rate and the monetary policy rate in order to capture the stance of the
macroeconomic environment. The positive and significant coefficients of both variables
indicate that a better macroeconomic stance is related to higher credit growth. There-
fore it appears reasonable to include both variables in the baseline specification. For
comparison, I estimate the specification without additional control variables in column
2. This leads to an estimated effect of 8.9 percentage points, which is statistically
significant but considerably higher. Furthermore, the finding of a stabilising effect also
holds if I lag both macroeconomic variables by one period, as shown in column 3.
Table 4.4 shows that the result remains stable – both quantitatively and in terms
of statistical significance – across the inclusion of different sets of time-varying control
variables. Many of the control variables turn out to be insignificant and do not add
to the goodness of fit measured by the R-squared. This is particularly so for the
private credit-to-GDP ratio (column 2) and the index of macroprudential regulation
by Cerutti et al. (2016), which captures the range of other macroprudential measures
targeted at either borrowers or financial institutions (column 5). Controlling for other
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macroprudential policy instruments is necessary as those instruments might interact
with each other in a non-trivial way in their effect on the credit supply from banks
(Kashyap et al., 2014). The specification in column 6 additionally controls for the
impact of a cap on leverage introduced after the crisis, though this does not appear to
have a significant impact on real credit growth either. In addition, the occurrence of
a banking or currency crisis negatively affects the real credit growth rate but does not
interfere with the stabilising effect of the cap on leverage either (column 7).
4.4.2 The Role of Country-Specific Characteristics
The heterogeneity of characteristics across countries may influence both the decision
to implement the leverage cap and the outcome variable, i.e. real credit growth. The
fixed effects specification effectively controls for the impact of these variables, so it is
key in identifying the desired effect of the leverage cap on real credit growth. Because
it controls for both observable and unobservable country-specific characteristics, how-
ever, I cannot investigate the impact of time-constant observables any more. By using
a correlated random effects model, we can still include time constant variables and
detect their impact on the outcome variable.7 The application of this approach gives
an idea of those country characteristics that actually drive the results.
Table 4.5 shows the results. Column 1 is from a specification which includes the
following time-constant country characteristics: the pre-crisis (2002-07) average of the
real GDP growth rate; the monetary policy rate; and the credit-to-GDP ratio. The
coefficient of the interaction term is the same as in the baseline case (column 1 of
Table 4.3), which it should be for the method to be correctly implemented.8 We see
that a higher private credit-to-GDP ratio before the crisis is associated with lower real
credit growth rates. Column 2 further indicates that a higher equity capital ratio for
banks before the crisis is on average related to higher growth of real credit. In Section
4.4.3 it will be shown that this can be explained by the stabilising effect of pre-crisis
capital on credit growth after the crisis. No significant effect is found for the pre-
crisis deposit ratio. Interestingly, the dummy indicating whether a given country had
a leverage cap before the crisis does not have a significant effect on real credit growth
either, even though the point estimate is relatively large in absolute terms. Without
over-interpreting the result, it can at least be said that it challenges the notion that
7 The correlated random effects model goes back to Mundlak (1978). See Wooldridge (2010) for
the case of an unbalanced panel. Technically, the correlated random effects model controls for
fixed-effects by including all time-varying variables along with their group-specific mean over time.
This identifies the same coefficients of time-varying variables as in the fixed-effects estimation but
additionally allows time-constant variables to be included in the regression.
8 The coefficient differs slightly in column 2 because it is based on a smaller estimation sample due
to the limited availability of the control variables included.
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the leverage cap was highly effective in reducing the build-up of a major credit boom
before the crisis. The finding is in line with Cerutti et al. (2016), who do not find a
significant effect on credit growth from caps on banks’ leverage either when looking at
the impact of individual instruments.
If we plausibly assume that a higher credit-to-GDP ratio or a higher equity capital
ratio are important in the decision being taken to introduce a cap on leverage in
order to mitigate the build-up of a potentially excessive credit boom, not including
them in the regression would lead to a biased estimate of the effect of the leverage
cap because we see from the regression that they clearly have an effect on the real
credit growth variable. In sum, the illustrative evidence for the role of country-specific
variables therefore supports the use of a difference-in-differences approach in the first
place. This is because the method is effective in taking into account the potentially
confounding influence on key pre-crisis differences of constant country characteristics.
4.4.3 Does the Effect Work Through the Pre-Crisis Capital
Ratio?
One channel through which the stabilising effect of leverage caps might work is that
after the crisis, banks might draw on capital buffers built up prior to the crisis. This
would mean they do not have to cut lending due to deleveraging to the same extent as
banks in countries that did not implement the regulation. I can investigate this channel
empirically by interacting the pre-crisis capital ratio (CapRatio) with the interaction
term of the baseline specification, and I additionally include all two-way interactions
not captured by the fixed effects:
∆lnRealCreditit =αi + αt + β1 [DPostCrisis ×DLEV] + β2 [DPostCrisis × CapRatioi]
+ β3 [DPostCrisis ×DLEV × CapRatioi] + x′itγ + εit (4.3)
To make sure that I capture the capital ratio with which the banks in a given coun-
try entered the crisis, I take the average of the years 2006 and 2007.
Table 4.6 shows the result. The coefficient of the triple interaction term tells us that
the stabilising effect is significantly higher for those countries in which the pre-crisis
capital ratios of the banks are higher. The size of the stabilising effect that is dependent
on the pre-crisis capital ratio is plotted in Figure 4.4 for the range of values observed
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for the pre-crisis capital ratios of the countries that had implemented the regulation.9
We see that the stabilising effect does indeed increase with a higher capital ratio and is
statistically significant for capital ratios of about seven percent and above. This gives
strong support to the argument that the leverage cap is effective in making banks build
up buffers before the crisis that then stabilise their lending after the crisis.
This finding is in line with Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2013), who document how banks
with lower leverage before the crisis showed on average a better stock market perfor-
mance during the global financial crisis. Similarly, Berger and Bouwman (2013) show
for the US that banks with a higher capital ratio perform better during banking crises.
4.4.4 The Effect on Total Asset Growth and the Contribution
of Its Subcomponents
The results so far suggest that the pre-crisis implementation of the leverage cap sta-
bilised credit to the private sector after the crisis. The next question is whether lend-
ing to the private sector was achieved through a general expansion of total assets
or via a reduction of claims on other sectors of the economy. To answer this, I re-
place the dependent variable in the baseline specification with the total asset growth
rate and decompose it into the contributions by various subcomponents, which are
claims on the non-financial private sector (PrivSecClaims, as in the previous analysis);
claims on non-residents; the central bank; the public sector; and financial institutions
(FinInstClaims). The total asset growth rate is decomposed in the following way:
TotalAssetsit − TotalAssetsit−1
TotalAssetsit−1
= PrivSecClaimsit − PrivSecClaimsit−1
TotalAssetsit−1
+ . . .
+ FinInstClaimsit − FinInstClaimsit−1
TotalAssetsit−1
(4.4)
Total asset growth and its subcomponents on the right hand side of this equation
are now used as dependent variables in the baseline specification. This procedure allows
the way that the subcomponents contribute to the overall effect on total asset growth
of caps on leverages to be quantified. As we are still in the difference-in-differences
set up, the interpretation of the results is always relative to the countries without the
9 The total effect is given by β1 + β3 × CapRatioi and depends on the value of the pre-crisis capital
ratio. The standard errors of the total effect cannot be read from the regression table. They are
computed as SE =
√
var(β1) + CapRatio2 × var(β3) + 2CapRatio × cov(β1, β3) (see also Brambor
et al., 2006).
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leverage cap.
The results are shown in Table 4.7. Column 1 shows the effect of the leverage cap
on total asset growth to be positive. Banks in countries with the leverage cap have on
aggregate expanded their balance sheet by 4.5 percentage points more than have banks
in other countries. The effect is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Column
2 shows that credit to the private sector contributed the largest part to this overall
effect, giving about 3.2 percentage points of the total of 4.5. From columns 3 and 4,
we see that the relative increase in claims on non-residents and the central bank after
the crisis also contributed positively to the overall effect on asset growth. In contrast,
there was a relative decrease in claims on the public sector and financial institutions,
which therefore negatively contributed to the overall asset growth (columns 5 and 6).
In terms of statistical inference, only the contribution by the claims on the private
sector is significant. The results suggest that claims on the private sector were by far
the most important component of the overall credit provided to the economy.
4.5 Robustness
4.5.1 Competing Explanations
Some of the results from above suggest that a closer look is needed at the role of the
financial cycle prior to the crisis. I must therefore check whether adjustment to the
pre-crisis credit boom is a competing explanation for the effect I found. The reason for
this exercise is that the pattern of real credit growth rates we observe is compatible
with the story that those countries that did not implement macroprudential regulation
were in the upturn of the financial cycle before the crisis and therefore saw their growth
rates adjust accordingly afterwards. In this case, the observed effect would not have
anything to do with macroprudential regulation but would rather reflect a standard
adjustment to the pre-crisis credit boom. We can test for this alternative explanation
by including the credit-to-GDP ratio from just before the crisis from the average of
2006 and 2007, and interacting it with the post-crisis indicator to check for the com-
peting differential effect. As it turns out, however, the result is not significant and the
initial stabilising effect remains strong, statistically and economically, as can be seen
in column 1 of Table 4.8.
Another competing explanation might trace the development of post-crisis real
credit growth back to the impact of the financial crisis and the severity with which it
and the subsequent Great Recession hit those countries. As a consequence of larger
losses in real output, credit might grow at lower rates in the following years. I use the
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drop in the GDP growth rate in the crisis year 2009 to measure the severity of the
crisis and check its differential effect as part of the specification. As it turns out, the
stabilising effect is limited quantitatively by this exercise, so the severity of the crisis
might play a role (column 2 of Table 4.8). However, the severity of the crisis effect is
not statistically significant itself and the stabilising effect of the leverage cap remains
sizable in economic terms.
A further test of competing explanations involves the effect of the pre-crisis av-
erage from 2002-07 of the regulatory quality indicator provided by the Worldwide
Governance Indicators database (World Bank) to test whether the differential effect on
credit growth is driven by a higher level of regulatory quality. The results suggest that
this is not the case either (column 3). The same holds true for the effect of a systemic
banking crisis in 2007/08 measured as a dummy variable drawn from the database by
Laeven and Valencia (2012, 2013) in column 4.
4.5.2 Subsample Analysis
The treatment group, consisting of the countries which actually implemented the cap
on leverage, is relatively small at only eight in the baseline specification. To make sure
that the results are not driven by the impact of one individual country, it is reasonable
to check how robust the results are to the exclusion of one of these countries from the
sample. This is done in Table 4.9. The results show that the effect varies somewhat in
size but remains statistically significant no matter which country is excluded from the
sample.
Table 4.10 presents the results from four additional robustness checks for different
subsamples. There might be other macroprudential measures which affected real credit
growth after the crisis, and therefore I estimate the effect using only countries in the
control group which did not introduce any macroprudential regulation before the crisis.
The results are shown in column 1. Another robustness check considers the subsample
of emerging market economies only (column 2).10 Then I narrow the estimation period
down to the years 2005-12, dividing the period symmetrically into four pre-crisis and
four post-crisis years (column 3). To check more carefully that the effect really captures
the difference between the post-crisis and pre-crisis periods, I also exclude the explicit
crisis years 2008 and 2009 from the sample (column 4). The clear picture that emerges
from all of these robustness exercises is that the finding of a stabilising effect on real
credit growth from caps on the leverage of banks after the crisis remains valid.
10I do not run the corresponding subsample analysis for the advanced economies because only two of
them (USA and Canada) have a leverage cap.
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4.6 Conclusions
The purpose of the study is to investigate empirically the effect of a cap on banks’
leverage on credit growth after a financial crisis. The results give information on how
macroprudential policy works with an instrument that is currently tested under the
Basel III regulatory framework on banking supervision.
I approach the question by applying a difference-in-differences approach to a panel
of 69 advanced and emerging market economies over the period 2002-14. I compare the
growth rate of real credit before and after the crisis across groups of countries that had
a leverage cap prior to the crisis and those that did not. The results show the leverage
cap to have a stabilising effect on real credit growth. The stabilising effect is of about
six percentage points. It is higher for countries with a higher aggregate bank capital
ratio prior to the crisis. This finding is in line with the interpretation that the leverage
cap made banks build up buffers before the crisis, which they could draw on after the
crisis had hit to continue lending to the private sector. The stabilising effect on credit
to the private sector was the most important part of a generally stabilising effect on the
growth of banking assets after the crisis. The findings are robust to various robustness
checks. In particular, the adjustment to the pre-crisis credit boom and the severity of
the crisis can be ruled out as competing explanations.
A comprehensive analysis of the cost and benefits of the implementation of a cap on
the leverage of banks is beyond the scope of this paper. Still, the results point towards
a potentially stabilising role of such macroprudential policy instruments in financial
downturns. This is a dimension of the overall effect of macroprudential policy that
should be incorporated into a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of the regulatory
trade-off. In this sense, this study is complementary to existing empirical analyses
because it highlights the ex-post rather than ex-ante dimension of macroprudential
policy. This holds true in particular considering that even if macroprudential policy is
effective in smoothing financial cycles, it might not be able to prevent future financial
downturns and crises from happening after all. Therefore, the question of whether and
through which channels macroprudential policy helps in stabilising the real economy
during financial downturns remains an interesting area for further research.
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Appendix to Chapter 4
4.A Data
Domestic credit to the private sector: Data on credit to the private sector by
resident banks are taken from the IMF Other Depository Corporation Survey, which
is part of the International Financial Statistics (IFS). The series was complemented
by the series on private credit-to-GDP ratios from the World Development Indicators
(WDI) database, which was multiplied by nominal GDP. The credit series in local cur-
rency units was deflated using the yearly CPI index from the IMF IFS.
Macroprudential policy tools: The information on the implementation of the lever-
age cap and on other macroprudential measures (borrower and financial institutions-
targeted macroprudential index) is taken from the dataset provided by Cerutti et al.
(2016). The dataset is based on the Global Macroprudential Policy Instruments (GMPI)
survey conducted by the IMF and can be accessed via the following link:
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=42791.0
Macroeconomic control variables: Data are either taken from the IMF Interna-
tional Financial Statistics (IFS) or the World Development Indicators (WDI) by the
World Bank (both databases accessed via Datastream). In detail:
• Real GDP growth rate (in %): Based on GDP in constant 2005 USD (IMF IFS).
• Monetary policy rate (in %): Based on the central bank policy rate. When this
was unavailable, the money market rate was used instead. When that was also
unavailable, the discount rate was used (IMF IFS).
• CPI inflation rate (in %): Based on the consumer price index taken from the
IMF IFS.
• Private credit-to-GDP ratio (in %): Series on domestic credit to private sector
(in % of GDP) taken from the WDI database.
• GDP per capita: The series in current international USD is taken from the WDI
database.
Regulatory quality: The indicator ranges from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) and is
taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) database of the World Bank.
See Kaufmann et al. (2011) for details.
(Systemic) banking crisis, sovereign debt crisis, currency crisis: The indica-
tors are taken from the database by Laeven and Valencia (2012, 2013).
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Aggregate balance sheet variables: The variables total assets and claims on the
subsectors of the economy (non-financial private sector, non-residents, public sector
(central plus state/local government), central bank), and the ratio of equity capital
(position: shares and other equity) to total assets are taken from the Other Depository
Corporation Survey, which is part of the International Financial Statistics (IFS) by the
IMF.
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4.B Figures and Tables
Figure 4.1: Capital-to-assets ratio of banks 2002-14
The graph shows the average capital-to-assets ratio (in %) of banks over 2002-14 for countries
with and without a leverage cap prior to 2008. The vertical line indicates the start of the
post-crisis period (2009). The sample is based on the estimation sample (69 countries). The
capital ratios are winsorised at the 1% and 99% quantiles. Data source: IMF IFS.
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Figure 4.2: Real credit growth rates 2002-14
The graph shows the average growth rates of real credit (in %) over 2002-14 for countries
with and without a leverage cap prior to 2008. The vertical line indicates the start of the
post-crisis period (2009). The sample is based on the estimation sample (69 countries). The
growth rates are winsorised at the 1% and 99% quantiles. Data source: IMF IFS.
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Figure 4.3: Pre-treatment differential effects
The graph shows the differential effect of caps on leverage on real credit growth in the three
years preceding the post-crisis period (2006-08). Estimation is based on Equation (4.2).
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Figure 4.4: The effect of the leverage cap on real credit growth conditional on the pre-crisis
capital ratio
The graph shows the effect of the leverage cap on real credit growth (solid line, measured on
horizontal axis, in percentage points) for different values of the pre-crisis capital ratio (ver-
tical axis, in %) based on the estimation results in Table 4.6. The estimates are surrounded
by 95% confidence bands (dashed lines).
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Table 4.1: List of countries included in estimation sample
The table shows the 69 countries included in the estimation sample. The upper panel shows
the countries which implemented a cap on banks’ leverage prior to the crisis of 2008 and the
lower panel shows those that did not. The countries are grouped into advanced and emerging
countries using the definition by the IMF (Cerutti et al., 2016; IMF, 2014).
Advanced Emerging
Leverage cap: yes Canada Chile Paraguay
United States Ecuador Saudi Arabia
Jordan St. Kitts and Nevis
Leverage cap: no Australia Albania Malaysia
Austria Algeria Mauritius
Belgium Angola Mexico
Cyprus Armenia Morocco
Czech Republic Belize Pakistan
Estonia Botswana Philippines
Finland Brazil Poland
France Bulgaria Romania
Germany Cape Verde Russia
Iceland Colombia Serbia
Ireland Costa Rica South Africa
Israel Croatia Thailand
Italy Dominican Republic Trinidad and Tobago
Japan El Salvador Turkey
Korea Fiji Ukraine
Latvia Georgia
Malta Guyana
Netherlands Hungary
Portugal Indonesia
Slovakia Kazakhstan
Slovenia Kuwait
Spain Lithuania
Sweden Macedonia
Total number 25 44
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics
The table shows summary statistics for the dependent variable (growth rate of real credit to
the private sector, in %) and the explanatory variables to be used in the empirical specifi-
cation. The sample is based on the estimation sample following the baseline specification in
the results section (69 countries, years 2002-14). All variables are winsorised at the 1% and
99% quantiles. See the Data Appendix for detailed description and data sources.
Variable Country group Observations Mean Standarddeviation Min Max
Real credit to the private sector
(growth rate, in %)
Leverage cap: yes 89 11.62 11.44 −14.10 60.74
Leverage cap: no 730 13.81 16.86 −14.10 78.34
Total 819 13.57 16.37 −14.10 78.34
Real GDP growth rate (in %)
Leverage cap: yes 89 3.87 3.35 −5.60 14.22
Leverage cap: no 730 3.30 3.76 −11.77 18.23
Total 819 3.36 3.72 −11.77 18.23
Monetary policy rate (in %)
Leverage cap: yes 89 4.56 3.40 0.13 15.36
Leverage cap: no 730 5.95 9.97 0.08 150.00
Total 819 5.80 9.49 0.08 150.00
CPI inflation rate (in %)
Leverage cap: yes 89 3.99 3.04 −0.73 14.99
Leverage cap: no 730 4.77 7.01 −1.09 109.59
Total 819 4.68 6.70 −1.09 109.59
Private credit-to-GDP ratio
(in %)
Leverage cap: yes 89 53.39 28.57 14.62 134.99
Leverage cap: no 725 65.06 40.55 4.20 172.41
Total 814 63.78 39.57 4.20 172.41
GDP per capita (Thous.
international USD)
Leverage cap: yes 89 23.09 15.98 4.78 54.63
Leverage cap: no 730 20.29 14.02 2.86 76.89
Total 819 20.60 14.27 2.86 76.89
Financial institutions-targeted
macroprudential index (0–10)
Leverage cap: yes 82 3.01 1.31 1.00 5.00
Leverage cap: no 677 1.38 1.27 0.00 6.00
Total 759 1.55 1.37 0.00 6.00
Borrower-targeted
macroprudential index (0–2)
Leverage cap: yes 82 0.34 0.57 0.00 2.00
Leverage cap: no 677 0.34 0.63 0.00 2.00
Total 759 0.34 0.62 0.00 2.00
Regulatory quality (-2.5–2.5)
Leverage cap: yes 89 0.30 0.88 −1.28 1.65
Leverage cap: no 717 0.52 0.76 −1.49 1.92
Total 806 0.50 0.78 −1.49 1.92
Banking crisis (0/1)
Leverage cap: yes 43 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00
Leverage cap: no 487 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Total 530 0.10 0.31 0.00 1.00
Sovereign debt crisis (0/1)
Leverage cap: yes 43 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00
Leverage cap: no 487 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00
Total 530 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00
Currency crisis (0/1)
Leverage cap: yes 43 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00
Leverage cap: no 487 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00
Total 530 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00
Capital-to-assets ratio (in %)
Leverage cap: yes 63 8.34 3.78 0.00 14.03
Leverage cap: no 691 9.91 4.26 0.00 22.56
Total 754 9.77 4.24 0.00 22.56
Deposit-to-assets ratio (in %)
Leverage cap: yes 63 55.93 9.67 39.19 76.98
Leverage cap: no 709 47.50 17.55 10.22 79.26
Total 772 48.19 17.19 10.22 79.26
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Table 4.3: Difference-in-differences regression
The table shows the regression results of the main difference-in-differences regression based
on Equation (4.1) for the period 2002-14. The dummy variable DLEV indicates countries
that implemented a cap on the leverage of banks prior to the crisis of 2008. The dummy
DPostCrisis captures the post-crisis period and is equal to one from the year 2009 on and zero
otherwise. The dependent variable is the rate of growth of real credit (in %). The number of
observations varies according to the availability of control variables. All specifications include
country-fixed and time-fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors at the country-level are
given in parentheses. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels
respectively. All variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% quantiles.
Dependent variable:
Real credit growth (%) (1) (2) (3)
DLEV ×DPostCrisis 6.029∗∗∗ 8.937∗∗∗ 5.889∗∗
(2.123) (2.761) (2.241)
Real GDP growth (%) 1.638∗∗∗
(0.248)
Monetary policy rate (%) 0.197∗∗∗
(0.073)
Real GDP growth (lag, %) 1.150∗∗∗
(0.207)
Monetary policy rate (lag, %) 0.284∗∗∗
(0.048)
Country FE y y y
Year FE y y y
Countries 69 69 69
Observations 819 819 817
R2 0.38 0.28 0.34
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Table 4.4: Difference-in-differences regression: time-varying controls
The table shows the regression results of the main difference-in-differences regression for
different sets of time-varying control variables based on Equation (4.1) for the period 2002-
14. The dummy variable DLEV indicates countries that implemented a cap on the leverage
of banks prior to the crisis of 2008. The dummy DPostCrisis captures the post-crisis period
and is equal to one from the year 2009 on and zero otherwise. The dependent variable is
the rate of growth of real credit (in %). The number of observations varies according to
the availability of control variables. All specifications include country-fixed and time-fixed
effects. Cluster-robust standard errors at the country-level are given in parentheses. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All variables are
winsorised at the 1% and 99% quantiles.
Dependent variable:
Real credit growth (%) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
DLEV ×DPostCrisis 6.029∗∗∗ 5.943∗∗∗ 6.178∗∗∗ 5.889∗∗∗ 5.373∗∗ 6.028∗∗ 6.276∗∗
(2.123) (2.065) (2.129) (2.118) (2.322) (2.382) (2.862)
Real GDP growth (%) 1.638∗∗∗ 1.629∗∗∗ 1.643∗∗∗ 1.640∗∗∗ 1.562∗∗∗ 1.566∗∗∗ 1.492∗∗∗
(0.248) (0.248) (0.253) (0.249) (0.242) (0.248) (0.286)
Monetary policy rate (%) 0.197∗∗∗ 0.297 0.197∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗ 0.153∗∗ 0.176∗∗ 0.105
(0.073) (0.190) (0.073) (0.075) (0.076) (0.075) (0.084)
Inflation rate (%) −0.148
(0.281)
Private credit-to-GDP (%) 0.012
(0.044)
GDP per capita (log) −8.814
(14.017)
MacroPru index
(fin. sector)
−1.808
(1.848)
MacroPru index
(borrower)
−2.054
(1.605)
Leverage cap (0/1) −4.585
(12.568)
Banking crisis (0/1) −5.693∗
(3.042)
Sovereign debt crisis
(0/1)
8.712
(8.559)
Currency crisis (0/1) −18.379∗∗∗
(5.040)
Country FE y y y y y y y
Year FE y y y y y y y
Countries 69 69 69 69 69 69 62
Observations 819 819 814 819 759 759 530
R2 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.35
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Table 4.5: Correlated random effects regression
This table displays the estimation result of the correlated random effects specification which
controls for time-fixed and country-fixed effects and includes constant country-specific re-
gressors for the period 2002-14: the average over 2002-07 of the real GDP growth rate, the
monetary policy rate, and the credit-to-GDP ratio. The average capital and deposit-to-assets
ratio in the two years before the crisis (2006/07) are added in column 2 and the dummy vari-
able DLEV indicating countries that implemented a cap on the leverage of banks prior to the
crisis of 2008 in column 3. The number of observations varies according to the availability of
control variables. Cluster-robust standard errors at the country-level are given in parenthe-
ses. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All
variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% quantiles.
Dependent variable:
Real credit growth (%) (1) (2) (3)
DLEV ×DPostCrisis 6.029∗∗∗ 6.147∗∗ 6.029∗∗∗
(2.140) (2.329) (2.142)
Real GDP growth (%) 1.638∗∗∗ 1.624∗∗∗ 1.638∗∗∗
(0.250) (0.278) (0.250)
Monetary policy rate (%) 0.197∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.073) (0.073)
Avg. real GDP growth 2002-07 (%) 1.101∗∗ 1.050∗ 1.106∗∗
(0.514) (0.619) (0.514)
Avg. monetary policy rate 2002-07 (%) 0.043 0.245 0.060
(0.363) (0.417) (0.363)
Avg. credit-to-GDP ratio 2002-07 (%) −0.076∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Avg. capital ratio 2006/07 (%) 0.260∗
(0.154)
Avg. deposit ratio 2006/07 (%) 0.003
(0.039)
DLEV (0/1) −3.991
(7.062)
Country FE y y y
Year FE y y y
Countries 69 61 69
Observations 819 746 819
R2 0.54 0.54 0.54
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Table 4.6: The effect of the leverage cap on real credit growth conditional on the pre-crisis
capital ratio
The table shows the regression results of the main difference-in-differences regression aug-
mented by an additional interaction of the interaction term with the pre-crisis capital ratio
(CapRatio, average over 2006/07) based on Equation (4.3) for the period 2002-14. The
dummy variable DLEV indicates countries that implemented a cap on the leverage of banks
prior to the crisis of 2008. The dummy DPostCrisis captures the post-crisis period and is
equal to one from the year 2009 on and zero otherwise. The dependent variable is the rate
of growth of real credit (in %). All specifications include country-fixed and time-fixed ef-
fects. Cluster-robust standard errors at the country-level are given in parentheses. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All variables are
winsorised at the 1% and 99% quantiles.
Dependent variable:
Real credit growth (%) (1)
DLEV ×DPostCrisis −1.059
(3.923)
DPostCrisis × CapRatio −0.368
(0.349)
DLEV ×DPostCrisis × CapRatio 0.862∗∗
(0.416)
Real GDP growth (%) 1.562∗∗∗
(0.282)
Monetary policy rate (%) 0.195∗∗
(0.081)
Country FE y
Year FE y
Countries 61
Observations 746
R2 0.61
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Table 4.7: The effect of the leverage cap on total asset growth and the contribution of sub-
components
The table shows the effect of the leverage cap on total asset growth of banks and its sub-
components for the period 2002-14. The dummy variable DLEV indicates countries that im-
plemented a cap on the leverage of banks prior to the crisis of 2008. The dummy DPostCrisis
captures the post-crisis period and is equal to one from the year 2009 on and zero other-
wise. The number of countries and observations varies according to the availability of the
dependent variable. The dependent variable in column 1 is total asset growth (in %). The de-
pendent variables in columns 2-6 measure the contributions of the respective subcomponent
to total asset growth and are defined as the yearly change in that subcomponent relative
to the total assets of the previous period (in %). The names of the subcomponents are
given in the header of each column and comprise claims on the non-financial private sector,
non-residents, the central bank, the public sector (central and state/local governments), and
other financial institutions. All specifications include country-fixed and time-fixed effects.
Cluster-robust standard errors at the country-level are given in parentheses. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All variables are win-
sorised at the 1% and 99% quantiles. The decomposition effects in the first row of results do
not exactly add up to the total effect in column 1 due to missing data on some components
and winsorising.
Dependent variable: Change in claims
subcomponent relative to total assets
of previous period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total
Assets
Private
Sector
Non-
residents
Central
bank
Public
sector
Financial
institutions
DLEV ×DPostCrisis 4.559∗ 3.205∗∗ 1.367 0.565 −0.076 −0.462
(2.476) (1.570) (0.854) (0.752) (0.507) (0.414)
Real GDP growth (%) 1.016∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗ 0.118 0.111 −0.012 0.035∗
(0.272) (0.127) (0.074) (0.090) (0.009) (0.020)
Monetary policy rate (%) 0.244∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.001 0.003
(0.032) (0.033) (0.009) (0.016) (0.003) (0.003)
Country FE y y y y y y
Year FE y y y y y y
Countries 66 66 66 66 65 66
Observations 761 761 761 739 748 761
R2 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
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Table 4.8: Robustness: competing explanations
The table reports the results of the baseline specification for the period 2002-14 augmented
by the interaction term of the post-crisis indicator and i) the pre-crisis credit boom variable
(measured as the average credit-to-GDP ratio over 2006/07) in column 1, ii) the severity of
the crisis (measured as the drop in the 2009 GDP growth rate) in column 2, iii) regulatory
quality (measured as the average of the regulatory quality indicator taken from the World
Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators database over 2002-07) in column 3, and iv) the
indicator of a systemic banking crisis in 2007/08 based on the database by Laeven and
Valencia (2012, 2013) in column 4. The dummy variable DLEV indicates countries that
implemented a cap on the leverage of banks prior to the crisis of 2008. The dummyDPostCrisis
captures the post-crisis period and is equal to one from the year 2009 on and zero otherwise.
The dependent variable is the rate of growth of real credit (in %). All specifications include
country-fixed and time-fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors at the country-level are
given in parentheses. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels
respectively. All variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% quantiles.
Dependent variable:
Real credit growth (%) (1) (2) (3) (4)
DLEV ×DPostCrisis 6.250∗∗∗ 5.256∗∗ 6.450∗∗ 5.408∗∗∗
(2.250) (2.371) (2.610) (1.963)
Pre-crisis credit boom ×DPostCrisis 0.011
(0.032)
Severity of crisis ×DPostCrisis −0.461
(0.433)
Regulatory quality ×DPostCrisis 2.512
(1.759)
Systemic banking crisis ×DPostCrisis −5.103
(3.160)
Real GDP growth (%) 1.633∗∗∗ 1.541∗∗∗ 1.576∗∗∗ 1.632∗∗∗
(0.245) (0.257) (0.239) (0.241)
Monetary policy rate (%) 0.193∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.150∗ 0.209∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.075) (0.089) (0.069)
Country FE y y y y
Year FE y y y y
Countries 69 69 68 69
Observations 819 819 806 819
R2 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.39
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Table 4.10: Robustness: subsample analysis
The table shows robustness checks for various subsamples following the baseline specifica-
tion. Column 1 shows the results of the specification which only includes countries as part
of the control groups which did not implement any macroprudential policy measure prior to
the crisis. Column 2 reports results for the subsample of emerging economies only. Column
3 reports results for the estimation period 2005-12. Column 4 reports results excluding the
years 2008/09 from the estimation. The dummy variable DLEV indicates countries that im-
plemented a cap on the leverage of banks prior to the crisis of 2008. The dummy DPostCrisis
captures the post-crisis period and is equal to one from the year 2009 on and zero otherwise.
The dependent variable is the rate of growth of real credit (in %). All specifications include
country-fixed and time-fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors at the country-level are
given in parentheses. ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels
respectively. All variables are winsorised at the 1% and 99% quantiles.
Dependent variable:
Real credit growth (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No
MacroPru
Emerging
economies 2005-12
Exclude
2008/09
DLEV ×DPostCrisis 7.800∗ 7.759∗∗∗ 6.191∗∗ 7.232∗∗∗
(4.145) (2.598) (2.720) (2.353)
Real GDP growth (%) 1.223∗∗∗ 1.664∗∗∗ 1.625∗∗∗ 1.823∗∗∗
(0.257) (0.301) (0.227) (0.297)
Monetary policy rate (%) −1.013 0.211∗∗∗ −0.194 0.231∗∗∗
(0.741) (0.066) (0.177) (0.070)
Country FE y y y y
Year FE y y y y
Countries 24 44 69 69
Observations 275 529 521 689
R2 0.41 0.39 0.43 0.40
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Concluding Remarks and Outlook
In the wake of the global financial crisis, many countries have updated their regulatory
framework. This thesis has contributed to the research on financial stability and to the
ongoing debate on regulatory reform.
Chapter 1 of the thesis analyzed credit risk co-movements in sovereign debt mar-
kets during the financial crisis and the subsequent euro area sovereign debt crisis. In
addition, it investigated to what extent high co-movements might be the outcome of
contagion and through which channels contagion occurs. There were two main find-
ings. First, credit risk comoved considerably, in particular among euro area countries
and during the sovereign debt crisis. Second, there is evidence that contagion occurred
through both fundamental and non-fundamental channels.
Chapter 2 assessed the impact of uncertainty on banks’ loan supply. The results
showed that higher uncertainty in banking negatively affects bank lending. This neg-
ative effect is alleviated for banks that are better capitalized and hold more liquid
assets. The effect is also less pronounced for banks in more financially open countries,
whereas it seems to be unaffected by the ownership status of the bank (domestic versus
foreign-owned).
Chapter 3 studied how liquidity provided by the Eurosystem affected internal ad-
justment in European periphery countries after the crisis. The key result which emerged
from this analysis was that Eurosystem liquidity provision lowered the adjustment in
real unit labor costs and real wages, and led to lower price increases in sectors that are
more financially vulnerable.
Chapter 4 investigated if a macroprudential policy instrument, caps on banks’ lever-
age, stabilizes bank lending during financial downturns. The main finding of the study
was that caps on banks’ leverage indeed have a stabilizing effect on real credit growth
during financial downturns. The channel through which this stabilizing effect works is
that banks subject to the leverage cap can draw on higher capital buffers which they
have built up before the crisis.
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In sum, the findings of this thesis can provide useful insights for the ongoing regu-
latory debate. One general conclusion is that there is a rationale for both short-term
policy measures in response to a crisis and long-term regulatory reform.
The finding of non-fundamentals based contagion in sovereign bond markets calls
for short-term policy measures in response to a crisis that are able to affect investors’
expectation and for rescue mechanisms which can provide immediate support. The
non-standard monetary policy measures by the ECB and the implementation of the
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) might be seen in this light.
Another conclusion is that short-term policy responses to a crisis might have un-
intended consequences. In the euro area, it was first and foremost monetary policy
that alleviated the immediate and adverse effects of the sudden stop in private capital
inflows due to the crisis. However, such a policy response can have unintended conse-
quences. Financial institutions might rely on the enhanced liquidity provided by the
central bank also in the medium to long term if international capital markets continue
not to work properly. This in turn might lead to a delay in necessary macroeconomic
adjustment. This thesis gave evidence that liquidity provision by the Eurosystem in-
deed affected macroeconomic adjustment over the medium and long term. The results
point towards a general trade-off between mitigating a negative liquidity shock and de-
laying adjustment. The use of fiscal or macroprudential policies may reduce the need
to rely on liquidity provision and relax this trade-off. In consequence, there is a need
for coordination of policies internationally and within existing political and monetary
unions.
A further implication is the relevance of the insights from microprudential regu-
lation for a comprehensive macroprudential framework. The thesis showed that the
negative impact of uncertainty is mitigated for banks with higher capital and liquidity
holdings. Banks with a high loss-absorbing capacity and sufficient liquidity buffers
are likely to contribute to the stability of the financial system as a whole. Therefore,
an updated regulatory framework should not only seek to establish new instruments
but also to build on existing microprudential tools to achieve macroprudential goals.
This in turn supports the new rules relating to bank capital and liquidity requirements
under Basel III, the implementation of a leverage ratio in addition to the minimum
risk-weighted capital ratio, and the use of new instruments.
Moreover, this thesis argues for long-term policies and a sustainable framework of
financial regulation. The thesis showed that weak economic fundamentals and cross-
border bank linkages might increase the vulnerability of a country to sudden shifts in
investors’ sentiment. This finding indicates a need for policies that address weak eco-
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nomic fundamentals. At the same time, it provides a rationale for supervising banks
at the supranational level in order to oversee their activities across borders. An impor-
tant step in this respect was the implementation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism
(SSM) in the euro area. In addition, the creation of new rules for bank resolution
under the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) are useful to break the link between
sovereigns and banks through the removal of explicit and implicit government guaran-
tees.
Furthermore, many countries have updated their regulatory and supervisory struc-
tures, which now incorporate the use of macroprudential policy. The findings of this
thesis imply that a comprehensive regulatory framework should take into account the
potentially stabilizing (or destabilizing) effect of any macroprudential instrument espe-
cially during financial downturns. Referring to previous conclusions, macroprudential
policy should be coordinated with other policies such as monetary and fiscal policy at
the national and international level. In addition, complementarities and inconsistencies
between the macroprudential and the microprudential sphere of banking supervision
should be taken into account.
This thesis focused on the key insights from the financial crisis and the economic
consequences of actual policies. Consequently, less emphasis was put on the benefits
such as improved risk-sharing possibilities that are likely to arise from economies being
more financially integrated. Regulation and policies should be designed in a way that
they address market failures and externalities but do not attenuate the benefits from
financial integration. A badly designed regulation might undermine market discipline
or prevent financial institutions from providing their key intermediary function, that
is, from efficiently allocating funds to productive investments. Another issue is that
the effectiveness of regulation might be impaired by gaps in the regulatory perimeter.
Entities such as shadow banks might shift their activities to unregulated parts of the
financial system putting them at the risk of fragility. While these challenges were not
discussed in this thesis, they certainly are interesting avenues for further research.
In conclusion, it is important to develop further understanding of how effective
different policies and new regulations actually are and how they interact with each
other. This is particularly important because international financial markets are sub-
ject to continuous change, and the sources of future financial fragility might yet be
unknown. Therefore, academic research and policy analysis should keep accompanying
the regulatory debate.
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